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CROSSINGS

*A QUARTERLY REVIEW
to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

GEORGES BERNANOS • JOHN HENRY NEWMAN
BALANDIER • SALOMON • STEFANINI

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BROTHER MARTIN

GEORGES BERNANOS

An introductory note by Albert Béguin

The following pages are all that Bernanos wrote of a book on Luther. Until very recently this essay appeared to be definitely lost. In 1943 the author, exiled in Brazil, had read it to a Benedictine friend, Dom Paul Gordan. As a matter of fact he later told this friend that the manuscript had been mislaid. But just a few days ago Pedro Octavio Carneiro, the present owner of the house LA CROIX DES AMES, where Bernanos lived at Barbacena in Brazil, brought me some sixty manuscript notebooks which remained there. Here are drafts of letters, of articles and of books, various notes, a treatise on horsemanship, fragments which are often undecipherable—all the exhausting labor of the man in scraps as pathetic as his destiny itself. Among this flotsam two little notebooks with colored covers, like those that are distributed to Brazilian students (complete with the national anthem and many flags on the back), contain the rough copy and a fair copy of LUTHER, or at least of its beginning. What is printed here is taken from the fair copy in the author's hand.

Georges Bernanos is best known for his novels dealing with the psychology of sanctity. The following article appeared first in *ESPRIT* (October, 1950), and because of its unusual background the special introduction by M. Albert Béguin, editor of *ESPRIT*, is also included.

Bernanos seems to have been haunted for a long time by the figure of the German reformer. He was drawn toward Luther by a taste for the mystery of beings, by a natural sympathy for great rebels, and by compassion toward souls wandering in darkness. He certainly felt no attraction toward the Reformation. As for that, he felt himself, as he wrote to Amoroso Lima (*ESPRIT*, 1950), "with all his coarse nature, too grossly at ease in obedience and in discipline." But one will recall in *THE DIARY OF A COUNTRY PRIEST* the dialogue between the curé of Torcy and the little priest of Ambricourt:

"Well, I've had my troubles like everyone else. . . . Why at that time I understood Luther. He could feel things, too. And in that dead-alive monastery at Erfurt, I'm certain he was madly thirsting for justice. . . . But Almighty God doesn't like us to meddle with His justice, and His wrath is rather too much for poor devils like us. It intoxicates, makes us worse than beasts. So after he'd made the cardinals shake in their shoes, in the end old Luther took his mash round to the trough of the German princes, and a nice lot they were. . . . Take a look at Luther's death mask. Nobody would believe that bloated old fellow with a fat under-lip had once been a monk. Even though in essentials he was just, his ire had poisoned him by degrees; it had turned to unhealthy fat, that's about all."

"Do you pray for Luther?" I asked.

"Every day," he answered. "And besides my name is also Martin."

And so Bernanos made the strongest and best-balanced of his priest characters pray for Luther. There is no doubt that he dreamed about Brother Martin somewhat as at certain times he dreamed about Hitler (he often compared the two). In Bernanos' eyes (see *LES ENFANTS HUMILIÉS*) Hitler was a deceived child, a man who "realized only the dreams of his maturity." Pastor André Dumas divined truly, and expressed a regret which is revived by the pages printed here, when he wrote in 1949 (*GEORGES BERNANOS, Cahiers du Rhône*, page 168): "We miss in the books of Bernanos a reconstruction of the boyhood of Luther, as he so extraordinarily sketched the boyhoods of Maurras, Pétain and Hitler. Undoubtedly we would find there, as in the description of the old vagabond of Munich, a horror blended with compassion before the intuition of Luther who, having laid bare the spiritual desert of the Vatican of his time, then turned to the advantage of his revolt his intuition of the religious thirst of the German people whom he loved like his own flesh."

This evocation of the "humiliated boyhood" of Luther, Bernanos would certainly have attempted if his book had not been abandoned. What remains, and this seems to me to be Bernanos at his best, allows us to catch a glimpse at least of the point of view from which he intended to approach the hidden life of Luther, whom he imagined as saved ("stolen from Hell") by a divine "stratagem". For him it was a question of the scandal and of the mystery, the one inseparable from the other, which is offered to every Christian by the spectacle of a visible Church endlessly involved in the density of historic existence. And it is not the least scandal, nor the least mystery, that the one who is scandalized so easily finds himself one day overwhelmed like Lamennais or exiled from the Church like Luther. Who would dare to say that today this tragic adventure threatens no one and that there cannot again occur one or other of those ruptures in which ardent souls are decided precisely by the lack of understanding or by the impression of solitude? Bernanos at least, drawing a strange lucidity from his grieving conscience, can help us understand what takes place when despair takes possession of the most solid hearts and hurls them into rebellion. Something rather more than the courage of optimists is necessary to suffer THROUGH the Church at a time when appearances lead men to believe that the Church is not with those who suffer.

FOR many months now I have wanted to write these pages. But for more months still, for years even, I have never written what I am most anxious to write. This is undoubtedly a great grace, perhaps the greatest which God has given me. Now that the moment of setting to work has come, the time of desire is past and love is dead—in appearance at least, for it sometimes seems to me that it has only withdrawn to the depths of my being, to the last recesses of my consciousness. I do not love a book when I begin to write it, but I desire it with an invincible will and, if without being ridiculous I may use such an expression of works as modest as my own, with a tragic will, a naked will reduced to bare essentials like a landscape left stark by the sun. Yes, when I begin to write a book there is always a period when I am detached from it, but I write precisely to rediscover, whatever the cost, the lost source and the movement of soul of which it is born.

In the hour before his first experience of battle a young soldier who wishes to do well is uneasy about many things which he forgets the moment he has crossed the barricade. American war correspondents who, to please movie fans and perhaps also to salve the self-love of the cowardly, borrowed from elementary manuals of neuropathy a bewildering psychology of the combatant, will undoubtedly believe I am trying to say that he thinks about nothing. Not at all. He thinks about everything except what he was thinking about five minutes before, and the last anxiety to lay hold of him is to strike an attitude in the face of death. He is anxious to know, for example, if he is carrying out his orders exactly, he worries about breaking formation, or he asks himself if at the next pause he will open his reserve provisions without authorization. And this detachment is less heroic than it sounds. It proves only that the combatant has a solid military training, that under fire he loses the taste for self-observation in order to rediscover the humble professional reflexes of the good soldier, ever careful to keep out of the guard house.

I have no fear of the guard house, but it is true that in beginning this book I have almost forgotten what preoccupied me just the other day. I am ashamed to be thinking now much less about what I am going to write than about the way in which I am going to write it. To speak to Catholics is always a dangerous undertaking, and it appears more and more so to a poor devil like myself who belongs in no sense to the teaching body of the Church. Now I do not want the reader to believe that I experience toward the teaching Church anything like the feelings of an empiric or a bonesetter toward the licensed physician. It is not the diploma which makes the priest, it is the sacrament. I have heard enough sermons in my lifetime to be able to imagine what a cultivated unbeliever would make of such a literature. But it is precisely not as a cultured unbeliever that I listen to them. Nine times out of ten I have good reason to find one more mediocre than another, because for me they do not even have the advantage of novelty. What difference does it make? I must place the reader of good will on guard against certain overhasty judgments. There is a mystery in the Church. No one would be able, without ridiculously contradicting himself, to demand of an unbeliever that he believe in the mystery of the Church. But if we see him wandering aimlessly about her do we not have the right to tell him that he is absolutely wasting his time if he lingers over trifles, if he seeks there for anything save Christ? . . . Yes, let him seek Christ there or let him abandon his search. For if he does not seek Christ there, and Christ alone, he will infallibly and despite himself, be the dupe and accomplice of the very mediocrity which has scandalized him from the first. He will become a part of that mediocrity and he ought to condemn himself with it.

NO, IT is not the diploma which makes the priest, it is the sacrament. It is in the name of the sacrament that he teaches. The unbeliever may doubt the reality of the sacrament; it would be wrong for him to reject *a priori* the hypothesis of it. An institution which aspires to the government of souls and the direction of consciences ought to found its right on something other than

the strict capacity of the members of its professional body, and every reasonable man will restrain himself from judging the teaching Church from the same point of view as a Professor at a university judges its doctors and agrégés. If it is true that Christ continues to reveal Himself to the world at every moment of the day and night, it is evident that one can not suppose that this immense infiltration of the Divine would occur by the methods in use at the Rockefeller Institute, thanks to which a rigorously selected personnel initiates tropical populations into the mysteries of hygiene. I mean to say that the great divine plan would not be much compromised by the mediocrity of its instruments. This mediocrity is not only corrected and compensated for there, but perhaps it finds itself absorbed as an inert matter is introduced into the living body, grows from blood and lymph, and itself comes to life.

Within the Church mediocrity perhaps destroys only the mediocre, which thus digests itself like a stomach brought to life by an ulcer. One knows that the gastric juices which finally are fatal for the ulcerous, are nevertheless indispensable for the digestion of the normal man. In what measure does the mediocrity of which I am speaking—and which an observer who is a stranger to our faith distinguishes with difficulty from other forms of mediocrity, when actually, I can assure him, it constitutes a species apart—find itself mysteriously bound to sanctity? Could it be only by the challenge it presents to sanctity? I have already many times cited the phrase, for me unforgettable, of a young Dominican slain at Verdun, Father Clérissac: *To suffer for the Church is nothing; it is necessary to suffer through her.*

I am not a theologian, which is why I guard myself, as against the plague, from literary generalizations on the visible Church and the invisible Church. I fear that these distinctions may be dangerous for all but the specialist, and besides in my case it could evidently only be a question of the visible Church since I mean to speak only of what I see. One cannot deny in the Church the existence of a certain kind of mediocrity, for which I can dispense myself from seeking a name, since it has one which for two thousand years has belonged to the universal vocabulary. There are still pharisees in the Church. Pharisaism continues to circulate in the veins of this great body, and each time that charity grows weak there, the chronic malady results in an acute crisis. Alas, one might wish that my comparison were more exact, for in common medical parlance, the words "acute crisis" soon evoke another word, "fever". But pharisaism is a suppuration without fever, a cold and painless abscess. Undoubtedly the Church is at once human and divine and therefore is not a stranger to any of the vices of man. But assuredly in pharisaism there is a particular kind of evil-doing which tries very cruelly the patience of the saints, while most frequently it serves only to irritate or revolt Christians of my kind. I am suspicious of my indignation, of my revolt. Indignation has never redeemed anyone, but it has probably lost many souls. All the simoniacal bacchanals of sixteenth century Rome would not have been of great profit for the devil if they had not succeeded in the unique coup of hurling Luther into despair and, along with this dauntless monk, two-thirds of unhappy Christendom. Luther and his followers despaired of the Church, and it is a curious fact that one who

despairs of the Church runs the risk of sooner or later despairing of mankind. From this point of view Protestantism appears to me like a compromise with despair.

LIKE my dear country priest I often think about Luther. In one of his books Jacques Maritain gives himself the cruel pleasure of reproducing, several pages apart, two portraits of the Reformation leader. The second shows us an old Luther, the face made painful by a kind of swelling like that of decomposition, the features unrecognizable and almost totally animalized. Jacques Maritain was born a Protestant and perhaps he believed himself to have found in this horrible metamorphosis an irrefutable and dreadful testimony to a spiritual failure probably without equal in history. To what purpose? That this unhappy man, distracted by hatred and caught in the snares of evil from whose fascination he visibly suffers, ended by tragically resembling some of those sodomite cardinals that he denounces—I believe that there is here rather something to make us dream on the mysterious designs of the all-powerful mercy towards this strange man. I prefer to try to understand something of the scenes of a drama whose true dénouement will always remain unknown to us in this world and perhaps also in the next. Who can tell, indeed, where the gentle pity of God will hide those He has snatched from Hell by some irresistible stratagem, to the eternal confusion of the just and the wise.

A moment ago I wrote that the scandal of Renaissance Rome hurled Luther into despair. No doubt that is true only in part. For a monk of his time that sort of *danse macabre* had nothing about it to disconcert either reason or conscience, and the awaited inevitable end found itself inscribed in stone upon the portals of cathedrals. The people of the Church would have willingly tolerated his joining his voice to so many other more illustrious or more saintly voices which never ceased to denounce these disorders. The unhappiness of Martin Luther was to aspire to reform. Let us be prepared to understand the precise distinction. I wish to write nothing in these pages which may not be directly accessible to any man of good faith, whether he is a believer or an unbeliever. When I speak of the mystery of the Church, I mean to say that there are certain particularities in the interior life of this great body which believers and unbelievers may interpret in different ways, but which are in themselves facts of experience. It is, for example, a fact of experience that one reforms nothing in the Church by ordinary means. Whoever pretends to reform the Church by these means, by the very means through which one reforms a temporal society, not only fails in his undertaking, but infallibly ends by finding himself outside the Church. I say that he finds himself outside the Church before anyone takes the trouble of excluding him. I say that he excludes himself by a sort of tragic fatality. He renounces the Church's spirit, he renounces her dogmas, he becomes her enemy almost without his own knowledge, and if he tries to return each step only separates him the more. It seems as if his very good will itself is accursed. This, I repeat, is a fact of experience that everyone can verify for himself if he will only take the trouble of studying the lives of heresiarchs great and small. One reforms the Church only by suffering for her.

One reforms the visible Church only by suffering for the invisible Church. One reforms the vices of the Church only by being prodigal of the example of her most heroic virtues. It is possible that St. Francis Assisi was not less revolted than Luther by the debauchery and by the simony of prelates. It is even certain that he suffered more cruelly because of them, for his nature was very different from that of the monk of Weimar. But he did not challenge the iniquity, he did not try to confront it with himself. He hurled himself into poverty, plunged into it as deeply as he could, along with his followers, as into the source of all purity. Instead of trying to snatch from the Church her ill-gained goods, he overwhelmed her with invisible treasures, and under the gentle hand of this mendicant the heap of gold and of luxury began to blossom like an April hedge. Oh, I know well enough that in these matters comparisons are not of much worth, especially when they are not free from a touch of humor. May I be permitted to say, nevertheless, in order to be better understood by some readers, that the Church has need not of critics, but of artists? . . . In the great crises of poetry what matters is not to denounce bad poets, nor worse still to hang them, but to write beautiful verses, to reopen the sacred sources.

THE Church has need not of reformers, but of saints. Martin Luther was the reformer born. There are reformers whose tragic destiny seems explicable to us, Lamennais for example. It is well known that Lamennais was broken like a cord stretched beyond the breaking point. An old friend of Pius XI told me that this Pope had a sort of devotion to poor Féli. Undoubtedly he would not have shown the same compassion for Luther, for the Pope and the monk, both inflexible, resembled one another in too many ways ever to have been capable of taking pity on one another. Oh, it is not that Lamennais appears to me to deserve any but a rather disdainful compassion. If it had depended only on this frail little Breton with his piercing logic, at once implacable and tender, his naive and sublime eloquence, at times rather silly—who makes us think of the well-executed exercise of the schoolboy but writes with all the blood of a man's heart—the immense disaster of the Church with the working class would probably have been avoided. When this gaunt man, dark and bent, consumed by illness, from his bench in the Chamber, with the cavernous voice of one in agony hurled the prophetic cry, "Woe to the poor", he announced at the same time Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini or Franco, the men of the monopolies and of the trusts. He opened to our view the doors of the great charnel houses. No, this was certainly not a man without means and without defense. He was only born too nervous, too sensitive, with the vanity of a woman or of a poet. He was made for despair, even as a beautiful vase is made for the liquid which must fill it. He filled himself to the brim with despair. But Luther, Martin Luther, he was rather made for joy, the rude joy of manual labor, of daily work, of the load borne on the shoulders, or tossed off with a thrust of the loins. Yes, this was a man who had nothing to do with beautiful vases, but rather with the peasant's jug, one of those jugs of heavy clay, honey-colored, into which one draws from a cask of—what does it matter?—cider, beer, brandy, Ah well, this strong man held out no longer than the other. He too became infatuated

with himself. We have seen him take the bit in his teeth, like a drayhorse which has set its huge hoof in a wasp's nest. He took off kicking clumsily with his four hooves, belly to the ground. And when he came to a halt—not out of weariness certainly, but to see where he was, to recover his breath, to smell out his wounds—the old Church was already far behind him, at an immense distance, incalculable, separated from him by all of eternity, and he—ah, rage, stupefaction, heart-rending misfortune.

IF THE censor or reformer of the Church never confronted anyone except those whose errors or crimes he is denouncing, he would run no great risk. . . . The censured ordinarily know their own worth; their consciences ordinarily find themselves secretly at one with the censor. The practice of evil in fact does not always abolish the conscience. Very frequently it has the result of increasing the sensitivity of the conscience, like living tissue laid bare by acid. It is the desire for Good that evil little by little destroys in us, but it is prevented from destroying with it the nostalgia for that Good of which we are no longer capable. On the contrary it nourishes it and cultivates it, for it is already the root of despair—of that despair which alone is capable of completing our destruction by snatching us from God. All those popes, those monks, those cardinals of the Renaissance too openly affronted the judgment of men not to preserve, in the depths of their indomitable souls, the fear of the judgment of God. Besides they well knew that this carnival of nepotism, lust, and simony would have its end, that the Church would go from one trial to another, and that to the crisis of cynicism sooner or later would succeed a hypocritical moralism, as the cold succeeds the heat. In provoking the anger of those that St. Catherine of Siena called demons incarnate Luther perhaps risked his life, but not his soul. But he raised up against himself at the same time all the scattered mediocrities—at one stroke mediocrity was brought to ferment, to boil and to hiss like new wine in the vat.

Oh, doubtless I will be accused of attempting here the rehabilitation of Luther. What does it matter? It is not for the pharisees but against them that I am speaking. I care about their anger like a fish about an apple. I have always believed—without attempting to force anyone to believe it with me—that the great heresiarchs who have ravaged the Church could as well have become her glory, that they were chosen, separated, marked out for an extraordinary destiny, a marvelous adventure. Logically then I am also obliged to believe that they have received priceless graces, that they have dissipated them, that they have thrown to the wind or lost in vain disputes immense and incalculable spiritual riches which would perhaps have sufficed to satisfy innocent Christendom for centuries. . . . One is perfectly free to imagine that if the little Jew named Saul had not one evening rolled in the dust on the road to Damascus, his face streaming with shame, remorse, love and tears, he would have ended his life in some obscure village synagogue. But one is also free to dream that he might have been the heresiarch of heresiarchs, more formidable by himself than Nestorius, Arius and Luther taken together, for he was like fire itself which either warms or consumes, purifies or destroys. Certainly the trial which

destroyed the monk of Erfurt would also have been able to save him—it was his downfall or his glory. And when one reads certain pages of his correspondence—but what Catholic has ever read Luther's correspondence? A worthy pupil of the Jesuit fathers would surely expect to be regaled there by coarse jests addressed to Katharina von Bora by this unfrocked libertine. One would readily understand that he would know nothing of the fatal dilemma which dominated Luther's life and that more than once alas, at least in his youth, he was tempted to obey the gentle voice which spoke to his heart and lovingly pressed him to remain humble and docile in the accomplishment of his task, like a little stone in the hands of the Most High, taken up today, rejected tomorrow. What did this voice say? Dear God, that is perhaps too rash a question to ask—but, no matter. . . .

“MY SON, Martin,” it undoubtedly murmured in the silence of the soul “I have placed this bitterness within you. Take care! It is with me, through me, in me, that you suffer over the miserable condition of my Church. Do not go and prevail over this suffering before me. Besides, those who love me a thousand times more than you are as yet capable of loving me do not feel it to the same degree, or hardly feel it at all. What revolts your conscience appears to them only like a dream, a bad dream from which they turn away when they will because they live in another world. But as for you, I have strongly marked your place in the world, I have made you of solid and heavy matter, an earthy man. I will hurl you against other men as earthy as yourself, men made of the same material, so that they may feel the force of your blows, for it is through you, if you are faithful to me, that I have resolved to break their pride and avenge my people whose souls they have put up for sale. But do not deceive yourself, brother Martin. This task is neither the greatest nor the highest. It is made to your measure and that is all. I have given you health, strength, popular eloquence, and a genius for controversy almost equal to that of my son Augustine. These are not, understand, the preferred arms of my saints. They will serve you only for clearing away, grubbing up and rooting out the rotten stumps. Oh, my son Martin, what I have given you is nothing compared to what I hold in store for you if you do not escape from my hands. Think on my apostle Paul whom you love so much. He too was an earthy man, violent, rash and argumentative. How I had to soften and break in his soul! Remember what I said of him in a vision to that Ananias of Damascus. Poor Ananias was none too eager to go to find Saul. For him it was a bit like throwing himself into the jaws of the wolf: Lord, I know what evil he has done to thy saints, and now he has received authority from the chief priests to bind all who invoke thy name. And then I replied, Go thy way, for this man is to me a vessel of election, for I will show him what great things he must suffer for my name's sake—*quanta oporteat eum pro nomine meo pati*.

Pro nomine meo pati. When you read that today, you naturally think only on the unhappy martyrdom of Paul, offering his head to the executioner. Brother Martin, believe me he gave it with an open heart, not only to do my will, but because he had suffered much, because he was weary of living and of

suffering. There are men, brother Martin, whom I have allowed to suffer wisely, even tranquilly, without struggling, as in the hands of a barber. But as for Paul, he was made to kick against the goad—*durum est tibi contra stimulum calcitrare*. There is no goad whose prick he did not test, not excepting that of the flesh, and when I finally allowed him to die, he no longer even had the strength to kick. He was like one of those old solitary wolves, broken by blows, bathed in blood, who at each new thrust of the spear can do no more than slowly turn toward the steel a stare already glassy, but inflexible. Oh, after so many centuries you form, you others, a very singular idea of that distant epoch!—From the beginning my Church has been what it is still, what it will be down to the last day, the scandal of the strong in spirit, the deception of the weak in spirit, the test and the consolation of interior souls who seek there for nothing but myself. Yes, brother Martin, who seeks me there will find me there, but it is necessary to seek me out, and I am better concealed than one thinks, or than some of my priests would have you believe,—harder to discover than in the little stable of Bethlehem for those who go not humbly toward me, behind the Magi and the shepherds. For it is true that palaces have been built for me, with endless galleries and peristyles, magnificently illuminated by day and by night, peopled with guards and with sentinels. But to find me there, as on the old road of Judea buried under the snow, the most malicious has still only to ask me what alone is necessary for him: a star and a pure heart. In the time of St. Paul, brother Martin, neither more nor less than today, you would have seen in my infant Church things to make you hang your great head and roll your shoulders, like a bull tormented by flies. Think then. After fifteen centuries one can see everywhere people who flatter themselves that they are better than others, because they belong to me. One would think I have chosen them for their fine figures or their beautiful souls. Poor children! They wear their faith proudly among the unbelievers. Sticking out their chests, they have the air of believing that the faith is given for merit, for seniority, or for some splendid achievement—like the Legion of Honor. Ah well, if these people are very proud of occupying a choice place in the Church, it is not difficult to imagine the pride of certain baptized Jews who saw me with their own eyes, or believed they saw me, on my journeys through Galilee—who could style themselves of my people, of my kindred. Don't believe that they gave a good welcome to St. Paul when he began to preach that a baptized Gentile, a *goy*, one who had never set foot in Jerusalem, who had never left his own idolatrous country, belonged to me neither more nor less closely than one of the circumcized. . . ."

Translated by ERWIN W. GEISSMAN

THE FACT OF COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

GEORGES BALANDIER

ONE of the most outstanding events of the recent history of humanity is the expansion of most of the European peoples across the globe; it has entailed the subjection—when it was not a matter of the disappearance—of almost all the peoples that are called backward, archaic, or primitive. Nineteenth century colonialism is the most important form taken by this European expansion, with the heaviest consequences. It collided brutally with the history of the peoples that it subjected, and in establishing itself, imposed on these peoples a very special kind of situation. This situation, which is represented by the fact of colonialism, presents problems to the subjected people—who respond to them to the degree that a certain lee-way is allowed them—to the administration which represents the so-called protecting nation (and defends its local interests), and to the freshly-created state on which all the liabilities of colonialism still weigh. Whether as a current situation, or one in the course of liquidation, colonialism brings up some specific problems which ought to provoke the attention of the sociologist. This post-war period has demonstrated the urgency and importance of the colonial problem in its entirety; it is characterized by difficult attempts at reconquest, by more or less conditional emancipations and concessions; it announces a technician phase of colonization as a follow-up to the political-administrative phase.

Only a few years ago a rough but significant estimate was that colonial territories covered one third of the globe's surface, and that 700,000,000 individuals, out of a total population of two billion, were subject peoples¹; up to a very recent period, if we exclude China and Japan, the major part of non-white populations have known only a dependent status controlled by one of the European colonial powers. These subjected peoples, spread out in Asia, Africa, and Oceania, are all of cultures called "backward", or pre-machine; they comprise the field of research in the interior of which anthropologists and ethnologists have been and still are operating. And the scientific knowledge that we have of these colonial peoples is largely due to the works undertaken by these men. In principle such works could not (or ought not) overlook a fact as important as that of colonization, which for a century or more has imposed a certain type of evolution on these subject populations; it would seem impossible that account would not be taken of the concrete conditions in which the recent history of these people unfolded. Nevertheless, it is only in a very unequal manner that anthropologists took into consideration that precise context which the fact of

Georges Balandier has written considerably on Africa, attempting to combine the perspectives of the sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist. The present essay appeared in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE. Vol. XI (1951).

colonialism implies; we will have the opportunity of demonstrating this in a study now in preparation. On one hand there were investigators who were obsessed by the pursuit of the ethnologically pure, the unaltered fact miraculously preserved in its primitive state, or researchers exclusively interested in theoretical speculation who meditated on the destiny of civilisations or the origins of society; on the other hand, there were all those engaged in multiple practical inquiries, of limited scope, who were satisfied with a convenient empiricism that scarcely went beyond the level of a technique. Between these extremes there is all the difference between what is called cultural and what is called applied anthropology. From one side the colonial situation is rejected because it is disturbing or it is viewed only as one of the causes of cultural changes; on the other extreme it is considered only under certain of its aspects—those most obviously concerning the problem that is being studied—and is not seen acting as a whole. Nevertheless, any *present* study of colonized societies that aims at a knowledge of existing reality and not at historical reconstruction, that desires a comprehension which does not sacrifice specificity for the convenience of a dogmatic schematisation, can be made only by reference to that complex that we have called the colonial fact.

Among the recent works undertaken in France, only those of O. Mannoni give an essential place to the specifically colonial aspect of the situation.² But, careful to keep himself uniquely on the psychoanalytical level, Mannoni gives only a very imprecise definition of this idea; he presents it as a lack of understanding, as a misconception, and consequently analyzes the complexes which characterise the colonizing and the colonized groups and which help us to understand the relations which they both maintain.³ This is insufficient. Mannoni seems to recognize it when he points out that "the (capital) importance of economic relations should not be underestimated"; moreover, he admits choosing a badly located aspect of the colonial situation. Inversely, we will have a prejudice in favor of a total viewpoint, since we think that there is deception involved in retaining only one of the implications of this situation.

IT IS possible to grasp such a situation, created by the colonial expansion of the European nations in the course of the last century, while starting from different points of view. There are as many individual approaches as there are insights of varying orientation that may be made by the historian of colonization, the economist, the politician and administrator, the sociologist who is preoccupied by the accounts of foreign civilizations, the psychologist who is interested in racial relations, etc. It seems indispensable, before attempting an over-all description, to examine what may be retained from each of these particular contributions.

The historian looks at colonization in its different periods and as an action of the colonial power; he helps us see the changes that have taken place between it and the dependent territories; he shows us how the isolation of the colonized peoples has been shattered by the movement of a History in which the latter have not yet taken their place; he recalls the ideologies which have justified colonization in different periods and made for the creation of the "role"

adopted by the colonist, the discrepancy between theory and facts; he presents us with the administrative and economic systems which have assured "colonial peace" and permitted a situation in which the colonial enterprise could produce revenue for the home country. In short, the historian makes us understand how the presence of the colonial power has been inserted, in the course of time, in the very center of the native societies. In this way he furnishes the sociologist a primary and indispensable ensemble of references; he reminds him, at the same time that he recalls the different aspects taken by this foreign presence, that the history of this colonized society has taken place as a function of alien pressure.

The majority of historians has insisted on the fact that the pacification and equipping of colonial countries, as well as the beginning of production in them, have taken place "invariably according to the interests of the western nations, and not in terms of any plan for taking care of local interests . . . letting the needs of native producers take a secondary position."⁴ They have shown how much the absorption by Europe of Asia, Africa and Oceania, in less than a century, "has transformed, sometimes by force and sometimes by reckless reforms, the harmony of human society"; to what degree such convulsions were made necessary by "colonial imperialism which is only one of the manifestations of economic imperialism."⁵ They have reminded us that economic exploitation depended on political possession—these are the two characteristic traits of the colonial fact.⁶ In this way the historians give us a chance to understand to what extent the colonized society is an instrument in the hands of the colonial power; we can note an indication of this instrumental character in the political strategy which consists in compromising the native aristocracy by making it an interested party. As Lyautey said, "Involve the ruling class in our interests",⁷ reducing the native chiefs to the role of what R. Kennedy calls "simple pawns". Even better examples of these tactics are the displacements of population or the recruiting of manual labor while considering only the needs of the economy of the mother country.⁸ By reminding us of certain "bold" measures—displacement of populations and the strategy of creating specially limited areas for the native populations, called "reserves"; transformation of traditional rights and the calling into question of all valuable property, the strategy of efficiency, etc.—the historian draws our attention to the fact that "colonization was sometimes truly social surgery".⁹ This indication, the value of which varies according to the regions and the peoples under discussion, is of great interest for the sociologist studying the colonized societies; it shows him that in varying degrees they are in a state of hidden crisis, and that to a certain degree a socio-pathology is involved. There is here an invaluable indication which reveals the special character of the sociology of colonized peoples and suggests the practical and theoretical results that might be expected from such a discipline; moreover, this important aspect will be encountered again at later stages of our analysis.

But after reminding us of this exterior pressure weighing on colonized societies, the historian points out to us the diversity of the resulting responses; the differing attitudes of the peoples of the Orient, of Islam and of Africa have been frequently evoked in comparative studies. Thus in a general way the "closing up" of oriental civilizations, in spite of the externals of westernization may be con-

trasted with the tense relations with Islam which does not surrender the feeling of its superiority and maintains a "competition which can be silent and veiled, but which always remains the heart of the problem". A further contrast can be made with the "openness" of the Negro world which can be explained by the "readiness of the African to imitate", and a lack of "confidence in the deep resources of invention".¹⁰ Within a more particular case, the history of Africa, the colonial continent par excellence, reveals important differences, even within the African alone, of resistance to the ascendancy of European nations. The history of colonization, after having demonstrated to us the importance of the "external factor" as to the transformations affecting the colonized societies, reminds us of the "internal factor", implied by the social structures and civilizations of the subdued peoples; there it emerges at a level where the anthropologist finds again his familiar horizons. But by making an outline of the different reactions to the fact of colonialism, we see to what a degree this response can be revelatory, and colonization appears as a test imposed on certain societies, or, if we may risk the expression, a rough sociological experiment. An analysis of colonized societies cannot forget these specific conditions; they reveal not only the process of adaptation and resistance, as some anthropologists have noted,¹¹ the innovations of behavior that arose from the destruction of traditional social models (what Anglo-Saxon authors call "patterns"), but they also make clear the "points of resistance" of colonized societies, the fundamental structures and conduct—they make us touch the hard core of their social existence. Such a knowledge presents a certain theoretical interest (if the fact of colonialism is considered as a matter that can be taken up by scientific observation, independently of the moral judgments that it suggests) and a real practical importance, since it shows which are the fundamental factors that must be taken into consideration in taking up the whole problem.

THE historian reveals how the colonial system was established and was transformed, what the different political, juridical and administrative aspects of this process were; he allows us, in addition, to locate the ideologies that have justified it.¹² Numerous studies insist on the contradiction between the principles put forward, one after the other, and the actual practice; between the "civilizing mission" (an expression which, under its particularly emphatic form, may be traced to Napoleon III) and the desired *usefulness* that Eugene Etienne, a colonist of Oran, defined in 1894 as "the sum of advantages and profits that ought to go to the mother country from every colonial enterprise".¹³ H. Brunschwig recalls, in his history of French colonisation, the long series of misconceptions—or rather, lies—which dot its course; L. Joubert brings to mind "the contradiction which existed, ever since the adoption of formulas regarding the responsibilities of bringing civilization, between the theory and the facts; the rupture between these two domains, or the hypocrisy which justified a pure and simple exploitation by humanitarian principles".¹⁴ Thus the complexus we call colonialism seems to lack, in an essential way, the character of authenticity; it constantly seeks to justify itself by an ensemble of pseudo-reasons. R. Kennedy shows how each characteristic of colonialism—color line, political dependence, economic

dependence, almost non-existent social accomplishments, lack of contact between natives and the "dominant caste"—depend on a "series of rationalizations": the superiority of the white race, the incapacity of the natives to govern themselves properly, the despotism of the traditional chieftains; the temptation of the actual political leaders to set themselves up as a "dictatorial clique"; the incapacity of the natives to develop the natural resources of their territories; the mediocre financial resources of the colonial countries; the necessity of maintaining prestige, etc.¹⁵ With the help of such indications the sociologist sees to what degree the colonizing European society has been animated by doubtful doctrine whose historical development can be followed, and is condemned to inauthentic behavior, because it is bound to a certain image of the native. Elsewhere, we have directed attention to this fact;¹⁶ there is no valid sociology of colonized peoples without giving this attention to the ideologies and to the more or less stereotyped behavior that they imply.

The historian reminds us how colonized societies at present are the product of a double history. For example, the Africans have their own history—"these societies, so stable, so motionless in appearance, are all, or almost all the result of the varying combinations of peoples that history has thrown together or superimposed on each other"¹⁷—which has established relations, either by domination or assimilation, of homogenous social forms",¹⁸ and another history largely conditioned by European domination "which has brought together radically dissimilar social forms"¹⁸ and indicates a movement of "disintegration". Ch. A. Julien writes that "three forces have disintegrated Africa: administration, missions, and a new economy."¹⁹ An actual study of these societies can be made only by situating them in relation to this double history. It is customary to recall, in a rather schematic manner, that colonization has taken place by the action of three forces that were strictly tied together—historically associated, as R. Montagne noted while indicating that "the missionary effort has been historically linked to an expansion of Europe, whether under a commercial, political or military form"²⁰—which have been experienced as connected by those who have undergone it. These forces are the economic, the administrative, and the missionary, and it is by virtue of these factors that anthropologists have habitually studied "social changes". But in order to characterize modern European colonization, and explain its appearance, certain historians have been led to emphasize one of these aspects, the economic: Ch. A. Julien notes in an article on this point that "colonial imperialism is only one of the manifestations of economic imperialism".²² Here the historian uncovers, from another point of view, a path which is indispensable to the understanding of the fact of colonialism.

IT WAS at least partially on economic reasons that the policy of expansion built its propaganda. In 1874 P. Leroy-Beaulieu showed the necessity for France to become a colonial power; in 1890 J. Ferry wrote, "The colonial policy is the daughter of the policy of industrialization . . . the colonial policy is an international manifestation of the laws of concurrence . . ." ²³ It is for economic reasons that colonial powers justify their presence—the increased productivity

and the equipment installed constitute acquired rights—and it is the economic advantages that are given up last, even when more or less genuine formulas of political independence have been accepted. Even before the studies of Marxist writers, certain analyses consecrated to “imperialism” had revealed its economic character.²⁴ From the Marxist point of view, Lenin was the first to give, in the celebrated work *Imperialism, the final stage of capitalism*, a systematic theory; Ch. A. Julien is essentially repeating it when he writes that “the colonial policy was born of monopoly, of the exportation of capital and the search for economic zones of influence”.²⁵ Under the forms of colonization or economic protectorate, a Marxist finds the same reality, which, since it is tied to capitalism, ought to disappear with it. The strict ties existing between capitalism and colonial expansion have led certain non-Marxist writers to link up the colonial question to the social question in general, and to declare (like J. Guitton) “that they are not substantially different, for the relationship of mother country and colony is not different from that of capital and labor, or in more general terms what Hegel called the master-servant relationship”.²⁶ P. Reuter, noting the possible identification of colonized peoples with the proletariat, writes that “it is a question in both these cases of a population which produces all the wealth, and is excluded from all political and economic advantages, and is constituted as an oppressed ‘class’”.²⁷ For a Marxist, there is, no doubt, this identification; politically, it justifies the combined action of the proletariat and the colonized peoples; J. Stalin has consecrated many studies to the colonial question, and after having shown that “Leninism has destroyed the wall which separated whites and blacks, Europeans and Asiatics, the ‘civilised’ and ‘non-civilised’ slaves of imperialism”, he recalls that “the Revolution of October has begun a new age, the age of colonial revolutions in the oppressed countries of the world, in alliance with the proletariat, under the direction of the proletariat”.²⁸ The colonized peoples themselves place more emphasis on the economic aspect of their position than on the political; an African journalist from the Gold Coast writes in this regard: “. . . the nations whose economic power is preponderant are precisely the same as those whose political authority is most important . . . up to the present the authorities have made no effort to encourage the native populations of the colonies to attain an economic level corresponding to their political advancement”.²⁹ Without accepting the reduction of the colonial situation to its economic manifestations alone, the sociologist who is really striving to understand and to interpret the colonized societies ought to recognize the importance of such indications. They should suggest to him that it is not only the contacts of a technical civilisation with a pre-technical one that explain the structure of the societies; they may recall to him that the colonial and the colonized societies are in certain relationships—we have especially pointed out the instrumental character of the colonized society—which imply tensions and conflicts. This observation would have been helpful to the theoretical thought of Malinowski; when the celebrated anthropologist established the doctrine of practical anthropology, he affirmed that a “wise” control of the forces of change “could assure a normal and stable development”, and this lack of awareness of the incessant conflicts which the colonial situation contained in itself led him, according to one commentator, to pose the problems in the “most naive terms”.³¹

THE economic aspect of colonialism has been brought to light, in its generalities, by certain anthropologists, and some geographers who are specialists on tropical countries. R. Kennedy has indicated its leading characteristics:³² the search for raw materials by the colonial powers in order to supply the industries of the home country (which explains the mediocre industrial equipment of the colonial territories, when it exists at all);³³ exploitation on the grand scale, with the import-export commerce being in the exclusive hands of certain companies, who are the only ones to profit from it;³⁴ the "distance" which separates the colonial power and the colonized society (which is essentially restricted to peasant activities, manual labor and domestic service) explaining the difficulty for the native of bettering himself economically; the economic stagnation of the native masses.

Among the studies in French, only those on Indo-China have a real fullness, and they are particularly important; they are the work of the geographers Ch. Robequain and P. Gourou (which is a good indication of the way in which French ethnology has fled contact with the here-and-now). The peasants comprise from 90 to 95% of the population of Indo-China, and these studies are essentially centered on the problems of the peasantry. Apart from the importance given first to technical methods (which have either been not at all, or only slightly improved by the colonial power), it is the decomposition of the landed estates, the dispossession from the land, bringing on proletarianization and uprootedness, that has been emphasized. There is also indication—parallel to the movement of dispossession—of the constitution of a bourgeoisie of essentially agrarian origin, born, "like the proletariat, of contact with western civilization and the weakening of traditional values", and whose growth always arises "from the exploitation of the rice fields and from the system of money-lending which is tied to it."³⁷ Observations made in regard to commerce (the native commerce is divided into many small establishments of little importance, while important business and export are in the hands of Europeans or foreigners, Chinese or Hindus) and industry (the stagnation of existing industry and the absence of industries of conversion, the feeble growth of the worker population—since 1890 the average annual growth of the number of workers, according to Ch. Robequain, has been 2500—the low level of their technical training, etc.) confirm the general outline established by R. Kennedy. By starting with such fundamental data P. Naville was able to give, from a strictly Marxist point of view, a precise analysis of the economic and political conditions of the Vietnamese revolution.³⁸

The works relating to Africa, especially Central and South Africa, reveal facts of a similar nature; they are essentially the work of Anglo-Saxon anthropologists, quite legitimately preoccupied with practical anthropology. The situation created in South Africa by the European minority is well known: territorial segregation imposed by the Native Land Act of 1913 (the native areas comprise only 12% of the total surface of the Union), social segregation legalized by the Color Bar Act of 1926 which restricts Negro workers to manual labor, mediocre participation of the Negroes in the national revenue (although they represent 69% of the population, they get only 20% of the national revenue, while the

whites who are 21% of the population, have a 74% share of this revenue), racial and racist bases given for economic and political organization, deep contradictions imposed by a policy of organized segregation—the whites are afraid of being overwhelmed by the Negroes—at the same time that “it has to fight the return to native hand work”,³⁹ and as a result provoke the rural exodus which brings on proletarianization and “detrribalization”. The special situation of South Africa—a caricature in some respects—shows us how much economic, political and racial aspects are strictly tied⁴⁰ and to what degree a study of the present condition of the peoples of the Union could be made only in relation to all of these aspects; here again we grasp that dominating necessity of considering the fact of colonialism as a complexus, a totality.

The Anglo-Saxon anthropologists have given an important place to economic facts considered as one of the principal forces that produce “culture-change”. In her well-known work, *Reaction to Conquest*, Monica Hunter studies the transformations undergone by the Pondo society (South Africa) primarily by virtue of this economic factor, and secondly, of the political factor (“which, historically, is of economic origin no matter what non-Marxists may say”). But these studies, which are already numerous in the realm of Africa alone, are conducted with regard only to the “primitive” economy and social organization, taking into consideration the disturbances brought on by the “modern” economy and the problems which it posed; they fail to refer them to the colonial problem, to the fact of colonialism as such; they do not seem to have the sense of a reciprocity of perspectives existing between the colonized and the colonizing society. The works inspired by Malinowski present these defects at their greatest by evoking only the result of the “contact” between “institutions” of the same nature, scarcely ever going beyond the simple description of transformations and the enumeration of problems. This explains why they are especially attached to the rural aspects of the situation, to the transformations affecting the village and the family, and the problem of the depopulation of the country. In this domain, they have set up revealing outlines of “culture change”: the destruction of the economic unity of the family, predominance of economic values, emancipation of the young generations, installation of a monetary economy which completely upsets personal relations, attack on traditional hierarchies (wealth and rank are no longer always strictly tied), etc. Certain specialised researches—like those related to the standard of living—have been developed, but important facts like new modes of establishing unity, born of the disorganisation of the traditional groupings, the appearance of social classes, the characteristics and the role of the proletariat, etc., are brought up only in very general terms, and the conflicts which they involve are rarely analysed.⁴³

NEVERTHELESS, it is to these latter aspects that the studies inspired by its political and administrative implications, give special attention; in this area, the observations made by the Marxist commentator join those of the high colonial functionary. For different reasons both give their attention to such realities as the degradation of the peasantry, the constant growth of the colonial proletariat, and to the antagonisms to which they are linked. As far as North

Africa and the French African colonies are concerned, we may recall two general studies which complement and confirm each other, one by the geographer J. Dresch and the other by the high commissioner R. Delavignette.⁴⁴ The complementary movements of dispossession ("730,000 rural families are totally deprived of lands and ought to be considered paupers," Dresch writes), the uprooting of the peasantry, and of proletarianization, which may be measured by the accelerated growth of the urban centers, are explained within the framework of local conditions. Moreover, the accent is placed on characteristics proper to the colonial proletariat: "The natives of North Africa are becoming proletarians, colonized proletarians who are restricted to manual labor and are considered equally good or bad for any job. They are simply the servants of an economy of speculation, and constantly menaced by the crises that drought or other changes in the flow of raw materials may provoke." The proletariat, says R. Delavignette, "is the vehicle of racism, it gives class warfare an unheard-of violence by mixing it with racial conflict"; because they feel menaced, some Europeans are tempted "to keep the peasantry in what they consider a primitive state for as long as possible". Such indications show to what degree the colonized society, under its urban as well as under its rural aspect, forms a whole, a system, with the colonizing society, and prove the necessity for every study of one of its elements to refer to this system. They also draw attention to the antagonisms which manifest themselves in the system's very being because of the class structure which asserts itself to the detriment of traditional social structures, and to the conflicts which can only be explained in the framework of the colonial situation. Moreover, the notion of "crisis" is at the center of these preoccupations (Dresch writes of "a crisis which strikes a society, shaking it and destroying it little by little"); they make us emphasize, and perhaps exaggerate, the pathological aspect of the colonized societies that we have already mentioned.

Besides, the role of the administrative and judicial apparatus whose function is to assure colonial domination is frequently given attention, and some critics, after denouncing its high-handedness, recall the action of an organisation "which has separated peoples of the same ethnic origin and social structure, while bringing together different ethnic and social groupings".⁴⁵ Arbitrary divisions and the cutting up of territories by administrative order culminates—or at least aims at—the fragmentation of important ethnic groups, the breaking of any extensive political unity, and the artificial assembling of different or even antagonistic ethnic groups. Certain recent movements among colonized peoples may be explained as a reaction against such a condition, and as the manifestation of a desire to restore a broken unity. In West Africa alone we may recall the protests for unification of Ewé (now split up between French and British Togoland), the attempts at federalism in South Cameroun, the desire—more or less explicit—for reunion shown by the Negro churches, known as Kimbangism, occurring in the Ba-Kongo country (in the Belgian and French Congo). This "balkanization", both created and maintained by the colonial power, the hostility or rivalries between ethnic groups which are either maintained for, or derive from, administrative ends, have imposed a very special history on the colonized peoples, and an understanding of it is indispensable to every sociological analysis. A recent study of the people of Madagascar shows how this

will of preventing the group from achieving unity (through fear of having the question of nationalism posed) is often accompanied by the desire to attack its history (through fear of giving justification to "the pride of being *Malgache*, and again encouraging nationalism").⁴⁶ Here again we discover the ideological domain evoked on several occasions; this perversion of history affects the collective memory which responds with a strong reaction, and we see the importance that such facts can have in the effort to understand the colonized peoples.

IF WE accept these primary considerations it becomes easier to situate and to appreciate the contributions of sociology and social psychology when applied to the study of colonizing and colonized societies. E. A. Walker calls our attention to the fact that colonies constitute plural societies.⁴⁷ He specifies that the colony in general "is composed of a number of groups more or less conscious of their existence, often opposed to each other because of color, who attempt to lead different lives within the limits of a single political framework. . . . Those groups, which speak different languages, eat different food, often are restricted to different occupations which are assigned to them by law or custom, wear different clothes, live in different kinds of houses, cherish different traditions, adore different gods, and have different ideas of good and evil. Such societies are not communities." To these considerations he adds another comment that is pertinent to our analysis when he says of the color-bar that it "translates the world-wide problem of minorities into tropical terms, with the difference that almost everywhere in the colonies the inferior class constitutes the majority."

These observations can furnish a point of departure. The interesting thing is not the mark of pluralism (characteristic of every total society) but the indication of some of its specific traits: the racial basis of groupings, their radical heterogeneity, the antagonistic relations that are maintained and the necessity of co-existence "within the limits of a single political frame-work". Moreover, the attention brought to the fact that the colonizing society is a dominant numerical minority is important; H. Laurentie has defined a "colony" as "a country where a European minority has imposed itself on a native majority of different civilization and behavior; this minority acts on these natives with a vigor disproportionate to their number; it is extremely contagious and corrupting."⁴⁸ This active and corrupting minority rests its domination on an incontestable material superiority (it imposes itself on pre-technical civilisations), on a state of law which has been established to its own advantage, on a system of justification which at bottom is more or less racial (for authors like R. Maunier, the fact of colonialism is first of all a "contact" of races). The more rooted and hostile to fusion this minority is, the more reactionary it will be: thus, in South Africa, the white population "begins to see a minority problem in its position, while the Negroes see a problem of colonialism and guardianship";⁴⁹ it is the same in North Africa. The phrase—"begins to see a minority problem in their position"—is revealing; it reminds us that this numerical minority is not a sociological minority, and risks becoming one only by a violent reversal of the colonial situation.

Some sociologists have already made this observation. While defining a minority and establishing a typology of minorities L. Wirth insisted that this concept was not simply a matter of statistics and he gives the example of Negroes living in the southern United States who are a numerical majority in several states but who nevertheless are a minority insofar as they are socially, politically and economically subordinated; he also uses the example of the situation created by the colonial expansion of European nations who establish the whites as dominant groups and colored peoples as minorities.⁵⁰ The volume of a grouping does not decide its minority status, although it can effect the status and general relations with the dominant group; the characteristic of a minority is a certain manner of existence in the total society; of its essence it implies the relationship of master and servant. We have constantly uncovered evidence of such a relationship in the course of our preceding analysis; for example, in recalling the position of the colonized society as an instrument at the disposal of the colonial power (historical perspective); the relations of the exploiter and the exploited, the kinship that has been established between the relationship of mother country and colony on one hand and capital and labor on another (economic perspective); the relationship of power and submission (political perspective). The minority character (in the sociological sense of the word) of the colonized society shows us sufficiently to what degree it ought to be considered as a function of the other groups that make up the colony—a necessity that we have recalled by indicating, at various instances, the obligation of understanding the colonized society and the colonizing society in reciprocal perspectives. But this does not tell us in what way the colonized society differs from other minorities (like American Negroes) who are placed in different circumstances. The first step that is necessary, therefore, is to specify what the place of the colonized group is in that total society which we call the colony.

IF THE groups that colonialism brings into relations are reviewed in a very schematic manner, from the colonizing society (dominant group) to the colonized society (subject group), we may retain: (a) the colonizing society, excluding white foreigners; (b) white foreigners; (c) the "colored", in the English sense of the term; (d) the colonized society, i.e., all those whom the Anglo-Saxons call the natives. This distinction and hierarchy are based, first of all, on criteria of race and nationality; they imply a sort of postulate: the excellence of the white race, and more precisely that fraction of it represented by the colonizing nation (this supremacy is presented as a fundamental datum established both in history and nature).

This rather rough broad view needs to be filled out. In a chapter devoted to the study of the colonizing society, R. Delavignette gives the following definition, recalling certain general characteristics that we have already encountered: "a society coming from the mother country and with attachments to it", of bourgeois character, constituting a numerical minority and animated by the "idea of heroic superiority" (this doctrine is partially explained by the large number of men and youth in the so-called "surrounded" colonies, or during the first period of colonization). Above all, it is a society whose function it is to

dominate politically, economically and spiritually; it tends to give its members, according to the formula of Delavignette, "the feudal spirit". The important fact is that this dominant society constitutes a numerical minority: the disequilibrium is great between the colonials and the native masses. There is a more or less conscious fear of seeing the hierarchy re-established in terms of the single criterion of mass; this fear becomes stronger during moments of crisis, and explains the most apparently incomprehensible reactions displayed in the recent outbreaks in Madagascar. L. Wirth's appraisal is much too simple when he claims that in the various instances of colonialism the dominant group can maintain its superior position simply by keeping the administrative and military machinery in motion; the disproportion between civilizations is greater than that! In this way he underestimates a number of important aspects of the situation. There are the means by which the dominant group makes itself untouchable: reducing contact to the minimum (segregation), presenting itself as a model while not allowing means of realising this model (assimilation is presented as the condition of equality—because it is known to be impossible or is severely controlled); ideologies justifying its dominant position; political means intended to maintain the disequilibrium in favor of the colonizing society, and of the mother country; and a more or less controlled transfer of these attitudes to certain groups in the colony, influenced by the political-economic domination. The Libano-Syrians of French West Africa are an example of this latter situation (in that area they represent that quarter of the population which the administration terms "European and assimilated"), or the Indians in the Union of South Africa who were not attacked along with the Negroes during the disturbances of 1947, 1948 and 1949. To the very degree that the distance between the civilisations becomes less, the importance of masses becomes greater; force is no longer sufficient to maintain domination and indirect means are more often employed; the aspect of cross-purposes in the colonial situation comes to the fore, whose importance has so struck H. Brunschwig on the level of history, and O. Mannoni on the level of psychoanalysis. These indirect means most often make use, in terms of the specific situation, of racial or religious relations which create conflicts (as in the Indies, during the classical epoch of British colonization). It must be added that the colonizing society is not perfectly homogeneous; it has its factions, its clans—administrators, private citizens, military men, missionaries—worlds which are more or less closed to each other, and more or less rivals (opposition between administrators and missionaries or business men are frequent), having their own native policy (to such a degree that certain English anthropologists have considered each of them an agent of culture-change), giving rise to very diverse reactions. Moreover, the colonizing society is a more or less closed world, and more or less distant from the colonized society—the policy of domination and prestige insist on it—and this does not facilitate mutual understanding and appreciation, but allows, or even makes necessary a facile appeal to stereotypes. Restricted to the colony, this society has in part broken its attachments to the mother country; Delavignette has made this point well in writing of these colonials "Europeans in the colony, in the mother country they are colonials . . . they try to concentrate their energies in a jealous particularism. . ."⁵³

This particularism is expressed, first of all, in their relations with white "foreigners". This latter group represents a minority in the complete sense of the term, both numerically and sociologically; they may have an important economic position, but they are none the less under administrative control. They are suspect precisely because of their nationality; for example, the distrust of foreign missionaries is frequent in colonial lands. The foreigners are often cut off from true colonial society—in French West Africa, the Libano-Syrians are not admitted (with the few exceptions of some extremely wealthy people) in "good society". To the same degree that they are rejected, they regroup themselves in ethnic minorities, and have more real relations with the natives. This greater familiarity, and their position of inferiority, explain the ambivalent reactions of the natives to them (a certain intimacy with nuances of scorn); it is this sort of relation that the Greeks and Portugese⁵⁴ have had with the Libano-Syrians in French West Africa. The resentment of the colonized society can bring itself to bear on these foreigners with a certain impunity; during the riots which touched certain cities of French West Africa from 1945 on, the Libano-Syrian minority was in fact the only group affected. A group like this is one of the most threatened in the whole fragile edifice of this colony which is a total society.

In the ladder of discredit which is attached to various subject groups, the position of the "colored", whether half-breeds or colored foreigners, is the worst; for essentially racial reasons he is rejected both by the colonizers and the natives; he has few contacts with either. He is especially condemned to the isolation (by discriminatory measures) of a foreign community if he has a more obvious economic importance; thus, the Indian problem in South Africa is especially explained by the fact that some Indians "are too rich and surreptitiously invade the positions held by the whites";⁵⁵ the overlapping of facts having to do with race and those of the economic order is again fully clear. For half-breeds, the isolation is still more complete because they constitute a "racial compromise". They succeed in forming a viable society only in exceptional circumstances—that of the "bastards of Rehoboth" in former German South-west Africa is particularly well-known—and by placing a strict fence around it. A. Siegfried noted that the "Cape colored" are thrown "towards the black race with which they do not wish to be confused"; they aim at being assimilated by the colonizing society which remains closed to them (more or less according to local circumstances) or concedes them a personal status⁵⁶ sanctioning their particular position in a legal manner. They are no less a social than a racial compromise; they are hardly to be seen as an instrument of liaison between the colonists and the natives. Their political alliance with the elite of the colonized society has never been lasting—the Conference of Non-Europeans, created in South Africa in 1927 and attempting to unite half-breeds, Indians and Bantus in a common purpose did not bring about effectual action and was of short duration. Because of their superior economic and political position, and because of the racial factor, these "colored" groups are more in conflict than in accord with the colonized society; they are not in a position to be the latter's leaders.

ABOVE all, two facts are striking in regard to the colonized society: its overwhelming numerical superiority⁵⁷ and the radical domination it undergoes; although a numerical majority, it is none the less a sociological minority; according to the phrase of R. Maunier, "colonization is a fact of power"; it involves the loss of autonomy, and a "guardianship of law or of fact."⁵⁸ Each of the sectors of the colonizing society has as its function the assurance of this domination in a precise domain (political, economic, and almost always, spiritual); this domination of the colonized society is absolute because of the absence of advanced technical skills, or of any material power other than that of number; it is expressed by a state of fact (practices may not be codified, but they involve a speedy reprobation if they are not respected) and a state of law. As we have mentioned several times, they are based on an ideology, a system of pseudo-justifications and rationalizations; it has a more or less avowed and open racist foundation. The colonized society undergoes the pressure of all the groups which make up the colony; all have preeminence over it in some area, so that its position of subordination is everywhere felt. The native society is essentially an instrument for the creation of wealth (although in spite of its numbers, it retains only a small fraction of the revenue); in part, this conditions the relations it entertains with other groups (who also draw their economic privileges from it). These relations are not simply those of exploiter and victim because of the lack of unity of the colonized society, and especially because of the radically diversified character of the culture (or rather, of the cultures) that it animates.

The colonized society is divided ethnically; these divisions took place in native history but have been utilized by the colonial power—remember the usefulness of the old principle, divide and conquer—and the situation has been further complicated by the arbitrary division of colonies and the creation of boundaries by administrative decision. These divisions govern the relations of each of the ethnic groups not only with the colonizing society (thus, the peoples who had served as intermediaries at the time of the African treaty and the agencies have tried to shift their role from the economic to the political level and appear to be "militant minorities") but also with the culture this society has brought with it (certain ethnic groups are more "assimilationist", or more traditional than other neighboring groups, partly in reaction against the others' attitude). The colonized society is divided spiritually. Some of these divisions may have taken place before the European colonization, and may be linked to the conquering thrusts of Islam, but we know how the colonizing powers have used them: the tactics of the English domination in the Indies are familiar. In many places colonization has brought with it religious confusion, with Christianity, represented by Christians of different churches, opposing traditional religions. On this point let us quote an African of Brazzaville who recalled "that state of things whose effect was only to create a lamentable confusion of moral development", and who added, "the black man of Africa, whatever he is, has the rudiments of religion; to take these away from him by atheism or by the confusion of imported religious doctrines, is surely to corrupt him."⁵⁹ The author goes so far as to ask the colonizing power to impose a doctrinal unity!

This is an indication of to what a degree these new divisions, added to former differences, are a bitter experience to many. But colonization brought other divisions with it, which may be described as social, and can be traced either to administrative and economic action, or education: the separation between city and country dwellers,⁶⁰ between proletariat and bourgeoisie, between élites (or what another jargon would call "the evolved") and the masses⁶¹, between generations—we have mentioned them and suggested their importance, in the course of our analysis. Each of these factions participates in a different manner in the total society; the contact of races and civilizations that colonization brings with it has neither the same significance nor the same consequences for any of them. Colonization ought to be studied, therefore, in terms of this diversity which it has partially created, but which now partially conditions it.

The colonized society differs from the colonizing society by race and civilization; in these domains, the opposition—indicated by language itself, by opposing primitive and civilized, pagan and Christian, "technical" and "backward" civilizations. What is more evident than the colonial situation as such is the fact that heterogeneous civilizations have been brought into contact with each other; this is what has interested the anthropologists in recent years, especially the shock that it produced, the clash of cultures which the English writers have marked out. We may mention how, starting with that observation, new studies (spoken of in the United States as of acculturation, and in England of culture contact) have developed, with the ambition of attaining in this way the most dynamic aspects of the cultures that have been brought to awareness, perhaps even of unsealing the characteristic traits of every cultural reality. The stages of contact have been specified in a more or less arbitrary and oversimplified manner: conflict, adjustment, and assimilation (or, in reaction, counter-acculturation) have been marked out by North American anthropologists; for R. Maunier, in his *Sociologie coloniale*, they were stages of opposition, imitation (whether from above or below) and aggregation; B. Malinowski speaks of the appearance of a new culture ("the *tertium quid* of contact"), different from those brought together, etc. We will not take up again here the criticisms that these studies and doctrines call for. We mention them in order to show, on one hand, that we cannot consider the relations between the colonizing society and the colonized society only under their economic and political aspects that are often exaggerated by writers who are committed to a specific ideology. We wish to recall, on the other hand, that contact between civilizations takes place within the particular situation we label colonialism, which is transformed historically, and that this contact is made by means of social groups—and not between cultures existing as independent realities—whose reactions are conditioned both internally (according to the type of grouping) and externally. A precise typology of the groups making up this total society, the colony, is the basis of every accurate and comprehensive investigation of this contact of cultures. We have frequently insisted on this necessity by indicating to what degrees sociology had to consider the colonizing society in reciprocal perspectives. In the same way we have suggested, in a previous study, the particular evolution which the fact of colonialism imposes on the socio-cultural data, notably by showing how the crises created by colonization partially direct this evolution.

MOST of the studies that treat of the colonized societies at present insist on the state of crisis which affects them, on the difficult and complex problems which they present; to a greater or lesser degree they are considered sick societies.⁶² This is true to the degree that the colonizing society opposes true solutions, for it certainly seems that as far as the colonized society is concerned, the search for normalcy coincides with the search for its own autonomy. This gives the sociologist an almost clinical method of analysis. In the essay to which we have just referred, we showed to what extent the study of colonized societies from the viewpoint of their specific crises represents "a most advantageous position for analysis . . . the only one by which we may grasp the evolution of the native social structures which have been brought within the complexus of colonialism".⁶³ Such crises place almost the whole society in question, the institutions as well as the groupings and symbols; the various examples of disequilibrium represent so many issues which allow for the introduction of analysis. Through them it is possible not only to grasp the phenomena of contact between the colonizing society and the colonized society, but also to better understand the latter in its traditional forms while they demonstrate certain systematic patterns and certain weaknesses (as we showed in the case of the Fang of Gabon, whose colonial situation encouraged the fractures implicit in their former social structure), or certain irreducible structures or collective representations (thus, the study of the religious crisis and "the Negro churches" that characterize the African Bantu would show what remains of the traditional religions after all the different pressures have weighed against them). Such crises, which affect the whole society in its ensemble, represent so many points of view from which to study that society and the relationships which it entails;⁶⁴ they permit the sort of concrete and complete approach that Marcel Mauss has already recommended. In order to complete the example that has just been given, we mention a recent thesis devoted to the "Negro churches" and the Bantu prophets in South Africa, in which the author, B. G. M. Stukler, shows that the problems posed are not only of a religious order but also bring into question the totality of Bantu reactions to white domination, or that the study of these churches leads to the study of all the social problems that are characteristic of the Union of South Africa.⁶⁵ At first glance these crises are characterized by the radical alteration or disappearance of certain institutions and groups. But sociological analysis could not isolate itself in only these aspects of the social—the institutional or structural side—and record the transformations and disappearances, marking and describing the new creations. It is indispensable that it go further and grasp, in the phrase of G. Gurvitch, the forms of sociability.⁶⁶ For it seems that some methods of association persist even when the structures within which they operated have been changed or destroyed, even when new structures make their appearance by virtue of the fact of colonialism. They are able to co-exist and give the innovations entertained by the colonized society those elements that are both traditional and modern, that ambiguity which has been noted by several observers.

We have frequently alluded to the importance of racial relations, to the racist foundation of the groups, and to the racial coloring taken by the economic

and political facts (the current literature confuses or associates racism and colonialism) in the framework of colonialism. Several authors insist on the interracial character of "human relations in over-seas countries", on the fact that above "political or economic issues which today bring the white race and men of color into opposition, there almost always exists a racial motive", on the fact that society remains "interracial" even when national independence has been gained.⁶⁷ We have indicated on several occasions that colonial anthropologists were insufficiently concerned with these facts and with the racial problems and pointed out the small place that has been given them in the programs of research that they have set up. This is explained by the attention given to cultures rather than to societies, and also by the care taken (more or less consciously) not to question seriously the foundations (and the ideology) of the colonizing society in which they participate.^{67a} Inversely, studies executed in the United States (and Brazil) are to a large degree devoted to racial relations and prejudices, especially to the relations between Negroes and whites. These facts could not be avoided there because the radical differences of civilization, language, and customs, which exist in the framework of the colonial situation, are here at a minimum, and serve neither to mask nor to complicate them. In those countries the state of subordination and racial prejudice cannot appear to be rooted in nature in so far as cultural difference becomes less and the identity of rights is affirmed, (this explains, among other things, why American society seems to be confused, contradictory and paradoxical, according to Gunnar Myrdal.)⁶⁸ and racial prejudices represent what remains to be liquidated of the colonial past—and it is precisely at the time of liquidation that they give rise to violent conflicts (in the United States, during what is called the period of "Reconstruction"). Such studies sometimes insist on economic implications, and sometimes on the sexual implications of different racial attitudes. As R. Bastide has indicated,⁶⁹ they show the liaison between racial reactions and those of a cultural order; his analysis of Negro messianism in the United States demonstrates to what degree it is linked to racial conflicts and a "psychology of resentment" (these conflicts reveal a great diversity of attitudes, corresponding to the diversity of situations). We have attempted this rapid survey because it demonstrates liaisons that cannot be denied, as well as the impossibility of separating the study of cultural contacts from that of racial contacts, or of considering the latter, in the case of the colonized societies, without reference to the fact of colonialism.

WE HAVE just discussed certain details that Anglo-Saxon writers tend to bring together under the heading of "the clash of civilizations", but we have shown that in the case of colonized peoples, these shocks (or contacts) take place in very special circumstances. We call the colonial situation this complexus of conditions. It may be defined by retaining the most general and obvious of these conditions: the domination imposed by a foreign minority, racially (or ethnically) and culturally different, in the name of a dogmatically affirmed racial (or ethnical) and cultural superiority, over a native majority with a material inferiority. This domination involves bringing radically different civilizations into

contact with one another: an industrial civilization of powerful economy, with Christian origins, and operating at a vigorous rhythm, imposing itself on a pre-technical civilization with a "backward" economy, working at a light pace, and radically "non-Christian". The fundamentally antagonistic nature of the relations existing between these societies is explained by the fact that the colonized society is condemned to play the role of instrument. In order to maintain this domination, it is necessary to resort not only to force, but also to a system of pseudo-justifications, stereotyped attitudes, etc. But the enumeration of these conditions would be insufficient. Rather than choose the particular points of view of any of the specialists, we preferred to try to grasp the colonial situation as a unity and in so far as it is a system; we have mentioned the elements in terms of which every concrete situation may be described and understood, and have shown how they are tied together and that because of this every specialized analysis is at the same time one-sided. This *totality* questions the groupings of the total society (the colony) as collective representations proper to each of them; it is attached to every level of social reality. But precisely because of the divergent character of the groupings, the cultural "models", representations that are brought in contact with each other, changes introduced into the system that is still intended to maintain artificially the relations of domination and submission, the colonial situation becomes profoundly altered at a rapid pace; it becomes necessary, therefore, to grasp it historically, and date it.

The colonized society to which the anthropologist devotes himself (naming it "primitive" or "backward", etc.) participates, to a more or less important extent (according to its volume, its economic potential, and its cultural conservatism) in the total situation of colonialism; it is one of the groups which make up the "colony". It is hard to see how any *present-day* study of this society can be made without taking this double reality into consideration, the "colony", the total society in which it is inscribed, and the colonial situation which is its creation; especially when it gives as its avowed object the facts resulting from "contact", the phenomena or procedure of evolution. When the anthropologist proceeds in an unilateral manner, exhibiting his data in terms only of the traditional background of the colonized people (considered "primitive"), he can do nothing but enumerate the facts and classify them: the same will be true if he follows Malinowski's recommendations and limits his study to "contact" between "institutions" of the same kind. In fact, the "modernizing tendencies" (once located) within the colonized peoples are incomprehensible unless they are related to the fact of colonization, and certain English anthropologists (Fortes, Gluckman) have advanced to that recognition, by considering that in the case of the colonized Negro peoples of Africa, the Negro and white societies participate integrally in the same unity, and by approaching the idea of "the situation".⁷⁰ Similarly, R. Bastide recalled the importance of "the concrete situation in which the process takes place", in relation to his studies devoted to the interpenetration of civilizations. We wished to go beyond the framework of these simple considerations by showing how a colonial situation might be approached, and what it implied; we wished to demonstrate that every present-day problem of the sociology of the colonized peoples had to be considered in

terms of this totality. The idea of "the situation" is not the private preserve of existential philosophy; it imposed itself on several specialists in the social sciences, who make use of it under the name of "social situation" (as does H. Wallon), or "the individual social conjuncture" (G. Gurvitch)—the notion of "total social phenomenon" developed by Mauss paved the way for such a necessity.⁷¹

It is sufficiently significant that many anthropologists, working within colonized societies, and devoting themselves to their present-day aspects and problems, have avoided (most often, unconsciously) reference to the particular concrete situation of these colonies. Perhaps it was because of a more or less conscious fear that they would have to take into consideration a "system" and a precise society—that of the colonizing society of which they are a part. They refer themselves to less compromising systems, like "western civilization" and "primitive civilizations", or limit themselves to restricted problems for which they suggest solutions which imply only slight changes. It is because of the unwillingness to yield in this latter attitude (which they believe inevitable and useful to the colonizing society alone) that some anthropologists refuse to give their discipline the character of "applied" science.⁷² There is here a fact which recurs in the framework of the criticism of observation in the matter of human sciences, and which suggests the important critical work to which the observer of colonized societies ought to commit himself.

WE HAVE frequently had the occasion of indicating the somewhat pathological character of colonized societies, the crises which mark the stages of the process that is called their "evolution"—crises which do not correspond to necessary stages of this process, but which have, nevertheless, specific characteristics as a function of the type of colonized society and the nature of the specific colonial situation (Mohammedan Negroes do not react like animist Negroes or pseudo-Christians, African societies do not react to the French colonial pressure in the same way as to the English, etc.) By testing the society which has undergone colonization as to what is characteristic of it, and the colonial situation in that which is peculiar to it, these crises make it possible for the sociologist to accomplish a comprehensive analysis, because they represent the only points at which, in a total manner, the transformations of one at the hands of the other may be grasped. Over-all pictures and essential liaisons are gained, and partial and artificial divisions (changes in economic and political life, etc.), which can produce only a purely academic description and classification, are avoided. We have already indicated that these "crises" represent so many openings, throwing light not only on the phenomena of contact but also on the colonized society in its traditional forms; it must be added that they permit in this way an analysis which takes into consideration both the "external milieu" and the "internal milieu"—and accounting for them in terms of the real relationships that are maintained, in terms of "lived conditions". We could be criticized for having recourse to the dangerous notion of pathology, and we might be asked what are the criteria of the characteristic crises of colonized societies. We come back again, in that case, to all the passages

of this essay in which we mentioned the areas of conflict between the colonized society and the colonizing societies, the native and the imported culture—linked to the relations of domination and submission, to the varied characters of the societies and cultures in contact—where we suggested the manner in which these conflicts are resented by individuals. The history of colonized societies reveals to us periods during which conflicts become hidden, an equilibrium or a provisory adaptation is realized; periods during which conflicts are openly expressed according to circumstances on one level or another (religious, political, economic), but in any case calling into question the ensemble of relations existing between the colonized society and the colonizing society, and between the cultures that each animates (as we recalled in connection with the Negro churches of Bantu Africa); and moments when the antagonism and the distance existing between these societies are at their greatest, which are experienced by the colonized as a questioning of the established order, and by the native as an attempt to regain autonomy. At each of these moments, which can be located all along its history, the colonized society presents a state that may be characterized as that of crisis; it is then that we see it in terms of the concrete situation which is colonialism.

Translated by JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

¹ R. Kennedy, "The colonial crisis and the future", in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, London, 1945, p. 307.

² O. Mannoni, *Psychologie de la colonisation*, Editions du Seuil, 1950. This writer is not, however, the creator of this expression, which is found with different meanings in previous works, notably in the studies devoted to the typology of minorities by the American sociologist L. Wirth.

³ Cf. our account of Mannoni's book, in *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, IX, 1950, p. 183-6.

⁴ L. Joubert, "Le fait colonial et ses prolongements", in *Le Monde Non-Chrétien*, 15, 1950.

⁵ Ch.-A. Julien, "Imperialisme économique et imperialisme colonial", in *Fin de l'ère coloniale*, Paris, 1948.

⁶ Cf. R. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 308-9, and R. Grousset, "Colonisations", in *Fin de l'ère coloniale*.

⁷ Quoted in the fine book of H. Brunschwig, *La colonisation française*, Calmann-Lévy, 1949.

⁸ For example, the displacements instigated in favor of the Province of Niger, which produced vigorous polemics; cf. P. Herbart, *Le Chancere du Niger*, preface by André Gide, Gallimard, 1939.

⁹ E. Chancelé, "La question coloniale", in *Critique*, no. 35, 1949.

¹⁰ Cf. L. Joubert, *op. cit.*, no. 11.

¹¹ Cf. L. P. Mair, "The study of culture contact as a practical problem", in *Africa*, VII, 4, 1934.

¹² Cf. J. Harmand, *Domination et Colonisation*, Flammarion, 1910, as a "classic" example of the juridical type of justification.

¹³ Cited by H. Brunschwig, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

¹⁵ R. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-8.

¹⁶ G. Balandier, "Aspects de l'évolution sociale chez les Fang du Gabon", in *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, IX, 1950, p. 82.

¹⁷ R. Montagne, "Le bilan de l'œuvre européenne au-delà des mers", in *Peuples d'Oltre-Mer et Civilisation Occidentale*, Semaines Sociales de France, 1948.

¹⁸ G. Balandier, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁹ Ch.-A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique*, Collection Que sais-je?, Presses Universitaires de France, 1944, p. 123.

²⁰ R. Montagne, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²¹ Cf., notably, Pham Nhuam, "Appel", in "Que pensent les étudiants coloniaux", *Le Semeur*, December 1947—January 1948.

²² Ch.-A. Julien, "Imperialisme économique et imperialisme colonial", *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²³ P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, 1874, 1st ed.; J. Ferry, preface to *Le Tonkin et la Mère-Patrie*, 1890.

²⁴ Cf. A. Conant, *The Economic Basis of Imperialism*, 1898, and J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism, a Study*, 1902 (whose value was recognized by Lenin), both cited by Ch.-A. Julien, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Ch. A. Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 29. Cf. as far as Africa is concerned, Frankel, S. H., *Capital investments in Africa*, 1936.

- ²⁶ J. Guitton, "Crises et valeurs permanentes de la Civilisation occidentale", in *Peuples d'Outre-Mer et Civilisation Occidentale*, p. 61.
- ²⁷ P. Reuter, "Deux formes actuelles de l'imperialisme colonial: protectorat économique et pénétration communiste", in *Peuples d'Outre-Mer et Civilisation Occidentale*, p. 142.
- ²⁸ J. Staline, *Le Marxisme et la question nationale et coloniale*, Editions Sociales, 1949, p. 179 and 247.
- ²⁹ *The African Morning Post*, June 2, 1945, cited in *Univers*, "L'Avenir de la colonisation", October 1945.
- ³⁰ B. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, Yale University Press, 1945.
- ³¹ Cf. an excellent analysis by M. Gluckman, "Malinowski's 'functional' analysis of social change", in *Africa*, XVII, 2, April 1947.
- ³² R. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 309-11.
- ³³ Cf. L. Durand-Reville, "Le Problème de l'industrialisation des territoires d'Outre-Mer", in *Le Monde non Chrétien*, 13, January-March 1950, where this aspect is suggested and in which the author, a member of the Parliament of Gabon, points out the changes which the late war made necessary along with the existing needs.
- ³⁴ As far as French Africa is concerned, again consult the key studies made by the geographer Jean Dresch.
- ³⁵ Cf. especially, Ch. Robequain, *L'évolution économique de l'Indochine française*, Paris, 1940, and P. Gourou, *L'Utilisation du sol en Indochine française et Les Pays Tropicaux*, Paris, 1948.
- ³⁶ Cf. for an over-all study of this phenomenon, the book of V. Liversage, *Land tenure in the colonies*, 1945; cited by P. Naville, *La Guerre du Viet-Nam*, 1949.
- ³⁷ Cf. Ch. Robequain, *op. cit.*
- ³⁸ P. Naville, *La Guerre du Viet-Nam*, Paris, 1949; note especially the chapters, "La Politique française en Cochinchine", "La Bourgeoisie cochinchinoise", "Les Paysans annamites et la Revolution", "Le Développement de la classe ouvrière et de l'industrie".
- ³⁹ J. Borde, "Le Problème ethnique dans l'Union Sud-Africaine", in *Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*, no. 12, 1950, an excellent over-all view and bibliography.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. W. G. Ballinger, *Race and Economics in South Africa*, 1934.
- ⁴¹ The most important authors on South Africa are I. Schapera and M. Hunter; for East Africa, L. P. Mair, Audrey Richards, M. Read, M. Gluckman; for West Africa, M. Fortes, D. Forde, K. L. Little.
- ⁴² Cf. M. Read, *Native standards of living and African culture change*, London, 1938.
- ⁴³ K. L. Little, "Social change and social class in the Sierra-Leone Protectorate", in *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1948—an important study.
- ⁴⁴ J. Dresch, "La Prolétarianisation des masses indigènes en Afrique du Nord", *op. cit.*, pp. 57-69, and R. Delavignette, "Les Problèmes du travail: Paysannerie et Proletariat", in *Peuples d'Outre-Mer et Civilisation Occidentale*, pp. 273-291.
- ⁴⁵ G. D'Arboussier, "Les Problèmes de la culture", in "Afrique Noire", special issue of *Europe*, May-June 1949.
- ⁴⁶ O. Hatzfeld, "Les Peuples heureux ont une histoire. Etude malgache", in *Cahiers du Monde non Chrétien*, 16, 1950.
- ⁴⁷ *Colonies*, Cambridge, 1948.
- ⁴⁸ H. Laurentie, "Notes sur une philosophie de la politique coloniale française", in the special number of *Renaissances*, Oct. 1944.
- ⁴⁹ J. Borde, "Le Problème ethnique dans l'Union Sud-Africaine", *op. cit.*, p. 320.
- ⁵⁰ L. Wirth, "The problem of minority groups", in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, pp. 347-72. The same writer's *The present position of Minorities in the United States* is also on this subject.
- ⁵¹ *Les vrais chefs de l'Empire*, new edition under the title of *Service Africain*, 1946, chap. II, "La Société coloniale".
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 353.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- ⁵⁴ There is a significant proverb, "God created the white man, the Negro, and then the Portuguese." Or, even: "There are three kinds of men—whites, Negroes, and Portuguese" (a proverb of the Belgian Congo).
- ⁵⁵ Cf. A. Siegfried, *Afrique du Sud*, Armand Colin, 1949, p. 75. Also, *Handbook on race relations in South Africa*, ed. by E. Hellmann, 1949, and J. Borde, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-40.
- ⁵⁶ This was attempted, before 1939, in the territories under French control: French West Africa, 1930; French East Africa, 1936; Indochina, 1938.
- ⁵⁷ For black Africa alone, R. Delavignette gave, in 1939, the following proportions for that part of the population called European: Union of South Africa, 250%; (former German South-West Africa, 100%); Rhodesia, 45%; Angola, 10%; Kenya, 5%; Belgian Congo, 2%; French West Africa, and French East Africa, 1%, *op. cit.*, p. 36. As far as these last territories are concerned, the European transfer has been important since 1945.
- ⁵⁸ Cf. R. Maunier, *Sociologie Coloniale*, p. 19, 30, 33.
- ⁵⁹ J.-R. Ayouné, "Occidentalisme et Africanisme", in *Renaissances*, special issue, October 1944, p. 204.
- ⁶⁰ Recall Brazzaville where the African population went from 3800 inhabitants in 1912 to 75,000 inhabitants by about 1950, or more than a tenth of the population of the middle Congo.
- ⁶¹ Cf. Dr. L. Aujoulat, "Elites et masses en pays d'Outre-Mer", in *Peuples d'Outre-Mer et Civilisation Occidentale*, *op. cit.*, p. 233-272.

⁶² Cf. L. Achille, "Rapports humains en Pays d'Outre-Mer", in *Peuples d'Outre-Mer et Civilisation Occidentale*, *op. cit.*

⁶³ G. Balandier, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Monica Hunter came very close to this awareness. She wrote, "The study of 'culture contact' shows quite clearly that society is one, and that when a single aspect of it is modified, the whole is affected", *Reaction to Conquest*.

⁶⁵ B. G. M. Stukler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, London, 1948.

⁶⁶ Cf. *La Vocation Actuelle de la Sociologie*, notably pp. 98-108, in which definitions and distinctions are given. Chapters III and IV are consecrated to Micro-psychology, of which Georges Gurvitch is the true founder.

⁶⁷ Cf. L. Achille, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-5.

^{67a} An extremely close analysis was given by M. Leiris, in a conference entitled "L'ethnographie devant le colonialisme", later published in *Temps Modernes*.

⁶⁸ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York, 1944.

⁶⁹ Cf. M. Fortes, "Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand", in *Bantu Studies*, XIV, 1940. Also the controversy of Malinowski on this subject, in *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, p. 14ff.

⁷¹ G. Gurvitch, moreover, associates the three terms in the "Avant-Propos" that he wrote for the section on "Psychologie Collective" of *Année Sociologique*, 3rd series, 1948-9. Similarly, a psychiatrist like Karen Horney insists on the fact that all neuroses, whether individual or collective, are explained by a process which calls into question all personal and socio-cultural factors; cf. Dr. Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of our Time*, New York, 1937.

⁷² Cf. F. M. Keesing, "Applied anthropology in colonial administration", in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, *op. cit.*

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SOCIOLOGY AND THE TOTAL STATE

ALBERT SALOMON

ARISTOTLE once stated that poetry is more philosophical than history. This is true insofar as history deals with a variety of events and situations in which contingencies are so thoroughly intertwined with necessities of conduct that it is impossible to make philosophical generalizations. There are, however, historical situations which force the historian and the historical sociologist to reflect upon their philosophical implications.

Albert Salomon is Professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research in New York City. The following essay is a projected introduction to a book to be published next year by the Noonday Press under the title The Total State, its origin and growth.

The ages of great transformation, the religious and political crises, recurrently raise two philosophical questions. The first question refers to the relationship between history, nature and that which transcends nature. It attempts to ascertain whether there is meaning in history and what its specific content might be. The second question deals with the problem of an historical anthropology. Historians are thus compelled to confront the human situation and to ask: what are the specific conditions of the historical context that enable certain kinds of human behavior to come to the fore while others disappear? The historian cannot escape a philosophical concern when he deals with situations involving radical change. He understands the potentialities of human grandeur and misery as the specific problem of man's historical human personality. The philosophically-minded historian confirms the thesis that man is by nature historical.

THE first question, mentioned above, was primarily the concern of the classical and scientific philosophers of pre-revolutionary times. In the age of revolutions that began in 1789, historians and sociologists asked the second question. In the western world during the last century there has been an unbroken trend of historical thinking which alarms historical-sociological thinkers because by implication it asks a philosophical question: What is going to happen to the human being, the bearer of spontaneity and constructive reason, in the rapidly expanding technological-industrial mass societies of the modern world?

The historians and sociologists who have raised such questions were affected by three fundamental crises: the French Revolution, Imperialistic Capitalism and Marxist Socialism. Henry Adams, Alexis de Tocqueville, Jacob Burckhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche, William Dilthey, Georg Simmel and Max Weber are among the thinkers whose radical analyses of historical processes led them to be deeply concerned with the problems of human independence and intellectual dignity.

When these thinkers reflected on the structure of their historical situations, socialism was still an expanding revolutionary movement. It could be discussed

merely as a dogmatic system whose power as a collective despotism was still only potential. The contemporary historian faces a very concrete problem today. He finds himself confronted by a state that calls itself socialistic, the U.S.S.R. It is interesting to note that nobody speaks of the Bolshevik State or the Socialist State. People, instead, speak of the Total State. This concept represents a precarious generalization, a questionable ideal-type of a completely formal character. It could have come into existence only after the Fascists and National Socialists had imitated the basic pattern of the Bolshevik State, while emptying it of socialist content. The authors of these regimes rejected socialism but did not feel called upon to be defenders of capitalism. They were fascinated by a state in which a tiny élite possessed a monopoly of power with which to control the material and moral forces of their respective nations. The pattern of the Total State implied the uninhibited sovereignty of a minority group whose members were permitted to manipulate at will all the human and material resources of their society. This élite established itself as sole guardian of all political institutions and as the proprietor of the lives and destinies of all citizens irrespective of enacted statutes and legal proceedings. The Total State, as a category, indicates a formal pattern of political organization regardless of its contents. It is the *l'art pour l'art* of power; it is imperialism for the sake of expansion, as an end in itself.

The category of the Total State was derived from the archetype of the Bolshevik State. The Bolshevik State was certainly total, but with constant reference to specific ends, whose contents were determined by the ideals of socialism as drafted by Marx. They were changed or expanded by the amendments of Lenin and Stalin.

It is important to note at this time that the formal category of the Total State has been generally accepted in everyday usage for all types of total organizations, regardless of their contents. Such a semantic decision indicates the deep shock that democratic and constitutional peoples receive when a tiny élite within a given state takes over the total control of the political, moral and social spheres of human conduct. The Total State is a type of political organization in which a select minority, with the application of its power to indoctrinate, direct and control all human activities, thoughts and affections, has set itself up above all law and mores.

This experience is as crucial to the modern historian as was the comprehension of the French Revolution to Alexis de Tocqueville, or the interpretation of industrial capitalism to Max Weber.

IT IS within the general scheme of historical thinking to relate new and fateful institutions to the plurality of causes and motives that have brought them into acceptance. Such an inquiry is theoretical and practical alike. It is theoretical to the philosopher, who establishes the truth of the sequence and the hierarchy of conditions. It is practical to the statesman, the physician of society, who strives for a correct diagnosis wherewith to promote political recovery or prevent a given social malady. Social causation is either general or specific. In all historical processes there are general tendencies resulting from

the logic and necessity of the social structure. There are lasting elements of expansion and resistance, of domination and subordination, of recognition and of being recognized. There are specific elements which refer to the uniqueness of an historical situation. Both types of causation occur in the analysis of all historical situations.

Among the general conditions which animate the dynamics of political institutions, historians will find those elements most important which contribute to the unity, density and integrity of a society or to its decay and disintegration. They may be factors of external pressure, such as enemies at the frontier, trying economic conditions, or population problems. They may be inner factors such as social antagonisms, class conflicts or political controversies. These conditions are objective factors; they become dynamic forces in the historical process when they are raised to the subjective consciousness of historical societies. Societies consider the forces of good and evil that act upon them in the social process in terms of the good life which they take for granted. This fact raises a further problem because the relevance of ideas and theories to the causal analysis of social and political development is called into question. Certainly the Fathers of the American Constitution were influenced greatly by Montesquieu's political philosophy and Locke's liberalism. On the contemporary scene, many historians have connected the rise of Fascism in Italy with Pareto's sociology and the origins of Germany's National Socialism with the theories and teaching of Hegel, Nietzsche and the existentialist philosophers.

Whatever might be the truth of such imputations, the cases cited above demonstrate that this is a methodological and a political problem alike. Furthermore these examples teach us two things. First, they imply that the assumption of historian-sociologists, that all radical transformations take place within a specific philosophical frame of reference, may be gratuitous. Secondly, they teach us to reflect upon the relevance of such imputations, if we are seeking a genuine interpretation of political or social institutions. Such considerations lead to the thesis that all such philosophical doctrines have only a very indirect influence on political or social movements. This is so because all organizations of large groups will respond to simple and primitive ideas that are the abstracts of political and social theories.

Special attention must here be given the work of Marx, since he provided the frame of reference within which the socialist movement and the Bolshevik party constructed their organization and planned their action. In contrast to Montesquieu and Locke, Marx intentionally developed the so-called Scientific Socialism as a guide and handbook to revolutionary action. He was not afraid to simplify and brutalize the complex phenomena of the social process in order to produce a spirit of social revolution. Nevertheless, his doctrines were transformed, in the mind and the imagination of the masses, into the rather naive vision of the *Zukunftstaat*, while the genuine interpretation of the doctrine became the personal monopoly of the party intellectuals who momentarily established themselves as the high priests of a church that had the final truth. After the Bolsheviks had seized power and exterminated the socialist competitors, they set up their regime as the ultimate fulfillment of Marx's theories.

It is doubtful whether it is valid to make any interpretation of Marx's works as providing the frame of reference for the construction of the Total State as the true socialist community. In spite of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, there remains the idea that socialism will bring about the leap into the world of freedom. There is still the remembrance of the Marx who tried to liberate himself from the bondage of Hegel by attempting to formulate a true Humanism.

In Russia the work of Marx is interpreted in the perspective of Lenin and Stalin. This has become manifest in the condemnation by the Russian Academy and Party, of the only great piece of Marxist philosophy, Georg Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness*.

When the Bolshevik party declared itself the true interpreter of Marx, the party intellectuals forgot to apply their most cherished device, the sociology of knowledge, to the members of their own group. The Russian revolutionary society served to unite three different trends which were all totalitarian. First, the organized revolutionary group was, by necessity, a totalitarian institution. Secondly, the revolution passed through the experience of total war. And thirdly, familiarity with the despotism of the Czarist regime provided the revolution with an effective guide to conduct. These three trends merged when the revolution and the collapse of the Czarist regime in the military catastrophe of 1917 took place. In this situation the Bolsheviks could understand the work of Marx in terms of a total dictatorship of the proletariat.

The totalitarianism of Marx is controversial. The pattern of total social organization as developed by the founders of sociology in France, however, is not so controversial. Marx's unbounded ridicule of this French philosophical movement has prevented the historians of sociology from reconsidering the works of the founders of sociology. It is, however, of considerable value for our inquiry into the origins of the Total State to re-examine these thinkers. It was not an accident that sociology came into existence in France, nor was it chance that the first sociologists developed the pattern of Totalitarianism.

SOCIOLOGY came into existence in France as a completely revolutionary philosophy of revolutionary progress. It was anti-revolutionary, however, in the political sense. It is the common objective of both the reactionary and the progressive founders of sociology to terminate the revolution and abolish universal anarchy. It was thought that this change should be achieved, not by political action, but by a complete social revolution that would abolish legal and political institutions as obsolete.

This starting-point of sociology is of importance in understanding its unique impact on the political institutions of the Total State. We meet here with a very interesting problem in social causation: these early sociologists construct the totalitarian pattern as the ideal type of organization for industrial societies. It is the thesis of this essay that the totalitarian pattern of technological-industrial mass societies, through the various channels of total organization that preceded its establishment as the pattern of the Revolutionary group, the practice

of total commitment, and the experience of the Russian Civil War, determined the rise of the Total State.

Sociology, as the science of man envisaged by its founders, was the first modern manifestation of a pattern of thought which disregards the principles of justice and equity as the criteria of a well-established body politic. This sociology rejected political philosophy as unwarranted metaphysics, and dismissed the state as a nuisance. Political action was considered as an arbitrary result of abstract rights and obligations which did not contribute anything to the progressive improvement of mankind's material and moral standards. Indeed, Sociology became a revolutionary power, by renouncing politics. It repudiated the constructive power of the human mind which had elaborated the principles and conditions of lasting co-existence in the body politic. These first Sociologists, moreover, condemned the objective knowledge which the political philosophers had accumulated. Such sociologists forgot that men know much more about the impulses and interests, the passions and the goods which they cherish in their social relationships than the sociologists think they know about the laws of society.

The sociologists inaugurated the fateful trend of thinking which postulates the application of scientific laws to the processes of society. This concept, the process of society, is an abstraction from the complex process of history, and includes the various aspects of political action. Sociology, thus, is still anti-political and anti-revolutionary. The early sociologists objected to the modest elements of Constitutionalism and Civil Rights which existed between 1815 and 1848. There is no reason for the establishment of legal rights which permit freedom of conscience and discussion in a society which is ruled by scientists. Such scientists of society admit of no possibilities for discussion and inner conflict because everybody must grant the correctness of their hypotheses; only a logical sequence of thought remains.

On the other hand, by applying scientific laws to the historical development of society, sociologists discovered the revolutionary progress of industrial society. They contended that the basic law of historical progress had been discovered. Turgot had already anticipated this Law of Progress. In virtue of this Law the human mind develops from the theological to the metaphysical state in order to accomplish the greatest degree of progress in the realization of the scientific state. The pattern has been elaborated. The founders of sociology created a new type of philosophy of history which is scientific because it enables us to describe and to understand the progress of the mind as the dynamic element in history. Such knowledge and understanding enabled the sociologists to foresee objectively the future of the social process. Their whole work actually became the elaboration of the new social transformation that would revolutionize the world and create new patterns of conduct, new attitudes of thought and feeling.

It has been the great merit of the founders of sociology that they were well aware that the brave new world would bring with it an organization of mankind radically different from all epochs of Western history. They predicted a world of authority, discipline, hierarchy and subordination as the prerequisites of a completely efficient mankind. It is important to know that, from the

beginning, the founders of sociology surrendered their trust in the constructive power of reason, so conspicuous in political philosophy, and in the achievements of constitutional states. As a substitute these sociologists offered a novel philosophy of history as the progress of the scientific mind, where order and hierarchy, discipline and obedience were necessary conditions for the material and moral growth of mankind.

THE founding fathers of sociology have achieved a great historical paradox. In their effort to promote the most radical progress they transformed the standards which had been characteristic of the Western world. Whatever might be said of the *parvenu* traits of pragmatic Western civilization as compared with the ideals and principles of the Hindu and Chinese civilizations, the West has created all of the constituents which make possible a genuinely liberal and moderate organization of the body politic, and of the individuals within that framework. The West has produced the ideals of the dignity of human reason, the creative power of human independence and spontaneity, together with the constitutional organization of political freedom.

The innovators of sociology changed these standards completely. They limited the historical process to the progress of the technological and industrial development of mankind. By doing so they made Society or the Collective Being the very reality of history. They declared the individual an abstraction, and recognized him merely as an agent or functionary of society. For this reason they did not attach any significance to the evaluation of human freedom and human dignity. Man's life was held meaningful to the extent that he fulfilled his functions as a member of society. These sociologists turned the social process into the very universe of human existence. They did not conceive of a larger whole. They maintained that the continuous progress of industrial mankind would create a perfect historical universe when scientific methods were applied. They wanted to substitute a well-meaning and scientifically-trained Planning Board for a political government, and the total organization of society for a political constitution of rights and duties. They set the pattern of the Total State while at the same time they renounced political organization.

These men were keenly aware that they were more radical than the Jacobins. They understood the revolutionary nature of technological transformation as altering completely all existing patterns, individual conduct, and societal relationships. They aimed at interpreting and suggesting this necessary future transformation, by means of three devices:

1. They analyzed the technological and economic conditions of an industrial mankind in such a way as to imply the inevitable necessity of total planning.
2. They taught that the industrial society was the mythical power (in the Sorelian sense) that was destined to eliminate the hostility between the workers and the minority of idle persons. This antagonism was viewed by them as identical with the opposition between constructive industrial mankind on the one hand and destructive political organizations on the other. They therefore considered themselves as mythical heroes who had received a divine assignment to

overthrow the political organizations of mankind and to abolish the anarchy of the world.

3. They invented new religions. This was a necessary requirement for equipping the technological and managerial societies with the impulses of love and sympathy for the welfare of the whole. The dichotomy between the positive analysis of the industrial world and the meaning of constructive religions indicate the precarious position of such sociological philosophy.

The revolutionary effort of the sociologists consisted in the application of scientific methods to the realm of human action in history. However, this did not provide them with any ideas as to how to direct and give articulation to human activities, since no ideals could spring from such a synthesis of diverse scientific methods. It was for this reason that the sociological religions supplied the theory of social and moral values. It is, however, a futile enterprise to glue human society together by equipping the Collective Being with an abstract love of an anonymous Humanity in order thereby to secure the scientific control of nature and society.

Such an effort is futile because human nature is one and indivisible. Human reason is the manifestation of human spontaneity and complexity. Plato and Aristotle and the Jewish thinkers all knew that the act of cognition and the act of love are intertwined with one another. The founders of sociology renounced their trust in human reason and relied on scientific methods. Because of this they had to invent an independent area of human affections as the directing force for the scientific reasoning of mankind. In its final consequences they brought into existence the specifically modern dichotomy of rational and irrational, thus indicating the precarious position in which the scientifically-minded man finds himself today.

It is impossible to understand the unique character of the work done by the founders of sociology if we do not recognize the various layers of their thinking. There is, first of all, the genuinely scientific analysis of the social and economic processes. There follows, secondly, the conceptualization of the industrial world as basically revolutionary. The analysis and synthesis of their work made possible the construction of an industrial mankind as the bearer of historical meaning, the hero of social action. The mythical elements introduced into their work help us understand the semantic problem of their linguistic standards, that strange coexistence of scientific, enthusiastic and imprecatory terminologies. This is the mythical level of their thinking.

The religions of Humanity are the logical conclusions of the mythical conception of the social revolution. They comprise the seal that affirms the truth and the meaning of the social revolution. They are the Declaration of Independence of the matured industrial world. Scientific men have learned that they themselves establish and bear the meaning of their collective existence in the social process.

THE sociological religions are again a new and revolutionary element in the works of the founders of sociology. It is a modern paganism that is going to be the main feature in the rising scientific and industrial fields. Sociology

thus arises as a new pattern of philosophy of history. Actually, this is a very old one. It is the imitation of the Augustinian design, with the added provision that the *Civitas Terrena* is the *Civitas Coelestis*. But in addition to being a secularized version of the Augustinian pattern of the philosophy of history, sociology follows completely the pattern of the Church's organization. The ideals of the sociologists with regard to the social and political reconstruction of the world, are taken over from the Church. The ordered structure of the Church provided them with the final authority of a gospel, the personal authority of a founder, a hierarchy endowed with discipline and subordination, the elements of a spiritual élite and the marginal democracy by which it is possible to advance into the ranks of the élite through learning and conviction.

In this way the founders of sociology established the principle of the total organization of society on three different levels of the historical process. *First*, on the technical-industrial level of history, human societies were held to be in need of a total control of production and distribution in order to secure the continuous advance of mankind's welfare. A scientific "Planning Board" was thought able to accomplish this. It is the pattern of a managerial society ruled by scientific and humanitarian planners. *Secondly*, the founders of sociology understood that every revolutionary group is by necessity a totalitarian organization which could not function without the ultimate authority of the leader, the obedience of the followers, and the religious transfiguration of the ends and meanings of its action.

The third plane of the historical process is the ecclesiastical one. The scientific planners and the social revolutionists are the priests of the gospel of social salvation and of redemption for collective mankind through the scientifically established meaning of the history of society. This religion is not revealed; it is demonstrated. Its truth must be granted because it is intelligible. It is a gospel of humanitarian love that must be enforced by radical persuasion. In the school of Saint-Simon and the church of Comte the followers of the Doctrine are scientists, priests and rulers at the same time. They will be in charge of the total organization and control of society because they possess a monopoly on truth, scientific and demonstrated.

This, then, is the three-fold aspect of the original pattern of sociology: it is totalitarian in three respects. On the economic level it requires an industrial managerial organization; on the revolutionary level it postulates the totalitarian organization of the revolutionary group; while on the spiritual level it prescribes the authoritarian power of an infallible church. This vision is the rationalization of the Jacobin regime of the revolution, of the centralized authority of the Napoleonic Empire, and the transfer of these historical experiences into the realm of the advancing technological and industrial world. This historical background made possible the specific and unique nature of French sociology and makes intelligible its pattern of totalitarian organization. This analysis illuminates the relationship between the original pattern of sociology and the Total State.

The totalitarian elements are also threefold in the U.S.S.R. First of all, there is the structure of the secret revolutionary society; this is totalitarian for formal reasons. Then there is the socialist principle of total planning which

is part of the doctrine; and there is, finally, the spiritual authority of the revolutionary gospel. In addition there is still another new constituent of the Russian Total State; the organization for total war during the Second World War.

The works of the first sociologists were not directly a cause of the rise of the totalitarian state. Lenin and Trotsky were, of course, completely familiar with these authors. Lenin, as we know from his writings, was fascinated by Saint-Simon's illuminating vision of the role of the credit banks in the reconstruction of society. This is, however, not of relevance when discussing the question of social causation. In the Russian revolution and its institutionalization four different trends merged: the tendency of total control and the organization of revolutionary groups, the doctrine of socialism, the continuity of total war, and the tradition of Czarist domination outside and beyond the law. The unification of these four ideas together with the disregard of the elements of freedom in the scientific doctrine of Marx, made possible the reconsideration of the totalitarian pattern as developed by the so-called utopian socialists and sociologists. From the vantage point of the contemporary observer it seems advisable to turn the tables and call the Marxist doctrine "utopian" and the French theories "scientific". In particular, in the contemporary situation here in the United States, the ideas expressed by the French sociologists are much more relevant than Marx's because they recognized the complete unity existing between management and labor, while on the other hand they did not introduce the idea of a class struggle. They are much closer to our ways of thinking because they are much more fascinated by technological and managerial problems and their integrating power than by the disrupting elements of social antagonisms.

IT WAS the purpose of the preceding analysis to make the point that the rise of sociology in France at this specific moment gave the opportunity to develop the unique character of the new pattern of a scientific philosophy of social progress with the implications of a totalitarian organization of society.

After the interpretation of the uniqueness of French sociology, it is necessary to state its affinity to specific patterns of philosophy during the last half of the nineteenth century. It goes without saying that this new pattern of philosophy as centered on history was set by Hegel. In spite of differences in their religious, political and philosophical backgrounds, it is important to note the structural affinities of the two thinkers, Hegel and Comte. Both agreed that history is the concern of philosophy because the Mind is advancing and thus accomplishing its progressive unfolding in the historical process. Both proceeded in accordance with the dialectical method as the specific device of the philosophy of the historical Mind. Both were the inventors of a modern "paganism", since both integrated religion into their philosophical systems as subdivisions of an all-embracing philosophical category. Both constructed an encyclopedic synthesis of Western learning as relevant to their fundamental positions. Hegel merged the conditions of Western idealism with the revolutionary elements of Romanticism. Comte, on the other hand, united 'scientifism' and romanticism.

What is the significance of this formal structural identity between thinkers who differed materially in the contents of their works? Hegel had explicitly

stated his consciousness of being the last philosopher. This statement has been ridiculed by superficial historians. It is, however, the profound insight of a philosopher who thought in terms of the historical context. Hegel was keenly aware that he lived on the ridge, overlooking an historical age. He visualized a new world-in-the-making that would not bother about the great intellectual traditions of the past. For this reason Hegel considered it his mission, in spite of history, to synthesize the traditions of the Classics, of Christian theology, and of rational idealism and romanticism as a permanent possession.

Comte too was aware of living in an age of total transformation. He believed that his assignment was to accomplish a synthesis of all those methods and principles of science that would turn the revolutionary world into a progressive order, or rather, an ordered progress, by applying these devices to the historical process. Such unification of order and progress will be the final accomplishment of a scientific mankind.

Common to both thinkers was the awareness that they lived in an age of radical transformation. Both of them, however, reached different conclusions. Hegel summarized the totality of theological and philosophical traditions with various constellations of historical events. Comte united the diversity of scientific methods and techniques as the necessary tools for constructing the new society of a positivistic mankind. Hegel stressed the living spirit of the past and the recurrent patterns of philosophizing in historical systems. Comte emphasized the scientific and technological methods as the indispensable means for establishing the new standards of a scientifically-minded mankind. Hegel saw the future in the perspective of the past, while Comte viewed the past in the perspective of the future. There is a strange and ambiguous affinity in the fact that the works of both thinkers were the antagonistic responses to the identical experience of total revolution.

In this specific relationship, both philosophers met with the spirit of Romanticism. They should not be classified as Romantic, but rather, both men were marginally affected by the climate of the Romantic movement. This movement was not a merely literary event. It was a comprehensive philosophical, poetical and socio-political movement. It was a movement of intellectuals conditioned by four fundamental experiences: the French Revolution, the advance of the sciences, the progress of philosophy and the great achievements of the poetical imagination. These experiences had made the intellectuals conscious of the lasting progress of human liberation. And these intellectuals were keenly aware that they had become the élite of the post-revolutionary world. They looked upon themselves as the mouthpieces of history and as society's responsible leaders towards the intelligible meaning of history. The meaning of history, was, however, obviously ambiguous. In a diversity of movements, the Romantic intellectuals found freedom in returning to the security and the authority of the Church, or in constructing their own religions as the French sociologists did. Some became submerged in the revolutionary movements and submitted to the orthodox dogmatism of revolutionary theories, as the true freedom. Indeed, the French sociologists are imbued with, and are part of, the spirit of Romanticism. They have worked out the blueprint for a totally

scientific world which is going to bring forth security, tranquillity and order as the prerequisites for the progress of the material and moral standards of a new industrial mankind.

THE founders of sociology have indeed inaugurated a new world. Their works are the symbol of a radical transition from the old world of Western standards and ideals to a brave new world of scientism, sociology, and managerialism.

In the perspective of the problem stated, it is possible to understand sociology, in its origins, as a unique philosophical effort. It was the daring venture to construct a scientific philosophy of social revolution and of total human transformation. It is a new mode of interpreting the historical process scientifically and foreseeing the future development of mankind objectively. The founders of sociology accurately heard the grass of necessity as it grew.

The first sociologists, particularly Auguste Comte and Saint-Simon, constructed a philosophy which declared that Society was to be real and the Individual hypostatized. They were the first to rely on the scientific method alone and to despise the empirical and *a priori* reasoning of the individual thinker. They initiated the confusion created by applying scientific methods to the process of history. They constructed the first theoretical systems that contained at the same time a scientific philosophy, a myth of the saving élite, and a religion of social redemption. In merging these diverse elements, the founders of sociology created the pattern of total societal organization. This pattern is finally transferred to a political sphere by encompassing the elements of war and revolution, which are total by their very nature. The correlation between sociology and the Total State opens a new perspective for understanding the precarious character of the human situation in an age of expanding rationalization, indispensable planning, and revolutionary mobilization.

SOCIOLOGISTS today are becoming more alive to the dangerous possibilities implicit in the origins of their science, and more aware of the risk which spiritually denuded human experience can entail. Although they still believe that the sociology of the liberal West must continue to expand the horizons of planning and efficacious government assistance, they realize that it must be wary of a method that eschews values, and that eliminates the human factor from social governance. Although in its ideological roots it has been injurious, as the study and not the domination of man, sociology can prove itself ever more useful in the struggle for human security and the possibility of spiritual growth.

THE MYSTERY THAT IS PLATO

LUIGI STEFANINI

THE Greek sculptor is supreme among artists because he knows how to submerge himself entirely in his work and to efface from it every sign, howsoever slight, which might reveal the strained efforts of the creative act. He enjoyed the divine faculty of making the figure stand out in perfect form leaving neither in the clay nor on the marble a single imprint of his thumb or trace of his chisel.

Plato is the sculptor of ideal forms.

It is difficult to discern, amidst the interplay of characters, the plotting of scenes, and the complex articulations of the argument, the animating secret which discloses the drama of thought born in the depths of his spirit with absolute objectivity and impartiality, even with a peculiar indifference. We must question the work in order to discover the artist for Plato names himself but two or three times within thirty odd dialogues and then only as an insignificant character concealed in the shadows of the background. He has taken pains to elude our recognition.

It is perhaps the result of a delicate awareness and subtle artifice to lend the dramatic fiction a certain plausibility that the real Plato, evidently foreign to the ideal debate, has charged one of his characters with the responsibility of representing him. The distinguishing features of this character are easily recognized by the alert reader just as the attentive observer cannot fail to recognize the features of Tintoretto among the figures of the blessed who crowd the scene in the *Paradiso*, or those of Veronese among the feast-makers of the *Cena di Levi*. In our case the identity revealed cannot be doubted for the author finds his faithful interpreter in the protagonist, the hieratic figure of the Athenian philosopher who is ever eager for discussion and untiring in his moral apostolate, who confronts every adversary and provokes debates, insists on objections and never ceases questioning until his opponent has surrendered. Plato is indeed the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues.

Yet the acceptance of this thesis presents a serious difficulty, one which at first appears to be simple and rather obvious. Before he acts as protagonist in Plato's dialogues, Socrates is an historical figure who has executed a specific

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program of ideas among his contemporaries and has accomplished a moral mission; hence Plato cannot superimpose his own personality on that of the historical Socrates without producing a contamination which renders both personalities unrecognizable.

The most refined and discerning criticism may perhaps succeed in distinguishing the authentic thought of the one from that of the other, and mark off, with a certain degree of approximation, the point at which the faithfulness of the pupil ends from that at which the philosopher enters and daringly advances beyond his teacher. In this case, however, the difficulty is merely shifted, not resolved, for the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, be he the historical or the created Socrates, loses his preeminent position if not in the drama itself then at least in the discussion, and the debate does not always end in a triumph. In the *Protagoras* the Philosopher of Abdera, in contradicting Socrates, develops conclusive arguments and well-pitched observations which often overrule the arguments of his opponent.¹ In the *Hippias Minor* the Sophist from Elea is justified in calling "great" (375d: Δεινὸν μεντὰν εἶη....) the thesis of Socrates that "if there should be one who is in error and does bad actions voluntarily, he cannot but be a good man" (376b: 'Ο ἄρ' ἐχὼν ἀμαρτάνων καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄδικα ποιῶν, ὃ 'Ιππία, εἴπερ τις ἐστὶν οὗτος, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος εἶη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός), a thesis which is repugnant to Socrates even though he be forced to accept it as logically deducible from his premises (374d; 376c). In the *Euthydemus* the Athenian sage advances, as an alternative to the commonplace eristic play of the two sophists, a wearisome and inconclusive dialectic which produces an unfavourable impression even upon the most loyal Crito. Without the least attempt at defending Socrates the *Clitophon* reaches the conclusion that the Socratic art is incapable of guiding one to the attainment of virtue and happiness. In the *Parmenides* Plato's teacher, become young again in age and wisdom, follows the pressing rhythm of the argument in a very docile manner, and grants his assent as the Eleatic philosopher argues away the very possibility of science and knowledge. This connivance is indeed surprising, yet not nearly so much as the attitude assumed by the teacher in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*. In these dialogues Socrates is granted the mere "honor of presiding"² over the assembly which condemns doctrines expounded and sustained in the earlier dialogues.

Though the figure of Socrates is not presented to us in an entirely coherent fashion and though he is not always master of the discussion, the critic need not despair of discovering a coherence in Plato's thought, for apart from the success or failure of our character in the dialogues, it may very well be that a coherent way of thinking will emerge out of the conclusions of single dialogues. Yet even in this way serious difficulties arise. At the very first, a great many of Plato's dialogues end without a specific conclusion. The *Euthyphro* does not succeed in defining the concept of either piety or worship; amidst endless shifting from definition to definition, the *Hippias Major* fails to disclose a satisfactory concept of the beautiful; in the *Laches* Socrates remains imprisoned in the dilemma he himself poses: If courage is knowledge it cannot be distinguished from the other virtues, and if it is not knowledge it is not a virtue. The *Charmides* ends in a similar way, in its search for a definition of wisdom. The case of the *Protagoras* is typical, for here each opponent succeeds in demon-

strating the thesis of his adversary rather than his own, and the dialogue ends in the defeat of both contestants. After a lengthy discussion on friendship, the *Lysis* concludes that those who claim to be friends hardly know the nature of friendship. The *Cratylus* first puts us through the ordeal of a wearisome etymological labyrinth and then, suddenly, unravels the words and shows that etymological analyses ultimately yield contradictory views of things. The *Ion* complacently sets forth, unresolved, the antinomy by which the art of the rhapsode seems to be on the one hand quackery, on the other a divine power. The *Parmenides* is not only inconclusive but a challenge given to him who in any way attempts to force the problem of reality and knowledge into a conclusion. The *Theaetetus* does indeed refute the protagorean definition of knowledge as sensation, but does not succeed in resolving the problem in a positive way, for the alternative definitions of knowledge as true opinion and true-opinion-supported-by-reason are equally unsatisfactory. Nor may we settle comfortably in the conclusions of those dialogues which go beyond the so-called negative ones, for often a positive dialogue becomes negative when it is related to the results of some other dialogue, and frequently he who is responsive to the totality of Plato's thought finds himself dislodged from a position he once thought was secure and definite. It seems that the sharp criticism the *Gorgias* moves against rhetoric admits of no answer, yet a sharply different attitude is outlined in the *Phaedrus* where rhetoric is presented as an art which engages and moves the soul (271d: 'Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύνάμεις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὐσα...'). It is a mistake to believe that the *Symposium* attempts a definitive redemption of art, viewed as spiritual activity, for within a very short time—in the *Republic*—a sharp offensive is opened against art which is attacked for corrupting morals and falsifying reality. Of the earlier negative dialogues the *Meno* constitutes a great exception for a positive result does emerge: virtue is neither born with us nor can it be taught, and he who possesses it holds it as a divine gift, uncomprehended (99d), but this conclusion is far from being definitive as we may readily discern by noting that in the rigid programme of studies outlined in the *Republic* for the moral education of the rulers dialectics occupies first place. Nor are we to be deceived by the boldness and precision with which the grandiose plan of the *Republic* is drawn, for a great many of the prescribed regulations of the ideal State are substantially changed in the *Laws*, a work of Plato's old age.

IF WE proceed further and go from an examination of the total results of the single dialogues to a study of specific problems, contradictions increase and force us to acknowledge the fact that it is difficult to find any thesis in Plato which is not followed by an antithesis.³

Let us note some of these antitheses, not for the sake of furnishing some kind of inventory but rather for the purpose of adducing a few examples. In the *Protagoras* Socrates rests his argument on the principle of the interchangeability of the good and the pleasant (354-358) while in the *Gorgias* the good is distinguished from and at times opposed to pleasure (500a). In the *Clitophon*

Socrates holds the view that justice is doing harm to one's enemies and good to one's friends (410a) while in the *Republic* this view is attributed to tyrants and is refuted by Socrates (335e-336a). According to the *Symposium* one and the same poet must be able to compose both tragedies and comedies (223d) while in the *Republic* it is impossible for the same author to achieve success in two allied genres like tragedy and comedy (III, 395a). The human soul presented in Bk.IV of the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* is composed of many parts (πολυειδής), although in the *Phaedo* and the very same *Republic* (Bk.X), the demonstration of its immortality is founded on its assumed simplicity (μονοειδής). In the *Phaedrus* the imprisonment of the soul within the body is the result of an initial fall and a means of expiation while in the *Timaeus* the union of body and soul is effected originally by God (69c). According to the *Republic* souls are immortal because they are eternal and can neither decrease nor increase in number (X, 611a) while in the *Timaeus* souls are generated and made immortal by divine will (41b).

Are such changes and uncertainties in matters of detail compensated for by the rock-like certitude of fundamental principles and criteria? No; on the contrary, we are greatly surprised to find in Plato a rather unique case: it is the phenomenon of an author who exhibits no crisis either of conscience or of thought; who proposes, as if his system were not of his making, the most serious objections against its very foundations, and then rises to a point of view strangely opposed to the one he seemed at first to have accepted as final.

The idea resolves every reality within itself, and all that lies without participates in some way in its life: but afterwards the idea finds an original *τιθέναι* outside itself and through its indispensable concourse the world of becoming arises. That which absolutely is not is absolutely unknowable and in the face of non-being the only possible condition is ignorance (*Rep.*, 477a, 478c); but then again a whole dialogue, the *Sophist*, is devoted to a demonstration of the proposition that non-being is knowable and that without it being itself could never be known. At first science does not reach its perfection unless it is cleansed of every sensible contamination and realistic interest; yet in the *Philebus* he who restricts himself to the contemplation of ideas and neglects every concrete cognition, to the point of forgetting his own way home (62a-b), is made out to be a ridiculous figure. When critics read in the *Sophist* about the fierce attack against the friends of the ideas by the philosopher of ideas, they sought to escape the scandal of Plato's self-criticism by identifying the friends of the ideas with a school other than Plato's; but they were unable to salvage the consistency of Plato's thought in the face of the mounting objections by which the *Parmenides* demolishes the whole doctrine of ideas.

From a general point of view, it is impossible to imprison Plato's thought within any one of the many doctrinal schemes by which it is customary to identify thinkers and systems of philosophy.

Plato is an ascetic who in the *Phaedo* raises a hymn to physical dissolution and to the joy of conquering the original purity of the beatific vision through a liberation from the weight of matter; he is, at the same time, an aesthete who in the *Symposium* expresses his pleasure in corporeal forms, in and through

which he finds an incentive for his spiritual ascent. He is a *disciplinarian* who does not wish to disturb the balance of reason, and therefore demands that laughter and tears be contained, compassion suppressed, and the affective life restrained (*Republic* X, 606). Even in the *Philebus*, (33b), he who follows reason is released from pleasure and pain, precisely as the gods are, yet the tenor of the whole dialogue seems to support a life mixed with both reason and feeling. He is the philosopher of Eros who celebrates the frenzy of lovers, the exaltation of seers, the prophetic fury of the prophetesses of Delphi and the priestesses of Dodon. He is an *idealist* completely absorbed in an otherworldly vision, unresponsive to grim reality, unaffected by the storm of political passions which hover about him; he is a *realist* who thrice undertook adventurous journeys into the distant courts of infamous tyrants in an attempt to realize his political dream by training, in his school, future law-givers and rulers of people. A faithful citizen of Athens, he submits the innocent sage to the inscrutable rule of law; an *individualist* and precursor of the new times, he submits the law to the supreme judgment of the sage. A *dualist*, he drives an unbridgeable wedge between the world of being and the world of becoming; a *pantheist*, he tries to give an ideal reality to whatever seems to contradict the idea. A *rationalist*, he grants his assent only to what may be bound into rigorous demonstrations and complicated dialectical proofs; but as a *mystic*, in the supreme moments of speculation he abandons himself to the revelations received by intuition, announces truths revealed through dreams, and disguises his doctrine with symbol and image, myth and legend. An enemy of the rhetors, he is himself a rhetor in the *Menexenus* and the *Phaedrus*; an enemy of the poets, he is himself a poet in all of the dialogues. In brief, we find summed up in Plato all the ideal contrasts experienced by his contemporaries, and we see in him the prophet of all those antinomies of thought and life which are soon to begin a long and agitated career.

The few precious fragments of Heraclitus and Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Empedocles which have reached us reveal, in a somewhat obscure fashion, the meaning of very ancient beliefs which for centuries have excited the curiosity of the wise with an intensity that increases in proportion to the vagueness and obscurity of these documents. In the case of Plato it is not deficiency but rather abundance of sources that generates the same feeling of unsatisfied curiosity. Of the many roads open to us in the thick of arguments and discussions, which, may we ask, will become hopelessly lost in the thicket and which will lead us on and guide us to a secure goal? From the fluctuations of the dialogue, the fencing of the opponents and the labyrinthine paths of the dialectic, is it possible to draw a unified system? Is there perhaps a profound and secret coherence in what at first seems contradictory? Who, in brief, is the real Plato?*

* In the next section (II) which we are omitting, Prof. Stefanini discusses some of the more important attempts made to synthesize the enigmatic thought of Plato. (Tr.)

The Platonic Skepsis

A passage from the VII Epistle:

THE animating secret of the dialogue concealed in the fiction created by Plato finally dispenses with intermediaries and speaks of itself, in its proper mode, in a document which thereby gains great value, the *Epistles*. The longest and most important of these discourses, the *VII Epistle*, bears a passage (340b-345c) which seems to contain an answer to the question we have formulated from the very beginning.*

Plato relates that once at the court of Dionysius, he sought to test the tyrant's love for philosophy, of which he had heard in Athens. To do this, Plato set before him the difficulties and great patience demanded of any one desirous of attaining wisdom. In the face of such a discipline those who are "stuffed with little half-understood philosophical formulas", who, in brief, have barely a "varnishing of opinions" (340b: τοῖς τῶν παρακουσμάτων μεστοῖς; 340d: δόξαις δ' ἐπικεχρωσμένοι) withdraw and pretend to know enough already. Such precisely was the attitude of Dionysius. After the first lesson given by the teacher he assumed the airs of one who, in his own wisdom, no longer needs to gather up the crumbs of other peoples' speeches. Plato learned later that his unskilled and untutored pupil had brought together in a treatise the fruit of the knowledge he had hurriedly acquired from others. Our author declares that all who have written or ever will write about the subject which engages his whole interest have understood absolutely nothing about philosophy. "As for me, at least no work on such a topic exists, nor ever will exist. It is indeed impossible to express philosophy in formulas, as is done in the other sciences; it is only after a long communion and familiarity with given problems that truth suddenly shines in the soul as the light given off from the spark which nourishes it (cf. 341c-d: Οὐκ οὐν ἐμὸν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστι σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μήποτε γένηται. ρητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν ὥς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει). If Plato had thought it possible to summarize his philosophy in a treatise and communicate it to everybody, he certainly would have done so and would have found deep satisfaction in giving to others a doctrine of salvation. He preferred not to do this, for it would have furnished some with an object of scorn and others with a means of puffing themselves up with an air of vain and stupid self-sufficiency.

He then expounds the reason why in philosophical matters nothing may be committed to writing. The elements of knowledge, according to the *VII*

* At this point Prof. Stefanini presents a long critical argument in support of the authenticity of the *VII Epistle*; the bibliographical references given are important and somewhat exhaustive. (Tr.)

Epistle, are five: the name, the definition, the image, knowledge, and the object itself. Let us take, as our example, a circle: we have first the name, *circle*; secondly, the definition, *that whose extremes are perfectly equidistant from the center*; thirdly, the image, *a drawing of the circle*; fourthly, *knowledge, understanding, true opinion*; fifthly, *the circle in itself*. Now the circle in itself is something entirely different from the name, the words pronounced, the material figures, and the knowledge which resides in the soul. Of these four elements the one which most resembles the object in affinity and likeness is the understanding (*νοῦς*). The first step in expressing being is the use of "that weak aid known as the word" (343a: διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀσθενές); but no sane man will risk confiding his thoughts to such a vehicle, especially when he is dealing with written words, for a name has no fixity and no one can prevent us from calling square that which is circular, and vice versa. The definition has no greater solidity for it is composed of names and verbs. The image is the element most contrary to the object in itself; for example, the drawn circle borders with the straight line on all its sides in contradiction to the circle in itself which does not. Knowledge resides in the soul and is thus distinguished from both its object and the other three auxiliaries. While the soul seeks knowledge of essences the instruments it uses always furnish it with what it does not seek and this in turn gives rise to much difficulty and uncertainty. The writer or orator who wishes to pursue the fifth element, the object in itself, finds himself exposed immediately to off-hand criticism not through his own fault but on account of the deficient means at the disposal of human knowledge; he may thus give the public, untrained for the understanding of truth, the impression that he knows nothing of what he strives to write or say. "But after dwelling on the four elements for a long time and passing up and down from one to the other, he finally gains knowledge after great labour" (343e: Ἡ δὲ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν διαγωγή, ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαίνουσα ἐφ' ἑκάστον, μόγις ἐπιστήμην ἐνέτεκεν....).

Long exercise, agility of mind and good memory do not suffice for grasping the object; it is necessary to add a certain affinity with the object, without which Linceus himself could not give us a vision of truth. "It is only after a laborious rubbing together of names, definitions, visual perceptions and sensible impressions, and after a discussion neither bitter nor full of envy, that the object studied becomes illuminated by the light of wisdom and of understanding, with all the intensity of which human strength is capable." (344b: μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἀλλήλα αὐτῶν ἑκάστα, ὀνόματα καὶ λόγοι ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἐν εὐμενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσεσιν χρωμένων, ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἑκάστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην). This is the reason why he who puts his thoughts in writing either does it for fun or has lost his senses. Dionysius composed his treatise on the fundamental principles of nature moved by the ambition of passing himself off for one gifted with a superior education, on account of which he was indeed most unworthy.

The constructive skepsis

FEW characters in the dialogues excel the Dionysius of the *VII Epistle* for the vivid and truthful portrayal of a character, of a human type which is constantly reappearing on the stage of history. He is the ambitious man who, with neither a love for truth nor any special disposition towards philosophy, is attracted to it for the purpose of adding yet another artificial gem to his pompous show of transient power. He listens to Plato distractedly, then passes on to some other philosopher and, while he should still bear the attitude of a pupil, considers himself already a master. The product of his dabbling in philosophy is a book, a collection of definitions and principles which are to be the foundation of human knowledge. This character is a worthy representative of all those philosophical pharisees who remain satisfied with the letter and are prompt to reject the spirit; who hasten towards the little magic formula which will resolve all their problems, who ingest syllogisms and conclusions, and, enchanted by the fatuous light of "clear and distinct ideas", do not discern the mystery which is ever reappearing at the margins of every solution and conclusion. But the old philosopher who has devoted his entire life to the search for truth, indignantly rejects the unworthy pupil and declares that history has not recorded a single line written by those philosophers who specialize in the making of maxims ("massimari"). The results of other sciences may rightly be summarized in manuals, facile instruments of knowledge; but in order to comprehend the science of sciences an entire life is barely sufficient. Truth does indeed exist, as the fixed and immutable object of knowledge; but what means are at our disposal for reaching it? The name? the definition? the image? The name has a conventional meaning and enjoys no natural connection with the essence of the thing signified; the definition is likewise deceptive and inadequate, for it is composed of names and verbs; the image distorts the concept by imprisoning it within a sensible sign. Let us not attempt, then, to enclose truth within a few phrases and a definition or two. Only the man who devotes his whole existence to a conscientious search, and, after accumulating many experiences, gathers in all the testimonies of sense, reason and intuition, and who, above all, cultivates within himself, by fervent love, an affinity with the object towards which his spirit incessantly strives in its ideal ascent, will be able to realize *imperfectly* his aspiration on this earth and prepare himself for the fully peaceful vision in the other life.

An absolute certitude and a radical doubt, a fixed and immutable object offered for the spirit to conquer, a subject anxiously groping and continually defeated by the end to be achieved; an intuition which suddenly and prodigiously soars to the greatest heights, a wearisome dialectic which never succeeds in grasping that sudden revelation which is its necessary presupposition and consequence: such is the essential nature of Plato's thought.

No term in the history of philosophy can epitomize the precise nature of Plato's thinking. Were I to speak of "*probabilismo*", I would indeed express the human mind's incapacity of ever equating itself perfectly with truth, but I would likewise take no account of the other means through which Platonism secures and guarantees certitude. Were I to speak of *mysticism*, I would do jus-

tice to the affective *élan* by which the soul stretches out towards its fulfillment, but I would overlook the rationalism which at times seems almost like that of the Enlightenment, and those aspects which make the use of ratiocination the indispensable condition of every spiritual progression. Forced to use a term, however inadequate, which might represent the greatest degree of resemblance to Plato's thought as a whole, I prefer to speak of Plato's *skepsis*, taking the word in its etymological meaning of *search, inquiry*. Plato is one who unceasingly inquires after what he has already found; that is, the effort of his speculation is directed towards translating into rational terms the ineffable experience revealed in intuition. He does not hold that whatever lies beyond the limits of inquiry is *unknowable* but simply unknown to him. He does not doubt the existence of truth; he merely hesitates to formulate a set of proofs for its existence.

The term I have used to characterize Plato's thought has acquired a meaning markedly different from the original; and by skeptic we now commonly understand one who displays an unlimited faith in his own reason for the purpose of demonstrating the inconsistency of every rational argument; the skeptic is one who dogmatically demolishes all dogma. While this degenerate type of *skepsis* inevitably ends in self-destruction, the only consistent attitude for a radical negativist is a complete suspension of judgment or, in a word, silence. In the *Republic*, (VII, 538d-539a) Plato condemns the kind of *skepsis* which is corruptive and in the *Theaetetus* he brings to light the vicious circle in the skepticism by which Protagoras, aiming at a denial of every absolute criterion of truth, ends in a contradictory self-destruction (171c: Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθὴς οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ).

The Platonic *skepsis* escapes this vicious circle. Although it, too, takes into account the imperfection of our instruments of knowledge, it accepts partial and fragmentary elements in the elaboration of positive data. In sum, Plato's *skepsis* is not only fruitful and constructive; it is the only possible *skepsis*.

In Eros his philosophy finds a divine symbolic expression experienced as a desire for great abundance and, touched by a sense of indigence, as a movement of the whole soul towards it. Plato does not possess wisdom, for he who is wise does not seek; it is in this sense that we may say that none of the gods philosophize. Neither is Plato ignorant, for he who is ignorant likewise does not seek. Let us say then that he is wise with the ignorance he unendingly seeks to overcome, and ignorant with the wisdom he incessantly seeks to reconquer.

The elements of the Platonic *skepsis*

I DO not intend to furnish an inventory of the constitutive principles of Plato's method, for nothing is more deeply repugnant to the spirit of Platonism than to pretend to schematize the abstract laws of thought and to derive from the dialogues a kind of formal logic of Plato's invention. The interpreter who does not wish to attribute to the master the work of pupils, or inventive and imaginative critics, must adhere faithfully to the real logic of the system and follow all its articulations in their manifold and subtle variations. It is therefore

fitting and proper that we study a few aspects of this method in a concrete context and view the system in its actual development so as to understand better, from a general point of view, the nature of the Platonic skepsis.

Language — An idolatry of the word is a necessary presupposition of a superficial knowledge, acquired at low cost, and nourished by neither love nor meditation. The worship of the precise term held to be perfectly adequate to the meaning of the thing, by and through which it arises; the substitution of the dictionary for the spirit and life; the habit of thinking of words rather than things, and of resolving problems by ruminating on terms: all this is peculiar to the philosophical formalism of all ages, to the rhetors who infested Greece in the times of Plato and the Peripatetics who killed Scholasticism in the XV century. Plato's contemporaries found pleasure in the study of etymological derivations and searched about in a name, as one does in a precious jewel-box, for the hidden answer. Plato pursues these etymologists by means of his beloved dialectic and the most refined irony (the precise meaning of which has deceived many modern critics), and parades his entire etymological knowledge, only so that later he may suddenly free himself of it (let us continue, he writes in the *Cratylus*, 396e, in this divine science today, and let us be purified of it tomorrow: αὐριον δ' ἔάν καὶ ὑμῖν ξυνδοκῇ, ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθα τ' αὐτὴν καὶ καθαρούμεθα), and show that an analysis of the constitutive forms of language demonstrates so little that it may account for such contradictory doctrines as those of Heraclitus and Parmenides. If, then, we wish to discover the nature of things, we must not study their names but the very things themselves (*Cratylus*, 439b); and the philosopher will not yield to the slavery of language, but will employ language as a servant of thought (*Theaetetus*, 173c). It should be evident by now that Plato holds no fetishistic attitude towards philosophical terminology; indeed he maintains an attitude of indifference which at times may be taken for contempt.⁶ The meaning of things and ideas must not be fixed in sacrosanct terms, but rather spring from the whole complexus of reason, with its references to experience and those suggestive images which put the mind in immediate contact with the object, without any intermediary principles which may act as veils or obstacles. When the concept is uncertain and changing, the word too (without displaying in its unchangeable form a clarity which thought does not possess) must follow, submissively, the uncertainties of thought; and in this way, upsetting the well-ordered plans of the critics, at times δόξα may be used in the place of ἐπιστήμη (*Phaedrus*, 237d-e; *Politicus*, 309c; *The Laws*, II, 655a), and ἐπιστήμη in the place of νόησις (*Rep.*, VII, 534a); ἀνδρεία may enter the field of σωφροσύνη (*Laws*, I, 632-635) or the field of σωφροσύνη ἀνδρεία (*Rep.*, IV, 430e-431e); the relation between the Ideas and the sensible world may be indicated equally well in the same passage by the most diverse names: participation, presence, communion, adhesion (μετέχειν, παρουσία, κοινωνία, προσγίγνεσθαι, ἐπέναι: *Phaedo*, 100c-105). One term which should certainly have been kept sacred and untouchable in Plato's vocabulary is the one chosen to designate the essence in which his whole system seems to culminate, the Idea. Instead, εἶδος or ἰδέα, often used indiscriminately, own a set of meanings over and beyond the metaphysical, meanings such as *Species*, *genus*,

concept, and even *sensible form* or *appearance*. (For the use of εἶδος in this latter sense, cf. *Phaedo*, 73d, 87a; *Rep.*, VI, 510d).

This brazen indifference in the use of terms has a necessary repercussion on the logical operations performed on these terms. We may say that if Plato was the first one to define clearly the essential elements of a definition, e.g. the genus and the specific difference, he was also the first to criticize the definition. No excessive difficulty is presented in arranging hierarchically in the universe of knowledge concepts pertaining to objects in the sensible world, an exercise which our author does indeed perform with ease, as if he were engaged in play. (Cf. the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*; in the latter dialogue, however, in the very middle of the logical game, Plato invites anyone who wishes to reach his old age in a somewhat wiser condition to avoid being inquisitive about words (τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, 261e). When it is a question of concepts pertaining to spiritual realities and metaphysical essences, however, one should not insist on precision for this would reveal both superficiality and light-mindedness. Just as we may say that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, and express by each of these definitions some aspect of the one same reality (*Rep.* I, 337b), so we may say that justice is the dutiful, the useful, the helpful, the profitable, the pleasing (*Rep.*, I, 336d; *Clitophon*, 409c) and each of these predicates expresses some partial yet true aspect of the one same reality. When our philosopher, pressed by the internal logic of his system, refuses to sum up the whole of being in the ideal causes and to introduce a principle of limitation outside of the Ideas, in the form of a partner in the production of the world of becoming, he does not pronounce a solemn definition to be sculptured in marble, but prefers to confound critics by defining the principal of limitation in a thousand different ways, as *matrix*, *mother*, *moving cause*, *non-being*, *place* (τόπος), *position* (χώρα), *location* (ἔδρα), *the infinite* (ἄπειρον), *the necessary* (ἀνάγκη, ἐλμαρμένη): These different predicates, in their complementary natures rather than in their reciprocal exclusion, mark the depths of the Platonic skepsis.

Plato's declared aversion to the written word draws its origin in great part from a consideration of the artificial immobility which thought assumes when it becomes imprisoned in a definitive form not adapted to the mentality of those to whom it is addressed. Thus the inventor of writing is not to be considered a benefactor of humanity, because he made it possible for men to acquire from books, without effort of inquiry and apprenticeship, a superficial knowledge which conceals a radical ignorance (*Phaedrus*, 275). In his literary production our author adhered faithfully to the dialogue form, not only as a homage to his master and as an expression of his natural artistic vocation, but also and especially because this form is the only one that makes it possible to escape thoughts that are dead and stereotyped in formulas, and to reproduce and conserve the freshness of living thought which shines forth in the inquiry and discussion. The dialogue is the literary genre of skepsis.

Reason — Plato employs neither deduction nor induction alone, and is neither an empiricist nor an *apriorist*. He speaks rather of the process which goes from the many to the one (συναγωγή) (*Phaedrus*, 66b, 249b-c, 265d; *Philebus*,

16b-e, etc.) and of the inverse process from the one to the many (διάρσεις) and furnishes later logicians with material for their elaborate distinctions. Yet none of his arguments and conclusions draws its strength exclusively from either the first or second of these two methods which he considers to be complementary phases of one same process, and distinguished solely for purposes of clarity and pedagogical reasons. From the examination of single facts the mind rises to the discovery of their essential unity which, even before being induced from experience, is deduced from an *a priori* exigency of the soul; this exigency in turn would remain un-expressed if sensible experience did not act as a stimulus for the process of ideation. Some facts find an explanation in a thesis, in which, however, the inquirer cannot rest, for the thesis itself, on becoming transformed into an hypothesis, must be connected with the other facts and data presented by reason and experience; and if it breaks down under demonstration, the preceding work is not fruitless for in shifting the inquiry to a higher plane it postulates a new hypothesis. Moreover, it takes into account the exigencies satisfied by the first thesis and thus may be more accurately considered as the true in respect to the false than as the complete in respect to the unilateral and incomplete. Thus understood, an *hypothesis* is an *approximative* rather than a *postulated* thesis, and must be transcended by one which will express a greater degree of approximation to the true.⁷

Whenever two contradictory hypotheses, tested by the facts, both appear to be false, the process of reducing them to absurdity⁸ marks neither the end of speculation nor the rejection of reason, for the unending process of speculation proves either that the antinomy is insoluble only for those who start with certain principles that speculation must overcome; or the two theses, irreconcilable in their reciprocal opposition, may be reconciled in a higher thesis which contains them both.

The first case takes place in the *Euthyphro* which shows that the two propositions "that is holy which is pleasing to the gods" and "that which is holy pleases the gods" are unfounded and unjustified, because the seer-priest has a false conception of the deity. In later dialogues, however, these same propositions are presented as true: since the gods love only that which is holy, the holy is undoubtedly that which is loved by the gods. If one wishes to conclude the discussion raised in the *Laches*—"If courage is wisdom it cannot be distinguished from the other virtues", "If it is not knowledge it is not a virtue"—one must go beyond the formalistic framework of that dialogue to the realism of the *Republic*. There the various parts of the human soul are distinguished and subordinated to the understanding, and the virtues, differentiated one from the other, are brought into unity by the rule of wisdom.

The second case takes place in the *Parmenides*: first the colossal failure of the Eleatic dialectic is underscored and attention is focussed upon the absurd consequences which flow from the two contradictory hypotheses: "the one is" and "the one is not". Then, having shown these inconsistencies, the dialectical dialogues demonstrate that the one and the many, understood under different aspects, cooperate in explaining the nature of reality which, though permitting neither an abrupt passage from the one to the infinite nor the skipping of inter-

mediaries, may yet be organized in ever more general and comprehensive syntheses mounting to the supreme unity.

The hypothetical method which Plato both practised and understood very well (*Phaedo*, 101d-e: "If any one attacks your hypothesis, do not mind him nor answer him until he has seen, in your opinion, whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an explanation, go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you find the best, and finally reach a definitive principle." Cf. also *Meno*, 86e; *Rep.*, 437a, 510-511; *Philebus*, 16d.) is not some third method added to induction and analysis;⁹ it is the very unbroken rhythm of speculation, ascending and descending; never satisfied with its own syntheses, it gathers in new elements and, in response to new difficulties, unendingly searches for wider and wider syntheses. The way of skepsis is neither συναγωγή nor διαίρεσις alone; it is the ascending and descending διαγωγή which passes again and again through the different phases of knowledge (*Epistle VII*, 343e). We must guard against being satisfied with thought which is merely self-consistent and coherent *in form*, and must not fail to submit our principles to the test of reality; otherwise we may find ourselves in the position of mathematicians who at times draw coherent conclusions from false premises (*Cratylus*, 436d:ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου μικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψευδοῦς γενομένους, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἐπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις). This warning against arguments which, though formally true are yet founded on wrong premises, throws light on another aspect of the Platonic skepsis. For Plato truth does not proceed from *one* argument or reason, but from *the whole* of reason, and the burden of proof of every single proposition falls upon an infinite number of proofs or on one alone, provided that one be co-extensive with the whole system. Just as things are connected and related almost as if they were actual relatives (*Cratylus*, 438e), so our reasonings are connected one to the other, and each acquires value to the extent to which it is capable of inserting itself securely within the general organic framework of life and thought. Every reason and discourse is immediately destroyed once a part is separated, cut off from the whole. This mania for separating, Plato insists, expresses an attitude foreign and unresponsive to the harmonic unity of truth (*The Sophist*, 259e). The light which illuminates the human mind shines forth only when names, definitions and perceptions are joined together, and the nature of the good has been thoroughly examined (*Philebus*, 60a).

Suppose the question at issue is the immortality of the soul. In this case Plato does not act as a logician who deludes himself into believing that he has engendered certitude by means of a *formally correct* syllogism, for he knows that the premises of one short argument are supported by those of another and that this argument in turn finds its source in still other premises which again must be demonstrated, etc., so that in order to fix one component element of certitude the furthest limits of knowledge must be touched. Thus the *Phaedo* presents several proofs although, for one who considers things carefully, there is only one proof illustrated under different aspects. This dialogue may indeed be defined as a general summary of the Platonic system presented under the aspect

of immortality. In the *Symposium* the creative power of art will be celebrated and immortality illustrated from a new point of view, as a fruitful and fecundating source. The *Republic* will be entirely devoted to a definition of the idea of justice, and the thesis "the soul is immortal" will be confirmed by a proof taken from a study of the consequences injustice breeds in the human soul. In brief, at every salient moment of his speculation, Plato feels the need of reviewing freshly a given concrete problem in order to re-cast it as one aspect of the whole philosophical problem which is, in substance, one and indivisible.

Pragmatism

ONLY a thought which is total can bring us close to the truth—thought, that is, which is the fruit of profound meditations that express direct experiences and interpret the exigencies of life. One must live with problems for a long time (*Epistle VII*, 341c-d) and persist in a life of intense and sustained reason before truth may at last condescend to become our friend (*Republic*, VII, 539d). To trust our own wisdom, or remain satisfied with our triumphs is to deceive ourselves, for the scope and range of reason is as wide as life itself.

In this sense right reason and the good life may be equated; yet we must not understand Plato to be substituting blind factors such as habits, feelings and passions for reason and intelligence in the difficult task of searching for truth. It is the mind alone that constitutes the nobility of the human soul, and enjoys the singular faculty of beholding the ideal light and of assisting man in the fulfillment of his nature. But in the realization of this supreme task the blind forces of the soul may act as a *causa permissiva*, if indeed they have not already obstructed the action of thought and obscured the natural light of intuition. While sensible pleasure, avarice and ambition prevent man from thinking and thereby cause him to be evil, the good life is a fully rational kind of existence which confers on the soul a certain affinity with and likeness to the object of its constant aspirations, that is, God (*Theaetetus*, 176b). One must move towards truth with the whole soul, we read in the *Republic*, (518c; cf., *Phaedo*, 84a-b).

In the solemn passage of his last hours, Socrates defends his last great hope with clear reasoning in the presence of absorbed friends who are drawn into the marvelous serenity emanated by the dying man. Then one of those present raises a doubt and presents an argument which shakes the faith of the audience: can it be that Socrates, the wise one, will yet drink the hemlock under the burden of one final objection, and confront death as one who no longer knows certitude? But Socrates is not disturbed. He caresses Phaedo's golden locks affectionately, answers objections triumphantly, and even finds time to admonish those who are so easily perturbed by the words of Simmias and Cebes. Let us be on our guard, he warns, against becoming haters of reason (μισολόγοι) for this would indeed be the greatest misfortune that any man could possibly suffer. We hate reason with the same motive by which we infer all men to be untrustworthy and bad just because we have discovered one man to be unfaithful.

But if we fix in our minds that no reasoning is ever sound, it becomes evident that it is we who are the diseased ones (*Phaedo*, 89c-90e, *passim*).

The sense in which we may speak of pragmatism in Plato should by now be clear. Plato does not insist that life furnish us with a light that reason alone can give; he asks, rather, that life allow reason to get to the very bottom of things, and that it be not prematurely judged at some half-way point in its work where a judgment would inevitably be negative. Whoever makes use of *one* reason alone in judging reason *itself* is a true *misologist*. Thus Plato's pragmatism is the exigency that the work of reason be co-extensive with life.

It is a serious misunderstanding of his thought to see Plato as a fore-runner of William James,¹⁰ to hold that his interest lies only in the securing of certain practical results and that belief in absolute and eternal ideas is subordinate to this purpose. In the Greek philosopher the hegemony of reason over life is absolute and admits of no exceptions;¹¹ truth seems to be prostituted to the needs of the practical order when rulers are allowed to wield lies and falsehood against their enemies, or their own citizens, for the ends of the State (*Rep.*, III, 389b); when the "noble lies" of rulers are acknowledged to be necessary (*Rep.*, III, 414b); and when it is considered legitimate to deceive the youth for good ends (*Laws*, II, 663d). Yet a more attentive study will show that these passages actually confirm Plato's intellectualism, for "noble lies" are employed by the wisdom of rulers as instruments for putting under their dominion those who, either because of inexperience or innate stupidity, are incapable of understanding the ways of wisdom. Plato does not intend to extract truth from error through some practical experiment, but to deceive, in an innocent way, in order to safeguard the rights of truth.

The problematic

THE work of extending the sphere of reason, of embracing psychological facts and sensible data in their total complexity and variety, of attending to the arguments of others and understanding history in its vicissitudes, involves the choice of a path that is being constantly blocked by difficulties in preference to a smooth road paved with illusory solutions. The short-sighted man is ever ready to establish an agreement among his representations and rest fixed in his conclusions, but he who has acute vision realizes that no limits can restrict inquiry, and proceeds onwards, full of astonishment (*Theaetetus*, 155d: μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν) and laden with a growing yet ever unsatisfied curiosity. The philosophical genius finds his guaranty in his power of understanding the ultimate problems which every solution brings forth and of discerning the halo of mystery which surrounds the luminous center of every truth.

Plato is the first great formulator of problems.

Heraclitus brings to light the eternal warfare that tears things to pieces and, by uniting opposites in a paradoxical way,¹² provokes reflection. The sophists, in denying traditional doctrines, keep the field of speculation alive through their negative positions. In Plato a problem never gushes forth from a violent clash of contradictory theses, but is prepared, gradually unfolded, and drawn

out, as if it were undergoing an educational experience. The initial point of the difficulty is now discovered, and seen to mature in various solutions crystallized in opposite schools. All the arguments of the opponents are heard, a solution is formulated, a higher synthesis is sketched, and the boundaries are left shaded and unclear so that proper emphasis may be placed on the fact that absolute clarity has not yet been reached.

If we connect the dialogues among themselves, from the first to the last, we discover that each one, within its own autonomy, contributes to the success of this one great plan. Some, the so-called negative dialogues, are deprived of decisive answers, yet do have positive conclusions in the form of clear historical and doctrinal presentations, but the conclusions that are advanced in them are introduced in later dialogues as the germ of new problems. This work, however, is not Sisiphean, for every solution suffices for those who are not strong enough to go ahead. It suffices also because the reasons of State mount and allow no postponement, because the given solution, though not false, expresses truth in a merely partial and fragmentary way, *in aenigmate*.

The myopia of pupils and the haste of critics would stop the inquiry at one of these intermediary solutions, but the Platonic skepsis is forever stretching beyond, in yearning; it destroys nothing of the work already accomplished and gathers everything in for a thorough reëvaluation. Problems concerning the voluntary character of evil, the nature of the human soul, the relations between ideas and the world, the form of political rule, although confronted and resolved many times, are still open questions on the last page of the dialogues, as they were on the very first. Problems are left open so that mankind may continue and extend the work of this one man, a work which for centuries has lived through distress and hope, doubt and certitude, and at one time has even anticipated, in a prophetic way, the most illuminating visions of man.

Verisimilitude

LET us now turn to a principle which Plato proclaims and repeats with an insistence so great that one immediately thinks of the unfaithful lover who wishes to conceal his own betrayal by uttering the warmest declarations of love.

Truth resides entirely in the object and the differing degrees of perfection in knowledge depend upon the greater or lesser perfection of the object itself. Immutable being can be known only through one immutable, fixed and perfect science, while that which only half exists, that is, the world of becoming, can give rise only to half-knowledge, or opinion. Ignorance is the counter-part of non-being (*Rep.*, V. 476d-480a; *Timaeus*, 29b-c, etc.).

More than a principle, this is an attitude ingrained in Plato as it is derived from the philosophical tradition and spiritual climate in which he lived. In the Greek world thinking is seeing, it is a clear mirroring in oneself of the object existing outside of thought; the activity of the subject has nothing to do with producing, increasing or decreasing the clarity of this vision. *In form* Plato remains *enslaved* to this dogma; *in substance*, he rises above it and gains merit

by contradicting it and giving it the lie. If we wish to convince ourselves of this point let us dwell on this situation: if there were a complete science of being, fixed and immutable, very few pages or even lines in Plato would treat of the kind of knowledge to which he dedicated his entire life.

Is it perhaps the ideas that are at issue? If so, nothing is more changeable, nothing more imprecise than the definition of their nature, number, hierarchical order, and relations: interposed between ourselves and the ideas we always find the cloud, at once radiant and opaque, of myth. Or are we speaking of the gods? After reading in the *Cratylus* (400d), that we know nothing of the gods, we are assured, in the *Timaeus* (29c-d), that we can say nothing very coherent or precise about them, and that, moreover, we should limit ourselves to considerations of a mythical character. Nor does Brochard, in our opinion, seem to be correct in his attempt to safeguard and explain the validity of the Platonic principle by situating the gods in the world of becoming.¹⁴ This explanation seems to be unwarranted for, apart from the celestial deities which do indeed belong to the world of becoming, it is impossible to situate in this same place the Demiurge who is the cause of generation and concerning whom Plato says nothing which is not mythical and indeed, in certain respects, grotesque. Perhaps it is a question of the human soul and immortality, yet even in this case we are told that it is impossible to see clearly with utter certainty, and therefore, it is best that we accept that one of our own arguments which is most probable and solid, and sail the high seas of life as on a raft, since we are unable to make the voyage on a more solid vessel, i.e. rest on an argument divinely inspired (*Phaedo*, 85c-d).

He who cultivates dialectic, the science of pure being, would never leave behind a documented record of his knowledge, even if we insisted on believing in his absolute adherence to the principle just stated. Plato, on the contrary, was the master of his own philosophical instinct and, first in the history of philosophy, questioned and rejected, though with hesitation and through deviations, the ontologistic thesis that reduces thought to a passive collection of rays of truth. For the Athenian philosopher truth is always possessed of an essential objective foundation, although its subjective correlative can never be transformed into vision and possession on this earth unless it has first undergone an experience of effort, aspiration, work and conquest. Moreover, the vision itself flashes on a few chosen ones and in exceptional moments of grace which remain inexpressible in rational terms.

The disproportion and disconformity which always remains between human knowledge and its object establishes a relationship which is not reducible to that of the modern theories of knowledge. Although this relationship does not have the value of an *equation*, it by no means bears an agnostic sense, for the relationship involved is one of *verisimilitude*, i.e. conformity to the true.

With a sustained and intense movement of ideas which can leave no doubt concerning his true intentions, and at the salient moments in his speculation, when a precise and apodictic knowledge of immutable being is in order, Plato takes us back and fixes our attention on an allegory, a symbol, an approximative expression. The thesis, "that which fully is, is fully knowable" (*Rep.*, V, 477a) finds no experimental verification in the dialogues.

After refuting the various erroneous conceptions of the good advanced in the *Republic*, Socrates should be ready to give his own definition. Instead he withdraws: "what the good in itself might possibly be, let us not inquire for the moment . . . ; I would rather speak, with your consent, about some of the consequences which follow from the good and most intimately resemble it" (*Rep.*, 506d-e). We cannot redeem our capital yet, although we can for the moment collect interest. And although we are promised payment of our entire debt at "some future time", the occasion never arises, and human knowledge is forever left in the anti-chamber of the Supreme Good while the man of wisdom who has actually seen this Good must rely on images alone to reveal the vision enjoyed. According to what we are told in the *Phaedrus* (250a) those souls which enjoy a more accurate recollection of the vision experienced in the other life do not discern, though they are inflamed by the sight of beauty, that wisdom which would arouse in them a love too ardent for the un-veiled eye to sustain. It is impossible, even in the *Philebus* (64e-65a), to embrace the nature of the good in one idea and we must be satisfied, therefore, with characterizing it in some way through the ideas of beauty, proportion and truth. Concerning the nature of the human soul, God alone can speak adequately for man is limited to thinking in images (*Phaedrus*, 246a). Nor does the dying sage, in the supreme moment, know how to substantiate his great hope by a speech other than "likely", "probable" (*Phaedo*, 70b). In the *Timaeus* (which cannot be taken only as a treatise on physics since it describes the origin of the world in relationship to the supreme metaphysical truths) the author marks every stage of his journey with the repeated declaration of the likely or probable character of what he is describing (*Timaeus*, 29d: ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τοῦτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν. Cf. also 48d, 59c, 72d-e.) Even the plan for the constitution of the ideal state is, for Plato, a *likely myth* exemplified in the *Republic*, the *Politicus* and the *Laws* by means of different exemplars which vary according to the greater or lesser degree of approximation which each bears to the eternal model.

Imperfect knowledge, then, does not depend on any imperfection in the object but on the deficiencies which lie in the knowing subject. In the face of the erroneous ontologistic presupposition, the following warning strikes a profoundly sincere note: "Let us remember, I who speak and you who judge—we are of the same human nature" (*Timaeus*, 29d); and human nature participates most imperfectly in the divine understanding (*Timaeus*, 51e) and shares very little of truth (*Laws*, VII, 804b: μικρὰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἄττα μετέχοντες).¹⁵

Incapable of producing a science perfectly adequate to its object, the human mind must proceed in the manner of children who, faced with the problem of deciphering a complex word, interpret it by comparing it with the simple elements of which it is composed and thus pass from the known to the unknown (*Politicus*, 278). We must search, in the world of our representations and concepts, for an image of the unseizable ideal which resembles the exemplar as closely as possible, and in this way reconstruct the principle on the basis of its known consequences. Without this bold exemplification of the ideal, we would

be unable to understand higher things, or would understand them as in a dream in which images disappear and leave us in a state of ignorance (*Politicus*, 277d: Χαλεπόν.... μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι τῶν μειζόνων....).

Stripped of vain pretensions, reason retains its positive value, and constitutes the most noble aspect of the human soul. If it does not lift us right up to our goal, it does nonetheless carry us towards it and prepare us for visions, fleeting in the present life, unchanging in the life beyond. If it does not permit us to stare in contemplation at the blazing sun, it does liberate us from the cavern of shadows and assist us in climbing the radiant slopes of the earth. In this progressive approximation of the human mind to its object we find among the sciences a complete hierarchy of degrees extending from the lowest to the most supreme. It is in this highest degree that we find expressed the most intimate likeness to truth. Plato, the first critic of reason, escapes both an optimistic and pessimistic attitude towards it. In a realistic way, he first sanctions the faculty and then immediately recognizes its limitations.

The myth

AFTER the comments just offered have been understood, it is easy to resolve the problem of the Platonic myths. Since the λόγος in the sense indicated above, is μῦθος, it is natural that the μῦθος be λόγος. The likely, the probable (εἰκῶν) becomes both the meeting point and the point of reconciliation between myth and scientific discourse (λόγος ὁρθός), and if we make our concept of science and myth sufficiently broad we may effect a meeting of the two on a common ground.

In this respect, too, Greek objectivism weighs heavily on Plato's thought and constitutes a premise unfavorable to the use not only of myth but of every form of image and simile. The author who suffered from the deluded belief that he could reproduce pure and immutable being in a precise science, free of sensible contamination, could not but judge arguments sustained by similitudes empty and treacherous (*Phaedo*, 92d: ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιούμενοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οἷσιν ἀλαζόσι, κ' ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εἰ μάλ' ἐξαπατῶσι....) and legendary tales as outright falsehood (*Rep.*, II, 382d). But this idea does not correspond to the most intimate and profound conviction of our philosopher, for whom the highest science is that which gives the highest degree of probability. Plato then proceeds not only to acknowledge but to place at the very center of his speculation every form of expression which realizes, in the concrete shape of image and symbol, the world of unseizable abstract concepts.

One of the most acute and ingenious interpreters of Plato's thought, V. Brochard, understands the essential function of the myth very well; he gives it a value similar to δόξα, which is as important in relation to becoming as dialectics is in relation to the world of essence. We may say that there exists a kind of Platonic probabilism which is as much a part of the whole system as the philosophy of becoming is and which gives the myth its natural place.¹⁷

This argument, however, seems to be only partially warranted since it takes no account of the more extensive employment Plato makes of mythology. As long as Brochard insists that "it is through a clear, definitive and unshakeable science such as mathematics, the perfect model of knowledge, that Plato flatters himself into believing that he may attain the highest objects",¹⁸ we are prevented from explaining and justifying the existence of the myth precisely because of the presence of these supreme objects. If, again, we insist on taking the Platonic dialectic for some kind of higher mathematics we shall forever be faced with the mystery if not absurdity of the following elements: the invocation of the Muses, the intervention of inspired priestesses, the revelation of dreams at the precise moment in which the argument is raised to a discussion of the world of ideas, of beauty in itself, of goodness and the supreme cause, problems which are certainly not reserved for the realm of δόξα.

There is no easy transition, in Plato, from the rational to the fantastic phase. The one merges into the other through a thousand intermediary nuances and makes it impossible to speak either of logical demonstrations or of imaginative anticipations.¹⁹ At the end of the dialogue on immortality Socrates reviews the ground covered and embraces in the one word μῦθος both the last tale concerning the destiny of souls in the other world and the whole preceding argument (*Phaedo*, 114d). It may be profitable to distinguish, with Willi, various kinds of myths, from the eschatology of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* to the allegories of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, and again to the brilliant similitudes distributed throughout the dialogues.²⁰ It would be equally interesting to follow the course of pure reason as it engages in lively skirmishes with experience, clothes itself with figurative language and enriches itself with metaphor; then finally it ascends to the sphere of myth. It is reason seeking fancy, and fancy seeking reason. Dialectic, a skeletal off-shoot of the same rich earth which had nourished a profusion of myths, assaults in vain the empyrean heights of truth, fails, and now asks of earth fresh waters that it may clothe itself in the green leafy branches of poetry. Beauty and truth, ingenuity of intuition and profundity of thought thus give Greece a new form of higher poetry.

There is no dualism between imaginative form and rational content in the Platonic myth, and whoever insists on separating the two may be said to be inflicting death on a still living organism. Yet several critics have interpreted Plato along these lines. Teichmüller, whose thesis has been validly rejected by Chiappelli,²² tried to interpret the myth as an expression of scientific thought couched in a sensible form for the benefit of those who are incapable of rising to the level of abstract concepts, and identified the essence of Platonism entirely with its rational part purified of the allegorical superstructure.²³ Couturat too understands the myth as a pure game. He takes no account of statements other than those which are favorable to the myth and impoverishes Plato's thought by reducing it to one central nucleus, the theory of ideas, which should finally emerge, he believes, free—(a most debatable thesis!)—of every mythological intrusion.²⁴ Rather than follow this course, the genius of Plato gives birth to a doctrine connatural to and inseparable from his own marked form and style; and whoever destroys the appearances of the fanciful in search of scientific meaning

will end with broken pieces in his hands, as a child in search of the soul of his little toy.

Having reached with Phaedrus the place where, according to legend, Boreas carried off Orithyia, Socrates suggests that we give a rational explanation and hold that it was the wind that killed the child in throwing her against the rocks; but then he immediately declares that this would be a rather crude and pedantic exercise (*Phaedrus*, 229e:....ἄτ' ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος). Critics have attributed this crude type of wisdom to Plato many times, yet the myth, taken in its wholeness, without searching for any double meaning or allegorical reference, is for him *the expression of verisimilitude*.²⁵ If we wish to go beyond the myth and approach truth more intimately we must not disembodify the tale in order to discover the skeletal frame of reason, but create a doctrine or myth which resembles truth more fully. The myth cannot be explained; it must be transcended. Then only would we be free to look with contempt upon those expedient instruments our thought is forced to use, "when by searching elsewhere we could find better and truer ones." (*Gorgias*, 527a:εἰ πῃ ξητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὐρεῖν.)

Thus in some of the dialogues the tale precedes the argument and constitutes an obscure anticipation of what the discussion will illustrate. At other times myth and reason alternate and chase each other, each seeking in the other a greater degree of certitude and evidence than it itself possesses. Finally, a tight argument occasionally breaks through the peaks in those difficult regions of the myth where the fog is most dense, as if there to protect the over-hanging and most limpid atmosphere of truth.

Does Plato perhaps exhibit a lack of thinking in losing himself in the darkness of myth and legend? Does his speculative power perhaps become extinguished by the imaginative constructions and nuanced contours which destroy the more direct and exact lines of certitude? Hegel²⁶ and Zeller, who were of this opinion, lamented the fact that Plato was too great a poet to be an accomplished philosopher.²⁷ I, on the contrary, find the myth to be a source which strengthens Plato's speculation, as those Christian mystics of the Middle Ages who lost themselves in the "holy darkness" which envelops the soul at the climax of meditation were excited by a prodigious increase of intellectual vigor. It is far better to touch the limits of the inexpressible on the bold wings of intuition than to enclose the cycle of speculation within the illusory clarity of abstract ideas. In our attempt to escape the *language of mythology* we end up slaves to the *mythology of language*.²⁸ It is better to describe the winged chariot with its charioteers and fiery steeds than to hand down a faculty psychology which compresses the life of the spirit into the superficial simplicity of an immutable schematism. It is better to describe the Demiurge mixing together the *same* and the *other* in forging the world than to delude others and oneself into the belief of having definitely resolved the fundamental problem of reality by means of the magic power of a word, the *sinolum* of matter and form.

Besides bearing a solution, the myth makes us understand the further difficulties which arise from it. In sum, the myth is the best instrument for the formulation of problems; hence, far from arresting, it indeed promotes the movement of Plato's thought.²⁹

Truth

PLATONIC probability is not an *appearance* but an *approximation* of truth. In one sense it is used in courts as when, for example, a man who has just beaten up some other person convinces the judge that it is he, feeble and inoffensive, who is innocent, for how indeed could he ever have assaulted the other who is a much stronger man? This kind of probability, which the masses understand, is used by those who care nothing for truth (*Phaedrus*, 273a-c). But the probability philosophy makes use of arises out of a continuous contact with truth and hence presupposes a certain knowledge of the true (*Phaedrus*, 273d: τὰς δ' ὁμοιότητος ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστ' ἐπίσταται εὐρίσκειν.)

What we have said about the value of human knowledge in Plato would lead to a very serious equivocation if we did not understand that fundamental postulate of Platonism which asserts that human knowledge, howsoever imperfect, is always confronted with a full and finished object which, although unseizable, is forever present. It is ineffable though without it nothing could be said.

At this point an equivocation is easily possible for we may think of the *a priori* of modern critical philosophy. The Marburg school has made this interpretation popular: the doctrine of reminiscence becomes an expression, in mythical form, of the Kantian concept of thought as a condition of possible experience; and the ideas, rather than subsistent realities to which thought must submit, become mental syntheses and hypotheses, capable of being erroneous yet joined in true relations, which science uses in coordinating and interpreting experience. The object of science is no fixed, absolute and transcendent term. It is one with the very dynamism of inquiry which, never exhausted, enjoys an indefinite extension. The ideas of God and of immortal soul become, as in Kant, at once exigencies and problems insoluble by reason. The good is no longer divine but the very moral imperative which transcends the empirical conditions of existence and realizes a value expressive of the meaning of life. Aspiration, love, anticipation and faith become substitutes for knowledge understood as adequation to object, and for morality understood as submission to transcendent law.³⁰

This solution is unwarranted for it assigns to the past, in an anachronistic manner, a gnoseological conception entirely modern and repugnant to the classical spirit and overthrows the precise meaning of the Platonic system. For Plato aspiration certainly does have value, but only in so far as a goal exists in which the aspiration sooner or later terminates; and the indefinite process of inquiry has value in so far as it is the condition *sine qua non* for experiencing flashes of intuition on this earth and a peaceful vision in the world to come. And although it is possible to organize life as if it were an aspiration towards the good, we must remember that it is not the process of aspiration itself that is divine but the Good which provokes the process. Problems are subjective demands for solutions in so far as there does exist an objective reality the subject wishes to understand. Eros would not be so restless if its parents had not bequeathed it the memory of great richness.

Hypotheses, understood as partial visions of reality, succeed one another, ever more vast and comprehensive, until we finally reach a fixed point, which is not presupposed but is rather the reason for its own being (*Rep.*, VII, 510b:τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τοῦ α; *Rep.*, VII, 533c-d: τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται.... Cf. *Phaedo*, 101d). So long as the sciences are held within the field of hypotheses and postulates, they remain suspended to what they do not know and hence arrogate to themselves the name of science which, strictly speaking, belongs to dialectics alone. Rather than stopping half way dialectics touches the farthest boundaries in the sphere of knowledge and discerns the essence which causes becoming, the immutable which produces change, the spiritual which explains the corporeal. It is this intellectual intuition of essence (νόησις), mystical and ineffable, that reveals to the soul the exemplar, that fixed and non-presupposed principle (ἀρχή) which makes the highest science possible and produces the highest degree of probability. It is not *subjective form* but *objective intuition* that constitutes the category of understanding; and hence our *a priori* remains forever the absolute, the law of our aspiration towards the good is still the Good, and the norm of probability is the True.

While the moderns subordinate the object to the activity of the subject Plato subordinates the activity of the subject to that of the object. Yet he does transcend the objectivism of the classical world and anticipates modern subjectivism when he assigns the subject the very grave task of bringing itself, by means of all the resources of reason, as close as possible to the richness of an initial revelation. Without the contribution of our activity, this revelation would remain eternally fruitless. *The intuitionist* of the absolute realizes that truth must be given a relatively small place in our reasoning only so that it may achieve greater value for us. We must exercise our powers of reflection methodically so that the light of intuition, which did one day illuminate us momentarily and will illuminate us again in a future life if we merit its rays, may not be scattered, and then vanish, in the present life.

Translated by ALFRED DI LASCIA

¹ The opinion of Grote, Hermann, Bonghi, Gomperz and Ramorino on Protagoras' speech are exposed and then accepted by B. Nardi in "Il discorso di Protagora nell'omonimo dialogo platonico", in *La Cultura Filosofica*, IX, 1915, no. 2.

² Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, 1903-1909, 3rd ed., Leipzig, Veit & Co., II Band, V Buch, XVII, Kap., p. 451.

³ Ancient authors too were aware of the contradictions to be found in Plato, especially in reference to his treatment of the immortality of the soul. Cf. Galen, *De format. foetus*, IV, 700-773 (*Opera omnia*, ed. Kuhn, Leipzig, Cnoblochium, 1821-1833.) In the *De natura Deorum* (I, 12) Cicero speaks of *inconstantia Platonis* and recalls the contradictory statements he made about the Divinity (*inter se vehementer repugnantia*). Cf. G. Grote, *Plato and the other Companions of Socrates*, London, Murray, 1867, 2nd ed., vol. II, pp. 220-1. Rémusat writes: "No one has yet explained the careless and uncertain way in which Plato often expresses himself on the most sublime and essential points of his philosophy. Are we perhaps to speak of impotence, carelessness, hidden motive, scepticism, artifice, prudence, playfulness? In our opinion, this is one of the most difficult problems Plato has bequeathed us: it is a problem yet to be solved", quoted by Ch. Huit, *La vie et l'oeuvre de Platon*, Paris, Thorin, 1893, v. I, p. 228.

⁴ V. A. Chiappelli, *Della interpretazione panteistica di Platone*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1881, p. 49.

⁵ If we compare this passage with section 314a-c of the *II Epistle*, we shall immediately see the exaggeration and falsification which characterize the latter document. In the *VII Epistle* he who is wise commits nothing to writing because it is impossible to summarize in a few hasty formulas the results

gained from the highest science; in the *II Epistle* he writes nothing and commits his conclusions to memory so as to prevent them from falling into the hands of the public. In the first case we see the reserve and reticence of wisdom in the face of an arduous and difficult task, in the other case we discern a shabby esoteric attitude absolutely foreign to the Platonic spirit. Again in the *VII Epistle* the philosopher states that he has written no treatise which in any way resembles that of Dionysius; in the latter case, he states that "there neither exists nor ever will there exist a work written by Plato: what at the present goes under this name is the work written by Socrates in his earliest youth." (314c). We find no justification, therefore, in the comparative study of the two *Epistles* undertaken by Zuccante in order to invalidate the testimony of the *VII Epistle* ("Sulle scarse notizie, intorno a Platone e alla sua vita, in Platone stesso e nei suoi contemporanei," in *Rendiconti del R. Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e lettere*, Serie II, v. LVI, f. VI-X, 1923, pp. 319ff.).

⁶ "Plato . . . professes, in regard to words, an indifference which displays a disposition at once somewhat coquettish and serious" (Diès, *Autour de Platon*, Paris, Beauchesne, v. I, p. 17). In v. II, p. 277 we read: "Plato has argued very strongly for the freedom of the philosopher in the use and application of words."

⁷ G. Falter (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Idee*, Teil I, *Philon und Plotin*, Giessen, Töppelman, 1906) has understood well that Plato does not use the term *ὑπόθεσις* in the sense of a supposed thesis; yet he is not correct in holding that the term refers to a thesis which acts as the foundation of the system or of one of its parts. A foundation does indeed exist in Plato. It is the intuition of essence, but is never called *hypothesis*. Its proper denomination is *principle* (*ἀρχή*). Cf., for example, *Phaedo*, 101e and *Rep.*, VII, 510b.

⁸ It is from the Eleatic school and especially Zeno that Plato derives the method of examining two contrary possibilities in the solution of a given problem for the purpose of excluding the one and the other in what is called a contradictory dichotomy. I do not think it is correct to claim, as Windelband does (*Platone*, Graziussi translation, Palermo, Sandron, p. 77) that there is any difference between the two, in that Zeno uses the method in a *negative* way while Plato makes a *positive* use of it. The method is at once negative and positive for both thinkers, for the procedure aims at making a higher truth emerge against the thesis of the adversaries which, in the case of Zeno, is made up of the erroneous testimony of common sense, and in the case of Plato is composed of the several doctrines of the Sophists, the Eleatics, etc. Brochard (*Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne*, introduction by V. Delbos, Paris, Alcan, 1912, pp. 15-23) has argued that the so-called sophisms of Zeno must not be understood as a fruitless dialectical game, but as a demonstration of his teacher's [Parmenides] system.

⁹ Such is the opinion, among others, of Cl. Piat, *Platon*, Paris, Alcan, p. 48. Among several of the other and different views expressed on this subject two are equally inexact: that of Brochard who makes the hypothetical method resemble deduction (in *Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne*, Paris, Alcan, 1912, p. 132) and that of James Adam (in *The religious teachers of Greece*, Edinburgh, Clark, 1908) who makes it resemble the experimental method.

¹⁰ J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909, p. 100. Diès resists the pragmatic interpretation successfully and writes (*op. cit.*, pp. 356-58): "The truth of science . . . is deduced neither from the internal harmony of a system of representations nor from the fittingness of this system to practical needs." While we are in agreement with the second part of Diès' thesis we cannot accept the first because the course of Plato's speculation is actually a continuous search for an intimate coherence of representations drawn from sources which, more and more copious, make the system grow gradually in extension and profundity. The immutable character of the true *ex parte objecti* should not make us forget that there is a dynamism *ex parte subjecti*.

¹¹ We could extend this thesis and prove that it is impossible to speak of pragmatism in the modern sense of the word in connection with the whole of Greek philosophy, at least up to the time of Plato. In pressing dialectics into the service of those who in any manner whatsoever wish to conquer life by means of practical aims, does sophism perhaps constitute an exception? No, because among the sophists also an essentially intellectualistic thesis prevails: truth is one with individual opinion and hence with that which is useful to the individual. Every moment of action is good because every position assumed by thought is true. It is always pure reason, so to speak, that dominates and subjects to itself practical action.

¹² Burckardt calls the salient note in Heraclitus' system a "mystical paradox", in *Heraclit, seine Gestalt und seine Künden: Einführung, Übertragung, Deutung*, Zurich, Orell Füssli, 1925.

¹³ A thousand attempts have been made to resolve the enigma which marks the negative dialogues. It has been supposed that the absence of definite conclusions may be explained by the immediate aim of the dialogues, which is to confute and humiliate the sophists. But in some of the dialogues, as we have already noted, Socrates is humiliated no less than his opponents and the sides thus turn out to be even. A salient feature here and an acute proposition there have been the object of close attention, and have been seized upon as conclusive expressions (commentaries, especially of the minor dialogues, are full of such interpretations). But it seems strange, so say the least, that an expression which the author himself has taken pains to confute should be taken as conclusive. Reference has been made to *concealed conclusions* (cf., F. Aciri's note on the *Parmenides* in *Dialoghi di Platone volgarizzati*, Napoli, Morano, 1889, p. 237) or implicit understandings (cf. Huit, *op. cit.*, II, p. 204) as if it were somehow possible to justify the reticence of an author who has never engaged in esoteric teaching. Gomperz advances the hypothesis (*op. cit.*, II, Band, V Buch, IX Kap., p. 337) that the absence of conclusions may be explained

in terms of the aim that every reader who searches in a serious and personal way should be given a free and open field for speculation, as if Plato, in order to keep his heirs quick-minded, has chosen the scarcely edifying means of remaining in slothful silence. The problem of the negative dialogues remains insoluble for those who do not take into account the development of the Platonic skepsis.

¹⁴ Brochard, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 95-98.

¹⁵ There is very little truth, then, in the statement that the Platonic synthesis is dominated by "an almost absolute trust in the value of human reason" and that "nothing escapes the hold of science which is indeed capable of exhausting reality; it is precisely reason, moreover, that performs this function." (Piat, *op. cit.*, pp. 337, 338).

¹⁶ Protagoras' criticism of reason is founded on the presupposition that the nature of things is irrational; the universality of reason is lacking because there is no universality in things. Protagoreanism does not therefore break through the general lines of the *objectivistic* vision of the Greek world.

¹⁷ Brochard, "Les mythes dans la Philosophie de Platon", in *Année philosophique*, reproduced in *op. cit.*, pp. 47-60.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁹ Although Perceval-Frutiger (in *Les Mythes de Platon*, Paris, Alcan, 1930) refuses to drive a sharp wedge between the rational and the fanciful phases of Plato's thought he accepts the myth only in those points where we find a certain freedom of exposition, symbolic expressions and a prudent imprecision of thought which deliberately avoids arriving at direct statements. If this were indeed the true yardstick for measuring the extent of the mythical side of Plato's thought very few pages of the dialogues would be excluded because very few are entirely without freedom of exposition, symbolic expressions and a prudent imprecision of thought. M. Valgimigli, on the other hand, correctly understands the complementary character of the *μῦθος ποιεῖν* and of the *λόγους ποιεῖν*. "In Plato," he writes, there is a poetizing which is also a philosophizing; here indeed is the very root of Plato's famous myths which are never extraneous as if embellishments or ornaments of his philosophizing. This philosophizing is also a poetizing, a composing of music, a *μουσικὴν ποιεῖν*, a singing for the end of enchanting (*ἐνδύειν*) the soul of man. All this we may say because every true and great philosophizing is never an abstract theoretical speculation, but is born and responds to the most vivid needs of man who is forever asking the philosophers, as he does the poets, the reason for his being and his dying". (I *Fedone*, Palermo, Sandron, 1921, p. xxxv).

²⁰ Walter Willi, *Versuch einer Grundlegung der platonischen Mythopöie*, Zürich, Erell Füssli, 1925.

²¹ E. Bréhier ("Philosophie et Mythe", in *Revue de Mét. et de Morale*, May 1914) holds that philosophy was born in Greece in opposition to the myth and as a way of opposing a static vision of things against the historical vision, represented by the myth. "There is an almost brutal contrast between the procedures of regressive analysis and those of progressive synthesis which constitute the life and movement of the ideal world, and the historical series of events, of catastrophes and successes which humanity as well as the individual soul must undergo." (p. 336) This may be said only of a philosophy which is preoccupied with realizing fixed and immutable logical constants; it cannot be said of that authentic philosophy which Plato certainly represents and which derives its truth from history and, if we may, from the drama of individual conscience.

²² A. Chiappelli, *Della interpretazione panteistica di Platone*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1881, pp. 51-74.

²³ Teichmüller, *Studien zur Gesch. d. Begriffe*, Berlin, Weidman, 1874; *Die Platonische Frage, Eine Streitschrift gegen Zeller*, Gotha, Perthes, 1876, *passim*. Chiappelli is correct in holding, in the work just mentioned (p. 57) that Teichmüller's attitude towards the Platonic myth is not always consistent; on p. 57, for example, the myth is taken as a means for deducing from metaphysical principles the position of the individual and the singularity of experience.

²⁴ L. Couturat, *De platonis mythis*, Paris, Alcan, 1896. On the question we are treating see also Julius Deuschle, *Ueber die plat. Mythen*, Hanau, 1854; Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, London, 1904.

²⁵ I say *verisimilitude* and not *probability*, as Brochard, on the contrary, does (*op. cit.*, p. 53). Probability (*τὸ εὐλογον*) expresses a relationship to truth which is very different from verisimilitude. In the latter case the approximation to truth is a positive and certain mastery on the part of the intellect; in the former it is merely a subjective faith which may even be deceptive and serve only as a guiding principle in practical life. The philosophy of probability—"probabilismo"—is a consequence of the degenerate skepsis of the New Academy and should not lead us into error in interpreting Plato.

²⁶ Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Phil.*, in *Werke*, Berlin, 1833, II. Band, I. T., p. 188. Cf. *Introduzione alla storia della filosofia*, translated by Momigliano, Bari, Laterza, 1925, p. 109.

²⁷ Zeller, *Die Phil.d. Griechen*, Leipzig, Reisland, 1922, 2nd ed., II. Teil, I. Abt., pp. 581-82: "Plato is not a complete philosopher because there is more of the poet in him."

²⁸ Let Eucken (*Ueber Bilder und Gleichnisse in der Philosophie*, Leipzig, Veit Comp., 1880) appeal for the need of purifying philosophical language of image and metaphor and urge that it be kept on the level of abstraction. He will not succeed, for language is, in origin and essence, imagery, and no philosopher, howsoever arid and austere he be, will ever succeed in purifying it so thoroughly as to alter its nature.

²⁹ He who believes that he can discover in the use of the myth the religious doctrines of a specific sect contracts Plato and falsifies his ideas (Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 133). Undoubtedly our philosopher

has performed, to use a term dear to the French, a "transposition" of orphic and dionysiac myths recast, along with other popular legends, poetic fictions and myths drawn from the official tradition, in the grandiose framework of his system. But we should not believe that he possesses the zeal of the initiate or the faithfulness of the "adept". He does not move from sect to school in order to strengthen the myth with philosophic content; he rather goes from the school to wherever his genius finds nourishment. He assimilates the materials of tradition and presses them into his service by a process of transfiguration.

³⁰ H. Cohen, *Die plat. Ideenlehre*, in *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, v. IV, 1865; *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*, Marburg, Pfeil, 1874. Cohen's writings have been collected recently in the following volumes: *Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte*, Akademie-verlag, Berlin, 1928, two volumes; *Jüdische Schriften*, Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, Berlin, three volumes. A. Auffarth, *Die platonische Ideenlehre*, Berlin, Dümmler, 1883. P. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre, Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*, Leipzig, Meiner, 1921, 2nd ed. (cf. G. Lombardo-Radicke's review in *La Critica*, I, 1903). For the formal interpretation of the Good see G. Rensi, "Platonismo e idealismo" in *Rivista di filosofia*, XIII, 1923, N.I.; "La morte di Eros," *ibid.*, XIX, 1928, N. 4. Not very different from Natorp's interpretation is that of J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909. On this whole question cf. A. Steriad, *L'interprétation de la doctrine de Kant par l'Ecole de Marburg, Essai sur l'idéalisme critique*, Paris, Giard et Brière, 1913.

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ON CONSULTING THE FAITHFUL IN MATTERS OF DOCTRINE*

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

A QUESTION has arisen among persons of theological knowledge and fair and candid minds, about the wording and the sense of a passage in the *Rambler* for May. It admits to my own mind of so clear and satisfactory an explanation, that I should think it unnecessary to intrude myself, an anonymous person, between the conductors and readers of this Magazine, except that, as in dogmatic works the replies made to objections often contain the richest matter, so here too, plain remarks on a plain subject may open to the minds of others profitable thoughts, which are more due to their own superior intelligence than to the very words of the writer.

The *Rambler*, then, has these words at p. 122: "In the preparation of a dogmatic definition, the faithful are consulted, as lately in the instance of the Immaculate Conception." Now two questions bearing upon doctrine have been raised in this sentence, putting aside the question of fact as regards the particular instance cited, which must follow the decision on the doctrinal questions: viz. first, whether it can, with doctrinal correctness, be said that an *appeal* to the faithful is one of the preliminaries of a definition of doctrine; and secondly, granting that the faithful are taken into account, still, whether they can correctly be said to be *consulted*. I shall remark on both these points, and I shall begin with the second.

Cardinal Newman is generally accepted as one of the seminal minds of the 19th century, and the influence of his thought does not seem to have diminished. The present essay appeared in THE RAMBLER, in July 1859, during the brief period in which he was editor of that publication, and does not appear in any collected volume of his work. We are glad to publish it for its historical and documentary value as well as its intrinsic merit, and believe it will be of special value to those studying the place of the layman in the Church.

* As far as can be determined, this article has never been completely republished in English, although a portion of it was appended to the later edition of *The Arians of the Fourth Century*. The first article Newman wrote for *The Rambler* during his brief editorship was on the "school question". In a passage in which he expressed the belief that the Bishops were interested in the opinions of influential laymen in matters which directly concerned them, he stated that the faithful are "consulted" in the preparation of a dogmatic definition. This terminology proved so provocative that he felt constrained to publish his full thought on the matter in the present article.

Newman's critics were far from satisfied. He became involved in a lengthy correspondence with Dr. Gillow of Ushaw and was forced to resign as editor; the article was formally delated to Rome as heretical by Dr. Brown, the

NOW doubtless, if a divine were expressing himself formally, and in Latin, he would not commonly speak of the laity being "consulted" among the preliminaries of a dogmatic definition, because the technical, or even scientific, meaning of the word "consult" is to "consult *with*," or to "take *counsel*." But the English word "consult," in its popular and ordinary use, is not so precise and narrow in its meaning; it is doubtless a word expressive of trust and deference, but not of submission. It includes the idea of inquiring into a matter of *fact*, as well as asking a judgment. Thus we talk of "consulting our barometer" about the weather:—the barometer only attests the *fact* of the state of the atmosphere. In like manner, we may consult a watch or a sun-dial about the time of day. A physician consults the pulse of his patient; but not in the same sense in which his patient consults *him*. It is but an index of the state of his health. Ecclesiastes says, "*Qui observat ventum, non seminat*;" we might translate it, "he who consults," without meaning that we ask the wind's opinion. This being considered, it was, I conceive, quite allowable for a writer, who was not teaching or treating theology, but, as it were, conversing, to say, as in the passage in question, "In the preparation of a dogmatic definition, the faithful are consulted." Doubtless their advice, their opinion, their judgment on the question of definition is not asked; but the matter of fact, viz. their belief, is sought for, as a testimony to that apostolical tradition, on which alone any doctrine whatsoever can be defined. In like manner, we may "consult" the liturgies or the rites of the Church; not that they speak, not that they can take any part whatever in the definition, for they are documents or customs; but they are witnesses to the antiquity or universality of the doctrines which they contain, and about which they are "consulted." And, in like manner, I certainly understood the writer in the *Rambler* to mean (and I think any lay reader might so understand him) that the *fidelium sensus* and *consensus* is a branch of evidence which it is natural or necessary for the Church to regard and consult, before she proceeds to any definition, from its intrinsic cogency; and by consequence, that it ever has been so regarded and consulted. And the writer's use of the word "opinion" in the foregoing sentence, and his omission of it in the sentence in question, seemed to show that, though the two cases put therein were analogous, they were not identical.

Having said as much as this, I go further, and maintain that the word "consulted," used as it was used, was in no respect unadvisable, except so far as

Bishop of Newport. W. W. Ward's *Life of Cardinal Newman* (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1912, pp. 479-536, esp. 501ff.) gives a detailed account of the situation and states the ultimate outcome succinctly: "Newman's defense was quite unanswerable, and after it had been understood in Rome the matter was finally dropped" (p. 503).

As editor Newman did not sign the article, and even refers to himself in the third person, but the fact and background of his authorship have been recently re-clarified in Douglas Woodruff's introduction to Lord Acton's *Essays on Church and State* (Hollis and Carter, 1952). (The translation of the Latin has been added. Ed.)

it distressed any learned and good men, who identified it with the Latin. I might, indeed, even have defended the word as it was used, in the Latin sense of it. Regnier both uses it of the laity and explains it. "*Cùm receptam apud populos traditionem consulunt et sequuntur Episcopi, non illos habent pro magistris et ducibus, &c.*" (*De Eccles. Christ.* p. i. §1, c. i., ed. Migne, col. 234). But in my bountifulness I will give up this use of the word as untheological; still I will maintain that the true theological sense is unknown to all *but* theologians. Accordingly, the use of it in the *Rambler* was in no sense dangerous to any lay reader, who, if he knows Latin, still is not called upon, in the structure of his religious ideas, to draw those careful lines and those fine distinctions, which in theology itself are the very means of anticipating and repelling heresy. The laity would not have a truer, or a clearer, or a different view of the doctrine itself, though the sentence had run, "in the preparation of a dogmatic decree, *regard* is had to the sense of the faithful;" or, "there is an *appeal* to the general voice of the faithful;" or, "*inquiry* is made into the belief of the Christian people;" or, "the definition is not made without a previous *reference* to what the faithful will think of it and say to it;" or though any other form of words had been used, stronger or weaker, expressive of the same general idea, viz. that *the sense of the faithful is not left out of the question* by the Holy See among the preliminary acts of defining a doctrine.

Now I shall go on presently to remark on the proposition itself which is conveyed in the words on which I have been commenting; here, however, I will first observe, that such misconceptions as I have been setting right will and must occur, from the nature of the case, whenever we speak on theological subjects in the vernacular; and if we do not use the vernacular, I do not see how the bulk of the Catholic people are to be catechised or taught at all. English has innovated on the Latin sense of its own Latin words; and if we are to speak according to the conditions of the language, and are to make ourselves intelligible to the multitude, we shall necessarily run the risk of startling those who are resolved to act as mere critics and scholastics in the process of popular instruction.

This divergence from a classical or ecclesiastical standard is a great inconvenience, I grant; but we cannot remodel our mother-tongue. *Crimen* does not properly mean *crime*; *amiable* does not yet convey the idea of *amabilis*; *compassio* is not *compassion*; *princeps* is not a *prince*; *disputatio* is not a *dispute*; *prævenire* is not *to prevent*. *Cicero imperator* is not *the Emperor Cicero*; *scriptor egregius* is not *an egregious writer*; *virgo singularis* is not *a singular virgin*; *retractare dicta* is not *to retract what he has said*; and, as we know from the sacred passage, *traducere* is not necessarily *to traduce*.

Now this is not merely sharp writing, for mistakes do in matter of fact occur not unfrequently from this imperfect correspondence between theological Latin and English; showing that readers of English are bound ever to bear in mind that they are not reading Latin, and that learned divines must ever exercise charity in their interpretations of vernacular religious teaching.

For instance, I know of certain English sermons which were translated into French by some French priests. They, good and friendly men, were surprised to find in these compositions such language as "weak evidence and

strong evidence," and "insufficient, probable, demonstrative evidence;" they read that "some writers had depreciated the evidences of religion," and that "the last century, when love was cold, was an age of evidences." *Evidentia*, they said, meant that luminousness which attends on demonstration, conviction, certainty; how can it be more or less? how can it be unsatisfactory? how can a sane man disparage it? how can it be connected with religious coldness? The simple explanation of the difficulty was, that the writer was writing for his own people, and that in English "an evidence" is not *evidentia*.

Another instance. An excellent Italian religious, now gone to his reward, was reading a work of the same author; and he came upon a sentence to the effect, I think, that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was to be held with "implicit" faith. He was perplexed and concerned. He thought the writer held that the Church did not explicitly teach, had not explicitly defined, the dogma; that is, he confused the English meaning of the word, according to which it is a sort of correlative to *imperative*, meaning simple, unconditional, absolute, with its sense in theology.

It is not so exactly apposite to refer,—yet I will refer,—to another instance, as supplying a general illustration of the point I am urging. It was in a third country that a lecturer spoke in terms of disparagement of "Natural Theology," on the ground of its deciding questions of revelation by reasonings from physical phenomena. It was objected to him, that *Naturalis Theologia* embraced *all* truths and arguments from natural reasons bearing upon the Divine Being and Attributes. Certainly he would have been the last to depreciate what he had ever made the paramount preliminary science to Christian faith; but he spoke according to the sense of those to whom his words might come. He considered that in the Protestant school of Paley and other popular writers, the idea of Natural Theology had practically merged in a scientific view of the argument from Design.

Once more. Supposing a person were to ask me whether a friend, who has told me the fact in confidence, had written a certain book, and I were to answer, "Well, if he did, he certainly would tell *me*," and the inquirer went away satisfied that he did *not* write it,—I do not see that I have done any thing to incur the reproach of the English word "equivocation;" I have but adopted a mode of turning-off a difficult question, to which any one may be obliged any day to have recourse. I am not speaking of spontaneous and gratuitous assertions, statement on solemn occasions, or answers to formal authorities. I am speaking of impertinent or unjustifiable questions; and I should like to know the man who thinks himself bound to say every thing to every one. Physicians evade the questions of sick persons about themselves; friends break bad news gradually, and with temporary concealments, to those whom it may shock. Parents shuffle with their children. Statesmen, ministers in Parliament, baffle adversaries in every possible way short of a direct infringement of veracity. When St. Athanasius saw that he was pursued on the Nile by the imperial officers, he turned round his boat and met them; when they came up to his party and hailed them, and asked whether they had seen any thing of Athanasius, Athanasius cried out, "O yes, he is not far from you;" and off the vessels went in different directions as swiftly as they could go, each boat on its own errand, the pursuer

and the pursued. I do not see that there is in any of these instances what is expressed by the English word "equivocation;" but it is the *equivocatio* of a Latin treatise; and when Protestants hear that *equivocamus sine scrupulo*, they are shocked at the notion of our "unscrupulous equivocation."

Now, in saying all this, I must not be supposed to be forgetful of the sacred and imperative duty of preserving with religious exactness all those theological terms which are ecclesiastically recognised as portions of dogmatic statements, such as *Trinity, Person, Consubstantial, Nature, Transubstantiation, Sacrament, &c.* It would be unpardonable for a Catholic to teach "justification by faith only," and say that he meant by "faith" *fides formata*, or "justification without works," and say that he meant by "works" the works of the Jewish ritual; but granting all this fully, still if our whole religious phraseology is, as a matter of duty, to be modelled in strict conformity to theological Latin, neither the poor nor children will understand us. I have always fancied that to preachers great license was allowed, not only in the wording, but even in the matter of their discourses; they exaggerate and are rhetorical, and they are understood *piè* as speaking *more prædicatorio*. I have always fancied that, when Catholics were accused of hyperbolical language towards the Blessed Virgin, it was replied that devotion was not the measure of doctrine; nor surely is the vernacular of a magazine writer. I do not see that I am wrong in considering that a periodical, not treating theology *ex professo*, but accidentally alluding to an ecclesiastical act, commits no real offence if it uses an unscientific word, since it speaks, not *more digladiatorio*, but *colloquialiter*.

I shall conclude this head of my subject with allusion to a passage in the history of St. Dionysius the Great, Bishop of Alexandria, though it is beyond my purpose; but I like to quote a saint whom, *multis nominibus* (not "with many names," or "by many nouns"), I have always loved most of all the Ante-Nicene Fathers. It relates to an attack which was made on his orthodoxy; a very serious matter. Now I know every one will be particular on his own special science or pursuits. I am the last man to find fault with such particularity. Drill-sergeants think much of deportment; hard logicians come down with a sledge-hammer even on a Plato who does not happen to enumerate in his beautiful sentences all the argumentative considerations which go to make up his conclusion; scholars are horrified, as if with sensible pain, at the perpetration of a false quantity. I am far from ridiculing, despising, or even undervaluing such precision; it is for the good of every art and science that it should have vigilant guardians. Nor am I comparing such precision (far from it) with that true religious zeal which leads theologians to keep the sacred Ark of the Covenant in every letter of its dogma, as a tremendous deposit for which they are responsible. In this curious sceptical world, such sensitiveness is the only human means by which the treasure of faith can be kept inviolate. There is a woe in Scripture against the unfaithful shepherd. We do not blame the watch-dog because he sometimes flies at the wrong person. I conceive the force, the peremptoriness, the sternness, with which the Holy See comes down upon the vagrant or the robber, trespassing upon the enclosure of revealed truth, is the only sufficient antagonist to the power and subtlety of the world, to imperial comprehensiveness, monarchical selfishness, nationalism, the liberalism of philosophy, the en-

croachments and usurpations of science. I grant, I maintain all this; and after this avowal, lest I be misunderstood, I venture to introduce my notice of St. Dionysius. He was accused on a far worse charge, and before a far more formidable tribunal, than commonly befalls a Catholic writer; for he was brought up before the Holy See on a denial of our Lord's divinity. He had been controverting with the Sabellians; and he was in consequence accused of the doctrine to which Arius afterwards gave his name, that is, of considering our Lord a creature. He says, writing in his defence, that when he urged his opponents with the argument that "a vine and a vine-dresser were not the same," neither, therefore, were the "Father and the Son," these were not the only illustrations that he made use of, nor those on which he dwelt, for he also spoke of "a root and a plant," "a fount and a stream," which are not only *distinct* from each other, but of one and the same *nature*. Then he adds, "But my accusers have no eyes to see this portion of my treatise; but they take up two little words detached from the context, and proceed to discharge them at me as pebbles from a sling."* If even a saint's words are not always precise enough to allow of being made a dogmatic text, much less are those of any modern periodical.

NOW I come to the *matter* of what the writer in the *Rambler* really said, putting aside the question of the *wording*; and I begin by expressing my belief that, whatever he may be willing to admit on the score of theological Latinity in the use of the word "consult" when applied to the faithful, yet one thing he cannot deny, viz. that in using it, he implied, from the very force of the term, that they are treated by the Holy See, on occasions such as that specified, with attention and consideration.

Then follows the question, Why? and the answer is plain, viz. because the body of the faithful is one of the witnesses to the fact of the tradition of revealed doctrine, and because their *consensus* through Christendom is the voice of the Infallible Church.

I think I am right in saying that the tradition of the Apostles, committed to the whole Church in its various constituents and functions *per modum unius*, manifests itself variously at various times; sometimes by the mouth of the episcopacy, sometimes by the doctors, sometimes by the people, sometimes by liturgies, rites, ceremonies, and customs, by events, disputes, movements, and all those other phenomena which are comprised under the name of history. It follows that none of these channels of tradition may be treated with disrespect; granting at the same time fully, that the gift of discerning, discriminating, defining, promulgating, and enforcing any portion of that tradition resides solely in the *Ecclesia docens*.

One man will lay more stress on one aspect of doctrine, another on another; for myself, I am accustomed to lay great stress on the *consensus fidelium*, and I will say how it has come about.

* Athan. de Sent. Dion. 8.

1. It had long been to me a difficulty, that I could not find certain portions of the defined doctrine of the Church in ecclesiastical writers. I was at Rome in the year 1847; and then I had the great advantage and honour of seeing Fathers Perrone and Passaglia, and having various conversations with them on this point. The point of difficulty was this, that up to the date of the definition of certain articles of doctrine respectively, there was so very deficient evidence from existing documents that Bishops, doctors, theologians, held them. I do not mean to say that I expressed my difficulty in this formal shape; but that what passed between us in such interviews as they were kind enough to give me, ran into or impinged upon this question. Nor would I ever dream of making them answerable for the impression which their answers made on me; but, speaking simply on my own responsibility, I should say that, while Father Passaglia seemed to maintain that the Ante-Nicene writers were clear in their testimonies in behalf (*e. g.*) of the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and Justification, expressly praising and making much of the Anglican Bishop Bull; Father Perrone, on the other hand, not speaking, indeed, directly upon those particular doctrines, but rather on such as I will presently introduce in his own words, seemed to me to say "*transeat*" to the alleged fact which constituted the difficulty, and to lay a great stress on what he considered to be the *sensus* and *consensus fidelium*, as a compensation for whatever deficiency there might be of patristical testimony in behalf of various points of the Catholic dogma.

2. I should have been led to fancy, perhaps, that he was shaping his remarks in the direction in which he considered he might be especially serviceable to myself, who had been accustomed to account for the (supposed) phenomena in another way, had it not been for his work on the Immaculate Conception, which I read the next year with great interest, and which was passing through the press when I saw him. I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing my gratitude and attachment to a venerable man, who never grudged me his valuable time.

But now for his treatise, to which I have referred, so far as it speaks of the *sensus fidelium*, and of its bearing upon the doctrine, of which his work treats, and upon its definition.

(1.) He states the historical *fact* of such *sensus*. Speaking of the "*Ecclesiæ sensus*" on the subject, he says that, though the liturgies of the Feast of the Conception "*satis apertè patefaciant quid Ecclesia antiquitus de hoc senserit argumento*,"¹ yet it may be worth while to add some direct remarks on the sense itself of the Church. Then he says, "*Ex duplici fonte eum colligi posse arbitramur, tum scilicet ex pastorum, tum ex fidelium sese gerendi ratione*"² (pp. 74, 75). Let it be observed, he not only joins together the *pastores* and *fideles*, but contrasts them; I mean (for it will bear on what is to follow), the "*faithful*" do not *include* the "*pastors*."

(2.) Next he goes on to describe the relation of that *sensus fidelium* to the *sensus Ecclesiæ*. He says, that to inquire into the sense of the Church on any

¹ Clearly show what the ancient Church thought of this issue."

² "We think it can be gathered from a double source, that is from the manner in which both "*pastors*" and faithful conduct themselves."

question, is nothing else but to investigate towards which side of it she has more inclined. And the "*indicia et manifestationes hujus propensionis*" are her public acts, liturgies, feasts, prayers, "*pastorum ac fidelium in unum veluti conspiratio*" (p. 101). Again, at p. 109, joining together in one this twofold consent of pastors and people, he speaks of the "*unanimis pastorum ac fidelium consensio . . . per liturgias, per festa, per euchologia, per fidei controversias, per conciones patefacta*."³

(3.) These various "*indicia*" are also the *instrumenta traditionis*, and vary one with another in the evidence which they give in favour of particular doctrines; so that the strength of one makes up in a particular case for the deficiency of another, and the strength of the "*sensus communis fidelium*" can make up (*e.g.*) for the silence of the Fathers. "*Istiusmodi instrumenta interdum simul conjunctè conspirare possunt ad traditionem aliquam apostolicam atque divinam patefaciendam, interdum vero seorsum. . . Perperam nonnulli solent ad inficiandam traditionis alicujus existentiam urgere silentium Patrum . . . quid enim si silentium istud alio pacto . . . compensetur?*"⁴ (p. 139). He instances this from St. Irenæus and Tertullian in the "*Successio Episcoporum*," who transmit the doctrines "*tum activi operâ ministerii, tum usu et praxi, tum institutis ritibus . . . adeò ut catholica atque apostolica doctrina inoculata . . . fuerit . . . communi Ecclesiæ cœtui*"⁵ (p. 142).

(4.) He then goes on to speak directly of the force of the "*sensus fidelium*," as distinct (not separate) from the teaching of their pastors. "*Præstantissimi theologi maximam probandi vim huic communi sensui inesse uno ore faetentur. Etenim Canus, 'In quæstione fidei,' inquit, 'communis fidelis populi sensus haud levem facit fidem'*"⁶ (p. 143). He gives another passage from him in a note, which he introduces with the words, "*Illud præclare addit;*" what Canus adds is, "*Quæro ex te, quando de rebus Christianæ fidei inter nos contendimus, non de philosophiæ decretis, utrùm potius quærendum est, quid philosophi atque ethnici, an quid homines Christiani, et doctrinâ et fide instituti, sentiant?*"⁷

³ "The complete agreement of the "pastors" and the faithful shown in liturgies, feasts, prayer, controversies concerning the faith, and sermons."

⁴ "At times instruments of that kind can, when used jointly and sometimes even separately, make manifest some apostolic and divine tradition. . . . Some are wont wrongly to urge the silence of the Fathers in order to affect the existence of some tradition. . . . What if such a silence can be made up for in some other way?"

⁵ "Both by the work of the active ministry, by use and practice, as well as by instituted rites . . . such that the catholic and apostolic doctrine shall have been grafted on to the general body (of belief) of the Church."

⁶ "The most outstanding theologians unanimously confess that the strongest power of proof lies in this "general agreement". Moreover Canus, says, 'In a question of faith, the general agreement of the Faithful makes for a belief by no means light.'"

⁷ "I ask you, when we argue over matters of Christian faith, and not of philosophy, whether we must inquire what philosophers and ethnicians, or rather what Christian men, instructed in doctrine and faith, think?"

Now certainly "quærere quid sentiant homines doctrinâ et fide instituti," though not asking advice, is an act implying not a little deference on the part of the persons addressing towards the parties addressed.

Father Perrone continues, "Gregorius verò de Valentiâ fusius vim ejusmodi fidelium consensus evoluit. 'Est enim,' inquit, 'in definitionibus fidei habenda ratio, quoad fieri potest, consensus fidelium.'" ⁸ Here, again, "habere rationem," to have regard to, is an act of respect and consideration. However, Gregory continues, "Quoniam et ii sanè, quatenus ex ipsis constat Ecclesia, sic Spiritu Sancto assistente, divinas revelationes integrè et purè conservant, ut omnes illi quidem aberrare non possunt. . . . Illud solùm contendo: Si quando de re aliquâ in materie religionis controversia [controversâ?] constaret fidelium omnium esse sententiam (solet autem id constare, vel ex ipsâ praxi alicujus cultûs communiter apud christianos populos receptâ, vel ex scandalo et offensione communi, quæ opinione aliquâ oritur, &c.) meritò posse et debere Pontificem illâ niti, ut quæ esset Ecclesiæ sententia infallibilis" (p. 144). ⁹ Thus Gregory says that, in controversy about a matter of faith, the consent of all the faithful has such a force in the proof of this side or that, that the Supreme Pontiff is able and ought to rest upon it, as being the judgment or sentiment of the infallible Church. These are surely exceedingly strong words; not that I take them to mean strictly that infallibility is in the "consensus fidelium" but that that "consensus" is an *indicium* or *instrumentum* to us of the judgment of that Church which is infallible.

Father Perrone proceeds to quote from Petavius, who supplies us with the following striking admonition from St. Paulinus, viz., "ut de omnium fidelium ore pendeamus, quia in omnem fidelem Spiritus Dei spirat." ¹⁰

Petavius speaks thus, as he quotes him (p. 156): "*Movet me, ut in eam [viz., piam] sententiam sim propensior, communis maximus sensus fidelium omnium.*" ¹¹ By "movet me" he means, that he attends to what the *cætus fidelium* says: this is certainly not passing over the *fideles*, but making much of them.

⁸ "Gregory of Valencia developed more fully the force of this consensus or general agreement of the faithful. He says, 'In definitions of faith the general agreement of the faithful must be taken into account as much as possible.'"

⁹ "Since they also certainly, in that the Church is made up of them, and the Holy Spirit therefore with them, preserve revelations wholly and purely, so that all these cannot err. . . . I only maintain this: Whenever, in the case of a controversy concerning a matter of religion, it is clear that the opinion of all the faithful is in agreement (and this can be observed, either from the very practice of a particular devotion common to all Christian people, or from scandal or common offense taken by them at some opinion proposed) then rightly the Supreme Pontiff can and ought to rest upon it, as being the judgment or sentiment of the infallible Church."

¹⁰ "Let us pay attention to the judgment of all the faithful, because the spirit of God breathes into every faithful."

¹¹ "The common judgment of all the faithful inclines me more to that opinion."

In a later part of his work (p. 186), Father Perrone speaks of the "consensus fidelium" under the strong image of a *seal*. After mentioning various arguments in favour of the Immaculate Conception, such as the testimony of so many universities, religious bodies, theologians, &c., he continues, "*Hæc demum omnia firmissimo veluti sigillo obsignat totius christiani populi consensus.*"¹²

(5.) He proceeds to give several instances, in which the definition of doctrine was made in consequence of nothing else but the "sensus fidelium" and the "juge et vivum magisterium" of the Church.

For his meaning of the "juge et vivum magisterium Ecclesiæ," he refers us to his *Prælectiones* (part ii. § 2, c. ii.). In that passage I do not see that he defines the sense of the word; but I understand him to mean that high authoritative voice or act which is the Infallible Church's prerogative, inasmuch as she is the teacher of the nations; and which is a sufficient warrant to all men, for a doctrine being true and being *de fide*, by the mere fact of its formally occurring. It is distinct from, and independent of, tradition, though never in fact separated from it. He says, "*Fit ut traditio dogmatica identificetur cum ipsâ Ecclesiæ doctrinâ, a quâ separari nequit; qua propter, etsi documenta deficerent omnia, solum hoc vivum et juge magisterium satis esset ad cognoscendam doctrinam divinitus traditam, habito præsertim respectu ad solennes Christi promissiones*" (p. 303).¹³

This being understood, he speaks of several points of faith which have been determined and defined by the "magisterium" of the Church and, as to tradition, on the "consensus fidelium," prominently, if not solely.

The most remarkable of these is the "dogma de visione Dei beatificâ" possessed by souls after purgatory and before the day of judgment; a point which Protestants, availing themselves of the comment of the Benedictines of St. Maur upon St. Ambrose, are accustomed to urge in controversy. "Nemo est qui nesciat," says Father Perrone, "*quot utriusque Ecclesiæ, tum Græcæ tum Latinæ, Patres contrarium sensisse visi sunt*" (p. 147).¹⁴ He quotes in a note the words of the Benedictine editor, as follows: "*Propemodum incredibile videri potest, quàm in eâ quæstione sancti Patres ab ipsis Apostolorum temporibus ad Gregorii XI. [Benedicti XII.] pontificatum florentinumque concilium, hoc est toto quatuordecim seculorum spatio, incerti, ac parùm constantes exstiterint.*"¹⁵

¹² "The general agreement of all the Christian people as it were seals with a most strong seal all these things."

¹³ "It happens that dogmatic tradition may be identified with the very Doctrine of the Church, from which it cannot be separated; wherefore, although all documents may be lacking, this live and constant authoritative teaching alone would be enough to know the doctrine received from God, due consideration being given especially to the solemn promises of Christ."

¹⁴ "Everyone knows how many Fathers of both the Greek and Latin Churches seem to have felt the opposite."

¹⁵ "It seems almost unbelievable, how many holy Fathers from apostolic times to the Pontificate of Gregory XI [Benedict XII] and the Florentine Council, a total of fourteen centuries, were uncertain and wavering on this question."

Father Perrone continues: "Certè quidem in Ecclesiâ non deerat quoad hunc fidei articulum divina traditio; alioquin nunquam is definiri potuisset: verùm non omnibus illa erat comperta; divina eloquia haud satis in re sunt conspicua; *Patres*, ut vidimus, in varias abierunt sententias; *liturgiæ ipsæ* non modicam præ se ferunt difficultatem. *His omnibus succurrit* jure Ecclesiæ magisterium, *communis præterea fidelium sensus*; qui altè adeò defixum . . . habebant mentibus, purgatas animas statim ad Deum videndum eoque fruendum admitti, ut non minimum eorum animi vel ex ipsâ controversiâ fuerint *offensi*, quæ sub Joanne XXII. agitabatur, et cujus definitio *diu nimis protrahabatur*."¹⁶ Now does not this imply that the tradition, on which the definition was made, was manifested in the *consensus fidelium* with a luminousness which the succession of Bishops, though many of them were "Sancti Patres ab ipsis Apostolorum temporibus," did not furnish? that the definition was delayed till the *fideles* would bear the delay no longer? that it was made because of them and for their sake, because of their strong feelings? If so, surely, in plain English, most considerable deference was paid to the "sensus fidelium;" their opinion and advice indeed was not asked, but their testimony was taken, their feelings consulted, their impatience, I had almost said, feared.

In like manner, as regards the doctrine, though not the definition, of the Immaculate Conception, he says, not denying, of course, the availableness of the other "instrumenta traditionis" in this particular case, "Ratissimum est, Christi fideles omnes circa hunc articulum unius esse animi, idque ita, ut maximo afficerentur *scandalo*, si vel minima de Immaculatâ Virginis Conceptione quæstio moveretur" (p. 156).¹⁷

3. A year had hardly passed from the appearance of Fr. Perrone's book in England, when the Pope published his Encyclical Letter. In it he asked the Bishops of the Catholic world, "ut nobis significare velitis, quâ devotione vester clerus *populusque fidelis* erga Immaculatæ Virginis conceptionem sit animatus, et quo desiderio flagret, ut ejusmodi res ab apostolicâ decernatur;"¹⁸ that is, when it came to the point to take measures for the definition of the doctrine,

¹⁶ "Certainly, however, there was not lacking in the Church a divine tradition with respect to this article of faith; otherwise it could never have been defined; true, it was not clear to all; the divine statements in this case were hardly clear enough. The Fathers, as we saw, split up into various opinions. The liturgies themselves offered no small difficulty. To the aid of all these came the authoritative teaching of the Church, and in addition the general agreement of the faithful. The faithful were so deeply convinced that souls, once purified, were immediately admitted to enjoy the Beatific Vision, that many were offended by the very controversy, which was carried on under John XXII, and whose definition was delayed too long."

¹⁷ "It is most clear, that all the faithful of Christ are in complete agreement on this article, to such an extent that they would be greatly scandalized if the least question of the Immaculate Conception were to be brought up".

¹⁸ "Would you kindly indicate to us, with what devotion your clergy and faithful are animated toward the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin and how eagerly they desire a decree by the Holy See in this matter."

he did lay a special stress on this particular preliminary, viz. the ascertainment of the feeling of the faithful both towards the doctrine and its definition; as the *Rambler* stated in the passage out of which this argument has arisen. It seems to me important to keep this in view, whatever becomes of the word "consulted," which, I have already said, is not to be taken in its ordinary Latin sense.

4. At length, in 1854, the definition took place, and the Pope's Bull containing it made its appearance. In it the Holy Father speaks as he had spoken in his Encyclical, viz. that although he *already* knew the sentiments of the Bishops, still he had wished to know the sentiments of the *people* also: "*Quamvis nobis ex receptis postulationibus de definiendâ tandem aliquando Immaculatâ Virginis Conceptione perspectus esset plurimorum sociorum Antistitum sensus, tamen Encyclicas literas, &c. ad omnes Ven. FF. totius Catholici orbis sacrorum Antistites misimus, ut, adhibitis ad Deum precibus, nobis scripto etiam significarent, quæ esset suorum fidelium erga Immaculatam Deiparæ Conceptionem pietas et devotio,*" &c.¹⁹ And when, before the formal definition, he enumerates the various witnesses to the apostolicity of the doctrine, he sets down "*divina eloquia, veneranda traditio, perpetuus Ecclesiæ sensus, singularis catholicorum Antistitum ac fidelium conspiratio.*"²⁰ *Conspiratio*; the two, the Church teaching and the Church taught, are put together, as one twofold testimony, illustrating each other, and never to be divided.

5. A year or two passed, and the Bishop of Birmingham published his treatise on the doctrine. I close this portion of my paper with an extract from his careful view of the argument. "Nor should the universal conviction of pious Catholics be passed over, as of small account in the general argument; for that pious belief, and the devotion which springs from it, are the *faithful reflection* of the pastoral teaching" (p. 172). Reflection; that is, the people are a *mirror*, in which the Bishops see themselves. Well, I suppose a person may *consult* his glass, and in that way may know things about himself which he can learn in no other way. This is what Fr. Perrone above seems to say has sometimes actually been the case, as in the instance of the "beatifica visio" of the saints; at least he does not mention the "*pastorum ac fidelium conspiratio*" in reviewing the grounds of its definition, but simply the "juge Ecclesiæ magisterium" and the "communis fidelium sensus."

His lordship proceeds: "The more devout the faithful grew, the more devoted they showed themselves towards this mystery. And it is the devout who have the surest instinct in discerning the mysteries of which the Holy Spirit breathes the grace through the Church, and who, with as sure a tact, reject

¹⁹ "Although we already know from requests received your sentiments regarding the definition finally of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, nevertheless we have sent encyclical letters etc, to all the Venerable Brethren, the Bishops of the whole Catholic world, that, after due recourse to prayer, they may also make known to us in writing, the piety and devotion of their faithful toward the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God."

²⁰ "The divine statements, venerable tradition, the unbroken sentiment of the Church, the outstanding agreement of Catholic Bishops and Faithful."

what is alien from her teaching. The common accord of the faithful has weighed much as an argument even with the most learned divines. St. Augustine says, that amongst many things which most justly held him in the bosom of the Catholic Church, was the 'accord of populations and of nations.' In another work he says, 'It seems that I have believed nothing but the confirmed opinion and the exceedingly wide-spread report of populations and of nations.' Elsewhere he says: 'In matters whereupon the Scripture has not spoken clearly, the custom of the people of God, or the institutions of our predecessors, are to be held as law.' In the same spirit St. Jerome argues, whilst defending the use of relics against Vigilantius: 'So the people of all the Churches who have gone out to meet holy relics, and have received them with so much joy, are to be accounted foolish' " (pp. 172, 173).

And here I might come to an end; but, having got so far, I am induced, before concluding, to suggest an historical instance of the same great principle, which Father Perrone does not draw out.

FIRST, I will set down the various ways in which theologians put before us the bearing of the Consent of the faithful upon the manifestation of the tradition of the Church. Its *consensus* is to be regarded: 1. as a testimony of the apostolical dogma; 2. as a sort of instinct, or *φρόνημα*, deep in the bosom of the mystical body of Christ; 3. as a direction of the Holy Ghost; 4. as an answer to its prayer; 5. as a jealousy of error, which it at once feels as a scandal.

1. The first of these I need not enlarge upon, as it is illustrated in the foregoing passages from Father Perrone.

2. The second is explained in the well-known passages of Möhler's *Symbolique*; e.g. "L'esprit de Dieu, qui gouverne et vivifie l'Eglise, enfante dans l'homme, en s'unissant à lui, *un instinct*, un tact éminemment chrétien, qui le conduit à toute vraie doctrine. . . . Ce sentiment commun, cette conscience de l'Eglise est la tradition dans le sens subjectif du mot. Qu'est-ce donc que la tradition considérée sous ce point de vue? C'est le sens chrétien existant dans l'Eglise, et transmis par l'Eglise; sens, toutefois, qu'on ne peut séparer des vérités qu'il contient, puisqu'il est formé de ces vérités et par ces vérités." Ap. Perrone, p. 142.

3. Cardinal Fisher seems to speak of the third, as he is quoted by Petavius, *De Incarn.* xiv. 2; that is, he speaks of a custom imperceptibly gaining a position, "*nullâ præceptorum vi, sed consensu quodam tacito tam populi quàm cleri, quasi tacitis omnium suffragiis recepta fuit, priusquàm ullo conciliorum decreto legimus eam fuisse firmatam.*" And then he adds, "This custom has its birth in that people which is ruled by the Holy Ghost," &c.

4. Petavius speaks of a fourth aspect of it. "It is well said by St. Augustine, that to the minds of individuals certain things are revealed by God, not only by extraordinary means, as in visions, &c., but also in those usual ways, according to which what is unknown to them is opened in answer to their prayer. After this manner it is to be believed that God has revealed to Christians the sinless Conception of the Immaculate Virgin." *De Incarn.* xiv. 2, 11.

5. The fifth is enlarged upon in Dr. Newman's second *Lecture on Anglican Difficulties*, from which I quote a few lines: "We know that it is the property of life to be impatient of any foreign substance in the body to which it belongs. It will be sovereign in its own domain, and it conflicts with what it cannot assimilate into itself, and is irritated and disordered till it has expelled it. Such expulsion, then, is emphatically a test of uncongeniality, for it shows that the substance ejected, not only is not one with the body that rejects it, but cannot be made one with it; that its introduction is not only useless, or superfluous, or adventitious, but that it is intolerable." Presently he continues: "The religious life of a people is of a certain quality and direction, and these are tested by the mode in which it encounters the various opinions, customs, and institutions which are submitted to it. Drive a stake into a river's bed, and you will at once ascertain which way it is running, and at what speed; throw up even a straw upon the air, and you will see which way the wind blows; submit your heretical and Catholic principle to the action of the multitude, and you will be able to pronounce at once whether it is imbued with Catholic truth or with heretical falsehood." And then he proceeds to exemplify this by a passage in the history of Arianism, the very history which I intend now to take, as illustrative of the truth and importance of the thesis on which I am insisting.

It is not a little remarkable, that, though, historically speaking, the fourth century is the age of doctors, illustrated, as it was, by the saints Athanasius, Hilary, the two Gregories, Basil, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, and all of these saints bishops also, except one, nevertheless in that very day the divine tradition committed to the infallible Church was proclaimed and maintained far more by the faithful than by the Episcopate.

Here, of course, I must explain:—in saying this, then, undoubtedly I am not denying that the great body of the Bishops were in their internal belief orthodox; nor that there were numbers of clergy who stood by the laity, and acted as their centres and guides; nor that the laity actually received their faith, in the first instance, from the Bishops and clergy; nor that some portions of the laity were ignorant, and other portions at length corrupted by the Arian teachers, who got possession of the sees and ordained an heretical clergy;—but I mean still, that in that time of immense confusion the divine dogma of our Lord's divinity was proclaimed, enforced, maintained, and (humanly speaking) preserved, far more by the "*Ecclesia docta*" than by the "*Ecclesia docens*;" that the body of the episcopate was unfaithful to its commission, while the body of the laity was faithful to its baptism; that at one time the Pope, at other times the patriarchal, metropolitan, and other great sees, at other times general councils, said what they should not have said, or did what obscured and compromised revealed truth; while, on the other hand, it was the Christian people who, under Providence, were the ecclesiastical strength of Athanasius, Hilary, Eusebius of Vercellæ, and other great solitary confessors, who would have failed without them.

I see, then, in the Arian history a palmary example of a state of the Church, during which, in order to know the tradition of the Apostles, we must have recourse to the faithful; for I fairly own, that if I go to writers, since I must adjust the letter of Justin, Clement, and Hippolytus with the Nicene Doctors,

I get confused; and what revives and re-instates me, as far as history goes, is the faith of the people. For I argue that, unless they had been catechised, as St. Hilary says, in the orthodox faith from the time of their baptism, they never could have had that horror, which they show, of the heterodox Arian doctrine. Their voice, then, is the voice of tradition; and the instance comes to us with still greater emphasis, when we consider—1. that it occurs in the very beginning of the history of the "*Ecclesia docens*," for there can scarcely be said to be any history of her teaching till the age of martyrs was over; 2. that the doctrine in controversy was so momentous, being the very foundation of the Christian system; 3. that the state of controversy and disorder lasted over the long space of sixty years; and 4. that it involved serious persecutions, in life, limb, and property, to the faithful whose loyal perseverance decided it.

It seems, then, as striking an instance as I could take in fulfilment of Father Perrone's statement, that the voice of tradition may in certain cases express itself, not by Councils, nor Fathers, nor Bishops, but the "*communis fidelium sensus*."

I shall set down some authorities for the two points successively, which I have to enforce, viz. that the Nicene dogma was maintained during the greater part of the 4th century.

1. not by the unswerving firmness of the Holy See, Councils, or Bishops, but
2. by the "*consensus fidelium*."

On the one hand, then, I say, that there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the "*Ecclesia docens*." The body of Bishops failed in their confession of the faith. They spoke variously, one against another; there was nothing, after Nicæa, of firm, unvarying, consistent testimony, for nearly sixty years. There were untrustworthy Councils, unfaithful Bishops; there was weakness, fear of consequences, misguidance, delusion, hallucination, endless, hopeless, extending itself into nearly every corner of the Catholic Church. The comparatively few who remained faithful were discredited and driven into exile; the rest were either deceivers or were deceived.

1. A.D. 325. The great council of Nicæa, of 318 Bishops, chiefly from the eastern provinces of Christendom, under the presidency of Hosius of Cordova, as the Pope's Legate. It was convoked against Arianism, which it once for all anathematized; and it inserted the formula of the "*Consubstantial*" into the Creed, with the view of establishing the fundamental dogma which Arianism impugned. It is the first Œcumenical Council, and recognised at the time its own authority as the voice of the infallible Church. It is so received by the *orbis terrarum* at this day. The history of the Arian controversy, from its date, A.D. 325, to the date of the second Œcumenical Council, A.D. 381, is the history of the struggle through Christendom for the universal acceptance or the repudiation of the formula of the "*Consubstantiali*."

2. A.D. 334, 335. The synods of Cæsarea and Tyre against Athanasius, who was therein accused and formally condemned of rebellion, sedition, and ecclesiastical tyranny; of murder, sacrilege, and magic; deposed from his see, forbidden to set foot in Alexandria for life, and banished to Gaul. Constantine confirmed the sentence.

3. A.D. 341. Council of Rome of fifty Bishops, attended by the exiles from Thrace, Syria, &c., by Athanasius, &c., in which Athanasius was pronounced innocent.

4. A.D. 341. Great Council of the Dedication at Antioch, attended by ninety or a hundred Bishops. The council ratified the proceedings of the councils of Cæsarea and Tyre, and placed an Arian in the see of Athanasius. Then it proceeded to pass a dogmatic decree in reversal of the formula of the "Consubstantial." Four or five creeds, instead of the Nicenè, were successively adopted by the assembled fathers. The first was a creed which they ascribed to Lucian, a martyr and saint of the preceding century, in whom the Arians always gloried as their master. The second was fuller and stronger in its language, and made more pretension to orthodoxy. The third was more feeble again. These three creeds were circulated in the neighborhood; but, as they wished to send one to Rome, they directed a fourth to be drawn up. This, too, apparently failed. So little was known at the time of the real history of this synod and its creeds, that St. Hilary calls it "sanctorum synodus."

5. A.D. 345. Council of the creed called Macrostich. This creed suppresses, as did the third, the word "substance." The eastern Bishops sent this to the Bishops of the West, who rejected it.

6. A.D. 347. The great council of Sardica, attended by 380 Bishops. Before it commenced, the division between its members broke out on the question whether or not Athanasius should have a seat in it. In consequence, seventy-six retired to Philippopolis, on the Thracian side of Mount Hæmus, and there excommunicated the Pope and the Sardican fathers. These seceders published a sixth confession of faith. The synod of Sardica, including Bishops from Italy, Gaul, Africa, Egypt, Cyprus, and Palestine, confirmed the act of the Roman council, and restored Athanasius and the other exiles to their sees. The synod of Philippopolis, on the contrary, sent letters to the civil magistrates of those cities, forbidding them to admit the exiles into them. The imperial power took part with the Sardican fathers, and Athanasius went back to Alexandria.

7. A.D. 351. Before many years had run out, the great eastern party was up again. Under pretence of putting down a kind of Sabellianism, they drew up a new creed, into which they introduced certain inadvisable expressions of some of the ante-Nicene writers, on the subject of our Lord's divinity, and dropped the word "substance." St. Hilary thought this creed also Catholic; and other Catholic writers style its fathers "holy Bishops."

8. There is considerable confusion of dates here. Anyhow, there was a second Sirmian creed, in which the eastern parts first came to a division among themselves. St. Hilary at length gives up these creeds as indefensible, and calls this one a "blasphemy." It is the first creed which criticises the words "substance," &c., as unscriptural. Some years afterwards this "blasphemia" seems to have been interpolated, and sent into the East in the name of Hosius. At a later date, there was a third Sirmian creed; and a second edition of it, with alterations, was published at Nice in Thrace.

9. A.D. 353. The council of Arles. I cannot find how many Bishops attended it. As the Pope sent several Bishops as legates, it must have been one of great importance. The Bishop of Arles was an Arian, and managed to seduce, or to

force, a number of orthodox Bishops, including the Pope's legate, Vincent, to subscribe the condemnation of Athanasius. Paulinus, Bishop of Trèves, was nearly the only champion of the Nicene faith and of Athanasius. He was accordingly banished into Phrygia, where he died.

10. A.D. 355. The council of Milan, of more than 300 Bishops of the West. Nearly all of them subscribed the condemnation of Athanasius; whether they generally subscribed the heretical creed, which was brought forward, does not appear. The Pope's four legates remained firm, and St. Dionysius of Milan, who died an exile in Asia Minor. An Arian was put into his see. Saturninus, the Bishop of Arles, proceeded to hold a council at Beziers; and its fathers banished St. Hilary to Phrygia.

11. A.D. 357. Hosius falls. "Constantius used such violence towards the old man, and confined him so straitly, that at last, broken by suffering, he was brought, though hardly, to hold communion with Valens and Ursacius [the Arian leaders], though he would not subscribe against Athanasius." *Athan. Arian. Hist.* 45.

12. Liberius. A.D. 357. "The tragedy was not ended in the lapse of Hosius, but in the evil which befell Liberius, the Roman Pontiff, it became far more dreadful and mournful, considering that he was Bishop of so great a city, and of the whole Catholic Church, and that he had so bravely resisted Constantine two years previously. There is nothing, whether in the historians and holy fathers, or in his own letters, to prevent our coming to the conclusion, that Liberius communicated with the Arians, and confirmed the sentence passed against Athanasius; but he is not at all on that account to be called a heretic." *Baron. Ann.* 357, 40-45. Athanasius says: "Liberius, after he had been in banishment two years, gave way, and from fear of threatened death was induced to subscribe." *Arian. Hist.* § 41. St. Jerome says: "Liberius, tædio victus exillii, in hæreticam pravitatem subscribens, Romam quasi victor intravit." *Chron.*

13. A.D. 359. The great councils of Seleucia and Ariminum, being one bipartite council, representing the East and West respectively. At Seleucia there were 150 Bishops, of which only the twelve or thirteen from Egypt were champions of the Nicene "Consubstantial." At Ariminum there were as many as 400 Bishops, who, worn out by the artifice of long delay on the part of the Arians, abandoned the "Consubstantial," and subscribed the ambiguous formula which the heretics had substituted for it.

14. A.D. 361. The death of Constantius; the Catholic Bishops breathe again, and begin at once to remedy the miseries of the Church, though troubles were soon to break out anew.

15. A.D. 362. State of the Church of Antioch at this time. There were four Bishops or communions of Antioch; first, the old succession and communion, which had possession before the Arian troubles; secondly, the Arian succession which had lately conformed to orthodoxy in the person of Meletius; thirdly, the new Latin succession, lately created by Lucifer, whom some have thought the Pope's legate there; and, fourthly, the new Arian succession, which was begun upon the recantation of Meletius. At length, as Arianism was brought under, the evil reduced itself to two successions, that of Meletius and the Latin, which

went on for many years, the West and Egypt holding communion with the latter, and the East with the former.

16. A.D. 370-379. St. Basil was Bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia through these years. The judgments formed about this great doctor in his lifetime show us vividly the extreme confusion which prevailed. He was accused by one party of being a follower of Apollinaris, and lost in consequence some of the sees over which he was metropolitan. He was accused by the monks in his friend Gregory's diocese of favouring the semi-Arians. He was accused by the Neocæsareans of inclining towards Arianism. And he was treated with suspicion and coldness by Pope Damasus.

17. About A.D. 360, St. Hilary says: "I am not speaking of things foreign to my knowledge; I am not writing about what I am ignorant of; I have heard and I have seen the shortcomings of persons who are present to me, not of laymen merely, but of Bishops. For, excepting the Bishop Eleusius and a few with him, for the most part the ten Asian provinces, within whose boundaries I am situate, are truly ignorant of God." It is observable, that even Eleusius, who is here spoken of as somewhat better than the rest, was a semi-Arian, according to Socrates, and even a persecutor of Catholics at Constantinople; and, according to Sozomen, one of those who urged Pope Liberius to give up the Nicene formula of the "Consubstantial." By the ten Asian provinces is meant the east and south provinces of Asia Minor, pretty nearly as cut off by a line passing from Cyzicus to Seleucia through Synnada.

18. A.D. 360. St. Gregory Nazianzen says, about this date: "Surely the pastors have done foolishly; for, excepting a very few, who, either on account of their insignificance were passed over, or who by reason of their virtue resisted, and who were to be left as a seed and root for the springing up again and revival of Israel by the influences of the Spirit, all temporised, only differing from each other in this, that some succumbed earlier, and others later; some were foremost champions and leaders in the impiety, and others joined the second rank of the battle, being overcome by fear, or by interest, or by flattery, or, what was the most excusable, by their own ignorance." *Orat.* xxi. 24.

19. A.D. 363. About this time, St. Jerome says: "Nearly all the churches in the whole world, under the pretence of peace and the emperor, are polluted with the communion of the Arians." *Chron.* Of the same date, that is, upon the council of Ariminum, are his famous words, "Ingemuit totus orbis et se esse Arianum miratus est." *In Lucif.* That is, the Catholics of Christendom were surprised indeed to find that their rulers had made Arians of them.

20. A.D. 364. And St. Hilary: "Up to this date, the only cause why Christ's people is not murdered by the priests of Antichrist, with this deceit of impiety, is, that they take the words, which the heretics use, to denote the faith which they themselves hold. Sanctiores aures plebis quàm corda sunt sacerdotum." *In Aux.* 6.

21. St. Hilary speaks of the series of ecclesiastical councils of that time in the following well-known passage: "It is most dangerous to us, and it is lamentable, that there are at present as many creeds as there are sentiments, and as many doctrines among us as dispositions, while we write creeds and explain them according to our fancy. Since the Nicene council, we have done nothing but

write the creed. While we fight about words, inquire about novelties, take advantage of ambiguities, criticise authors, fight on party questions, have difficulties in agreeing, and prepare to anathematise each other, there is scarce a man who belongs to Christ. Take, for instance, last year's creed, what alteration is there not in it already? First, we have the creed, which bids us not to use the Nicene 'consubstantial;' then comes another, which decrees and preaches it; next, the third, excuses the word 'substance,' as adopted by the fathers in their simplicity; lastly, the fourth, instead of excusing, condemns. We impose creeds by the year or by the month, we change our minds about our own imposition of them, then we prohibit our changes, then we anathematise our prohibitions. Thus, we either condemn others in our own persons, or ourselves in the instance of others, and while we bite and devour one another, are like to be consumed one of another."

22. A.D. 382. St. Gregory writes: "If I must speak the truth, I feel disposed to shun every conference of Bishops; for never saw I synod brought to a happy issue, and remedying, and not rather aggravating, existing evils. For rivalry and ambition are stronger than reason,—do not think me extravagant for saying so,—and a mediator is more likely to incur some imputation himself than to clear up the imputations which others lie under." *Ep.* 129. It must ever be kept in mind that a passage like this only relates, and is here quoted as only relating, to that miserable time of which it is spoken. Nothing more can be argued from it than that the "*Ecclesia docens*" is not at every time the active instrument of the Church's infallibility.

Now we come secondly to the proofs of the fidelity of the laity, and the effectiveness of that fidelity, during that domination of imperial heresy to which the foregoing passages have related. I have abridged the extracts which follow, but not, I hope, to the injury of their sense.

1. ALEXANDRIA. "We suppose," says Athanasius, "you are not ignorant what outrages they [the Arian Bishops] committed at Alexandria, for they are reported every where. They attacked the *holy virgins and brethren* with naked swords; they beat with scourges their persons, esteemed honourable in God's sight, so that their feet were lamed by the stripes, whose souls were whole and sound in purity and all good works." Athan. *Op. c. Arian.* 15, Oxf. tr.

"Accordingly Constantius writes letters, and commences a *persecution against all*. Gathering together a multitude of herdsmen and shepherds, and dissolute youths belonging to the town, armed with swords and clubs, they attacked in a body the *Church of Quirinus*: and *some* they slew, *some* they trampled under foot, *others* they beat with stripes and cast into prison or banished. They haled away many *women* also, and dragged them openly into the court, and insulted them, dragging them by the hair. *Some* they proscribed; from *some* they took away their bread, for no other reason but that they might be induced to join the Arians, and receive Gregory [the Arian Bishop], who had been sent by the Emperor." Athan. *Hist. Arian.* § 10.

"On the week that succeeded the holy Pentecost, when the *people*, after their fast, had gone out to the cemetery to pray, because that *all* refused communion with George [the Arian Bishop], the commander, Sebastian, straight-

way with a multitude of soldiers proceeded to *attack the people*, though it was the Lord's day; and finding a few praying, (for the greater part had already retired on account of the lateness of the hour,) having lighted a pile, he placed certain *virgins* near the fire, and endeavoured to force them to say that they were of the Arian faith. And having seized on *forty men*, he cut some fresh twigs of the palm-tree, with the thorns upon them, and scourged them on the back so severely that some of them were for a long time under medical treatment, on account of the thorns which had entered their flesh, and others, unable to bear up under their sufferings, died. All those whom they had taken, both the men and the virgins, they sent away into banishment to the great oasis. Moreover, they immediately banished out of Egypt and Libya the following Bishops [sixteen], and the presbyters, Hierax and Dioscorus: some of them died on the way, others in the place of their banishment. They caused also more than thirty Bishops to take to flight." *Apol. de Fug.* 7.

2. EGYPT. "The Emperor Valens having issued an edict commanding that the orthodox should be expelled both from Alexandria and the rest of Egypt, *depopulation and ruin to an immense extent immediately followed*; some were dragged before the tribunals, others cast into prison, and many tortured in various ways; all sorts of punishment being inflicted upon persons who aimed only at peace and quiet." *Socr. Hist.* iv. 24, Bohn.

3. THE MONKS OF EGYPT. "*Anthony left the solitude* of the desert to go about every part of the city [Alexandria], warning the inhabitants that the Arians were opposing the truth, and that the doctrines of the Apostles were preached only by Athanasius." *Theod. Hist.* iv. 27, Bohn.

"Lucius, the Arian, with a considerable body of troops, proceeded to the *monasteries* of Egypt, where he in person assailed the assemblage of holy men with greater fury than the ruthless soldiery. When these excellent persons remained unmoved by all the violence, in despair he advised the military chief to send the fathers of the monks, the Egyptian Macarius and his namesake of Alexandria, into exile." *Socr.* iv. 24.

OF CONSTANTINOPLE. "*Isaac*, on seeing the emperor depart at the head of his army, exclaimed, 'You who have declared war against God cannot gain His aid. Cease from fighting against Him, and He will terminate the war. Restore the pastors to their flocks, and then you will obtain a bloodless victory.'" *Ibid.* 34.

OF SYRIA, &c. "That these heretical doctrines [Apollinarian and Eunomian] did not finally become predominant is *mainly to be attributed to the zeal of the monks* of this period; for *all the monks* of Syria, Cappadocia, and the neighbouring provinces *were sincerely attached to the Nicene faith*. The same fate awaited them which had been experienced by the Arians; for they incurred the full weight of the popular odium and aversion, when it was observed that their sentiments were regarded with suspicion by the monks." *Sozom. Hist.* vii. 27, Bohn.

OF CAPPADOCIA. "Gregory, the father of Gregory Theologus, otherwise a most excellent man and a zealous defender of the true and Catholic religion, not being on his guard against the artifices of the Arians, such was his simplicity, received with kindness certain men who were contaminated with the poison,

and subscribed an impious proposition of theirs. This moved the monks to such indignation, that they *withdrew forthwith from his communion*, and took with them, after their example, a *considerable part of his flock.*" Ed. Bened. Monit. in Greg. Naz. Orat. 6.

4. SYRIA. "Syria and the neighbouring provinces were plunged into confusion and disorder, for the Arians were very numerous in these parts, and had possession of the churches. The members of the Catholic Church *were not, however, few in numbers.* It was through their instrumentality that the Church of Antioch was preserved from the encroachments of the Arians, and enabled to resist the power of Valens. Indeed, it appears that all the Churches which were governed by men who were firmly attached to the faith did not deviate from the form of doctrine which they had originally embraced." Sozom. vi. 21.

5. ANTIOCH. "Whereas he (the Bishop Leontius) took part in the blasphemy of Arius, he made a point of concealing this disease, partly *for fear of the multitude*, partly for the menaces of Constantius; so those who followed the apostolical dogmas gained from him neither patronage nor ordination, but those who held Arianism were allowed the fullest liberty of speech, and were placed in the ranks of the sacred ministry. But Flavian and Diodorus, who had embraced the ascetical life, and maintained the apostolical dogmas, *openly withstood* Leontius's machinations against religious doctrine. They threatened that they would retire from the communion of his Church, and would go to the West, and reveal his intrigues. Though they were not as yet in the sacred ministry, but were *in the ranks of the laity*, night and day they used to excite all the people to zeal for religion. They were the first to divide the singers into two choirs, and to teach them to sing alternately the strains of David. They too, assembling the devout at the shrines of the martyrs, passed the whole night there in hymns to God. These things Leontius seeing, did not think it safe to hinder them, for he saw that *the multitude was especially well affected* towards those excellent persons. Nothing, however, could persuade Leontius to correct his wickedness. It follows, that among the clergy were many who were infected with the heresy: but *the mass of the people were champions of orthodoxy.*" Theodor. Hist. ii. 24.

6. EDESSA. "There is in that city a magnificent church, dedicated to St. Thomas the Apostle, wherein, on account of the sanctity of the place, religious assemblies are continually held. The Emperor Valens wished to inspect this edifice; when, having learned that *all who usually congregated there were opposed to the heresy* which he favoured, he is said to have struck the prefect with his own hand, because he had neglected to expel them thence. The prefect, to prevent the slaughter of *so great a number* of persons, privately warned them against resorting thither. But his admonitions and menaces were alike unheeded; for on the following day *they all crowded to the church.* When the prefect was going towards it with a large military force, a poor woman, leading her own little child by the hand, hurried hastily by on her way to the church, breaking through the ranks of the soldiery. The prefect, irritated at this, ordered her to be brought to him, and thus addressed her: 'Wretched woman, whither are you running in so disorderly a manner?' She replied, 'To the same place that others are hastening.' 'Have you not heard,' said he, 'that the prefect is about to put to

death all that shall be found there?' 'Yes,' said the woman, 'and therefore I hasten, that I may be found there.' 'And whither are you dragging that little child?' said the prefect. The woman answered, '*That he also may be vouchsafed the honour of martyrdom.*' The prefect went back and informed the emperor that *all were ready to die in behalf of their own faith*; and added that it would be preposterous to destroy so many persons at one time, and thus succeeded in restraining the emperor's wrath." Socr. iv. 18. "Thus was the Christian faith confessed by the *whole city of Edessa.*" Sozom. vi. 18.

7. SAMOSATA. "The Arians, having deprived this exemplary flock of their shepherd, elected in his place an individual with whom *none of the inhabitants of the city*, whether poor or rich, servants or mechanics, husbandmen or gardeners, men or women, young or old, would hold communion. *He was left quite alone*; no one even calling to see him, or exchanging a word with him. It is, however, said that his disposition was extremely gentle; and this is proved by what I am about to relate. One day, when he went to bathe in the public baths, the attendants closed the doors; but he ordered the doors to be thrown open, that the people might be admitted to bathe with himself. Perceiving that they remained in a standing posture before him, imagining that great deference towards himself was the cause of this conduct, he arose and left the bath. *These people believed that the water had been contaminated by his heresy*, and ordered it to be let out and fresh water to be supplied. When he heard of this circumstance, he left the city, thinking that he ought no longer to remain in a place where he was the object of public aversion and hatred. Upon this retirement of Eunonius, Lucius was elected as his successor by the Arians. Some young persons were amusing themselves with playing at ball in the market-place; Lucius was passing by at the time, and the ball happened to fall beneath the feet of the ass on which he was mounted. *The youths uttered loud exclamations, believing that the ball was contaminated.* They lighted a fire, and hurled the ball through it, believing that by this process the ball would be purified. Although this was only a childish deed, and although it exhibits the remains of ancient superstition, yet it is sufficient to show the odium which the Arian faction had incurred in this city. Lucius was far from imitating the mildness of Eunonius, and he persuaded the heads of government to exile most of the clergy." Theodor. iv. 15.

8. OSROENE. "Arianism met with similar opposition at the same period in Osroëne and Cappadocia. Basil Bishop of Cæsarea, and Gregory Bishop of Nazianzus, were held in high admiration and esteem throughout these regions." Sozom. vi. 21.

9. CAPPADOCIA. "Valens, in passing through Cappadocia, did all in his power to injure the orthodox, and to deliver up the churches to the Arians. He thought to accomplish his designs more easily on account of a dispute which was then pending between Basil and Eusebius, who governed the Church of Cæsarea. This dissension had been the cause of Basil's departing to Pontus. *The people, and some of the most powerful and wisest men of the city*, began to regard Eusebius with suspicion, and to meditate a secession from his communion. The emperor and the Arian Bishops regarded the absence of Basil, and the hatred of the people towards Eusebius, as circumstances that would

tend greatly to the success of their designs. *But their expectations were utterly frustrated.* On the first intelligence of the intention of the emperor to pass through Cappadocia, Basil returned to Cæsarea, where he effected a reconciliation with Eusebius. The projects of Valens were thus defeated, and he returned with his Bishops." Sozom. vi. 19.

10. PONTUS. "It is said that when Eulalius, Bishop of Amasia in Pontus, returned from exile, he found that his Church had passed into the hands of an Arian, and that *scarcely fifty inhabitants of the city* had submitted to the control of their new Bishop." Sozom. vii. 2.

11. ARMENIA. "That company of Arians who came with Eustathius to Nicopolis had promised that they would bring over this city to compliance with the commands of the imperial vicar. This city had great ecclesiastical importance, both because it was the metropolis of Armenia, and because it had been ennobled by the blood of martyrs, and governed hitherto by Bishops of great reputation, and thus, as Basil calls it, was the nurse of religion and the metropolis of sound doctrine. Fronto, one of the city presbyters, who had hitherto shown himself as a champion of the truth, through ambition gave himself up to the enemies of Christ, and purchased the bishopric of the Arians at the price of renouncing the Catholic faith. This wicked proceeding of Eustathius and the Arians brought a new glory instead of evil to the Nicopolitans, since it gave them an opportunity of defending the faith. Fronto, indeed, the Arians consecrated, *but there was a remarkable unanimity of clergy and people in rejecting him.* Scarcely one or two clerks sided with him; on the contrary, he became the execration of all Armenia." *Vita S. Basil. Maurin.* pp. clvii. clviii.

12. NICOMEDIA. "Eighty pious clergy proceeded to Nicomedia, and there presented to the emperor a supplicatory petition complaining of the ill-usage to which they had been subjected. Valens, dissembling his displeasure in their presence, gave Modestus, the prefect, a secret order to apprehend these persons and put them to death. The prefect, *fearing that he should excite the populace to a seditious movement against himself,* if he attempted the public execution of so many, pretended to send them away into exile," &c. Socr. iv. 16.

13. ASIA MINOR. St. Basil says, about the year 372: "Religious people keep silence, but every blaspheming tongue is let loose. Sacred things are profaned; *those of the laity who are sound in faith avoid the places of worship* as schools of impiety, and raise their hands in solitude, with groans and tears, to the Lord in heaven." *Ex.* 93. Four years after he writes: "Matters have come to this pass; *the people have left their houses of prayer,* and assemble in deserts: a pitiable sight; *women and children, old men, and others infirm,* wretchedly faring in the open air, amid the most profuse rains and snow-storms, and winds, and frost of winter; and again in summer under a scorching sun. To this they submit, because *they will have no part in the wicked Arian leaven.*" *Ep.* 342. Again: "Only one offence is now vigorously punished, an accurate observance of our fathers' traditions. For this cause the pious are driven from their countries, and transported into deserts. *The people are in lamentation,* in continual tears at home and abroad. There is a cry in the city, a cry in the country, in the roads, in the deserts. Joy and spiritual cheerfulness are no more; our feasts are turned into

mourning; our houses of prayer are shut up, our altars deprived of the spiritual worship." *Ep.* 343.

14. SCYTHIA. "There are in this country a great number of cities, of towns, and of fortresses. According to an ancient custom which still prevails, all the churches of the whole country are under the sway of one Bishop. Valens [the emperor] repaired to the church, and strove to gain over the Bishop to the heresy of Arius; but this latter manfully opposed his arguments, and, after a courageous defence of the Nicene doctrines, quitted the emperor, and proceeded to another church, *whither he was followed by the people. Valens was extremely offended at being left alone in a church with his attendants, and, in resentment, condemned Vetrano [the Bishop] to banishment. Not long after, however, he recalled him, because, I believe, he apprehended an insurrection.*" Sozom. vi. 21.

15. CONSTANTINOPLE. "Those who acknowledged the doctrine of consubstantiality were not only expelled from the churches, but also from the cities. But although expulsion at first satisfied them [the Arians], they soon proceeded to the worse extremity of inducing compulsory communion with them, caring little for such a desecration of the churches. They resorted to all kinds of scourgings, a variety of tortures, and confiscation of property. Many were punished with exile, some died under the torture, and others were put to death while being driven from their country. *These atrocities were exercised throughout all the eastern cities, but especially at Constantinople.*" Socr. ii. 27.

The following passage is quoted for the substantial fact which it contains, viz. the testimony of popular tradition to the Catholic doctrine: "At this period a union was nearly effected between the Novatian and Catholic Churches; for, as they both *held the same sentiments concerning the Divinity*, and were subjected to a common persecution, the members of both Churches assembled and prayed together. The Catholics then possessed no houses of prayer, for the Arians had wrested them from them." Sozom. iv. 20.

16. ILLYRIA. "The parents of Theodosius were Christians, and were attached to the Nicene doctrine, hence he took pleasure in the ministration of Ascholius [Bishop of Thessalonica]. He also rejoiced at finding that the *Arian heresy had not been received in Illyria.*" Sozom. vii. 4.

17. NEIGHBOURHOOD OF MACEDONIA. "Theodosius inquired concerning the religious sentiments which were prevalent in the other provinces, and ascertained that, as far as Macedonia, *one form of belief was universally predominant,*" &c. Ibid.

18. ROME. "With respect to doctrine no dissension arose either at Rome or in any other of the Western Churches. *The people unanimously adhered to the form of belief established at Nicæa.*" Sozom. vi. 23.

"Not long after, Liberius (the Pope) was recalled and re-instated in his see; for the people of Rome, *having raised a sedition, and expelled Felix* [whom the Arian party had intruded] from their Church, Constantius deemed it *inexpedient to provoke the popular fury.*" Socr. ii. 37.

"Liberius, returning to Rome, found the *mind of the mass of men alienated from him*, because he had so shamefully yielded to Constantius. And thus it came to pass, that those persons who had hitherto kept aloof from Felix [the rival Pope], and had avoided his communion in favour of Liberius, on hearing

what had happened, *left him for Felix*, who raised the Catholic standard. Among others, Damasus [afterwards Pope] took the side of Felix. Such had been, even from the times of the Apostles, *the love of Catholic discipline in the Roman people.*" Baron. ann. 357. He tells us besides, that the people would not even go to the public baths, lest they should bathe with the party of Liberius.

19. MILAN. "At the council of Milan, Eusebius of Vercellæ, when it was proposed to draw up a declaration against Athanasius, said that the council ought first to be sure of the faith of the Bishops attending it, for he had found out that some of them were polluted with heresy. Accordingly he brought before the Fathers the Nicene creed, and said he was willing to comply with all their demands, after they had subscribed that confession. Dionysius, Bishop of Milan, at once took up the paper and began to write his assent; but Valens [the Arian] violently pulled pen and paper out of his hands, crying out that such a course of proceeding was impossible. Whereupon, after much tumult, *the question came before the people, and great was the distress of all of them; the faith of the Church was impugned by the Bishops. They then, dreading the judgment of the people,* transfer their meeting from the church to the imperial palace." Hilar. in Const. i.

"As the feast of Easter approached, the empress sent to St. Ambrose to ask a church of him, where the Arians who attended her might meet together. He replied, that a Bishop could not give up the temple of God. The pretorian prefect came into the church, where St. Ambrose was, *attended by the people*, and endeavoured to persuade him to yield up at least the Portian Basilica. *The people were clamorous against the proposal;* and the prefect retired to report how matters stood to the emperor. The Sunday following, St. Ambrose was explaining the creed, when he was informed that the officers were hanging up the imperial hangings in the Portian Basilica, and that upon this news the people were repairing thither. While he was offering up the holy sacrifice, a second message came that *the people had seized an Arian priest* as he was passing through the street. He despatched a number of his clergy to the spot to *rescue the Arian from his danger.* The court looked on this resistance of the people as seditious, and immediately laid considerable fines upon *the whole body of the tradesmen* of the city. Several were thrown into prison. In three days' time these tradesmen were fined two hundred pounds weight of gold, and they said *that they were ready to give as much again, on condition that they might retain their faith.* The prisons were filled with tradesmen: *all the officers of the household, secretaries, agents of the emperor, and dependent officers who served under various counts,* were kept within doors, and were forbidden to appear in public under pretence that they should bear no part in the sedition. *Men of higher rank were menaced with severe consequences,* unless the Basilica were surrendered. . . .

"Next morning the Basilica was surrounded by soldiers; but it was reported, that *these soldiers had sent to the emperor to tell him that if he wished to come abroad he might, and that they would attend him, if he was going to the assembly of the Catholics; otherwise, that they would go to that which would be held by St. Ambrose.* Indeed, the soldiers were all Catholics, as well as the citizens of Milan; there were no heretics there, except a few officers of the emperor and some Goths. . . .

"St. Ambrose was continuing his discourse when he was told that the emperor had withdrawn the soldiers from the Basilica, and that he had restored to the tradesmen the fines which he had exacted from them. *This news gives joy to the people*, who expressed their delight with applauses and thanksgivings; *the soldiers themselves were eager to bring the news*, throwing themselves on the altars, and kissing them in token of peace." Fleury's *Hist.* xviii. 41, 42, Oxf. trans.

20. THE SOLDIERY. Soldiers having been mentioned in the foregoing extract, I add the following passage. "Terentius, a general distinguished by his valour and by his piety, was able, on his return from Armenia, to erect trophies of victory. Valens promised to give him every thing that he might desire. But he asked not for gold or silver, for lands, power, or honours; *he requested that a church might be given to those who preached the apostolical doctrines.*" Theodor. iv. 32.

"Valens sent Trajan, the general, against the barbarians. Trajan was defeated, and, on his return, the emperor reproached him severely, and accused him of weakness and cowardice. But Trajan replied with great boldness, 'It is not I, O emperor, who have been defeated; for you, *by fighting against God, have thrown the barbarians upon His protection.* Do you not know who those are whom you have driven from the churches, and who are those to whom you have given them up?' Arintheus and Victor, the other commanders, *accorded in what he had said*, and brought the emperor to reflect on the truth of their remonstrances." Ibid. 33.

21. CHRISTENDOM GENERALLY. St. Hilary to Constantius: "Not only in words, but in tears, we beseech you to save the Catholic Churches from any longer continuance of these most grievous injuries, and of their present intolerable persecutions and insults, which moreover they are enduring, which is monstrous, from our brethren. Surely your clemency should listen to the *voice of those who cry out so loudly*, 'I am a Catholic, I have no wish to be a heretic.' It should seem equitable to your sanctity, most glorious Augustus, that they who fear the Lord God and His judgment should not be polluted and contaminated with execrable blasphemies, but *should have liberty to follow those Bishops and prelates* who observe inviolate the laws of charity, and who desire a perpetual and sincere peace. It is impossible, it is unreasonable, to mix true and false, to confuse light and darkness, and bring into a union, of whatever kind, night and day. *Give permission to the populations to hear the teaching of the pastors whom they have wished*, whom they fixed on, whom they have chosen, to attend their celebration of the divine mysteries, to offer prayers through them for your safety and prosperity." *In Const.* i.

NOW I know quite well what will be said to so elaborate a collection of instances as I have been making. The "lector benevolus" will quote against me the words of Cicero, "*Utitur in re non dubiâ testibus non necessariis.*" This is sure to befall a man when he directs the attention of a friend to any truth which hitherto he has thought little of. At first, he seems to be hazarding a paradox, and at length to be committing a truism. The bearer is first of all startled, and then disappointed; he ends by asking, "Is this all?" It is a curious pheno-

menon in the philosophy of the human mind, that we often do not know whether we hold a point or not, though we hold it; but when our attention is once drawn to it, then forthwith we find it so much part of ourselves, that we cannot recollect when we began to hold it, and we conclude (with truth), and we declare, that it has always been our belief. Now it strikes me as worth noticing, that, though Father Perrone is so clear upon the point of doctrine which I have been urging in 1847, yet in 1842, which is the date of my own copy of his *Praelectiones*, he has not given the *consensus fidelium* any distinct place in his *Loci Theologici*, though he has even given "heretici" a place there. Among the *Media Traditionis*, he enumerates the *magisterium* of the Church, the Acts of the Martyrs, the Liturgy, usages and rites of worship, the Fathers, heretics, Church history; but not a word, that I can find, directly and separately, about the *sensus fidelium*. This is the more remarkable, because, speaking of the *Acta Martyrum*, he gives a reason for the force of the testimony of the martyrs which belongs quite as fully to the faithful generally; viz. that, as not being theologians, they can only repeat that objective truth, which, on the other hand, Fathers and theologians do but present subjectively, and thereby coloured with their own mental peculiarities. "We learn from them," he says, "what was the traditionary doctrine in both domestic and public assemblies of the Church, without any admixture of private and (so to say) subjective explanation, such as at times creates a difficulty in ascertaining the real meaning of the Fathers; and so much the more, because many of them were either women or ordinary and untaught laymen, who brought out and avowed just what they believed in a straightforward inartificial way." May we not conjecture that the argument from the Consent of the Faithful was but dimly written among the *Loci* on the tablets of his intellect, till the necessities, or rather the requirements, of the contemplated definition of the Immaculate Conception brought the argument before him with great force? Yet who will therefore for an instant suppose that he did not always hold it? Perhaps I have overlooked some passages of his treatises, and am in consequence interpreting his course of thought wrongly; but, at any rate, what I seem to see in him, is what actually does occur from time to time in myself and others. A man holds an opinion or a truth, yet without holding it with a simple consciousness and a direct recognition; and thus, though he has never denied, he has never gone so far as to profess it.

As to the particular doctrine to which I have here been directing my view, and the passage in history by which I have been illustrating it, I am not supposing that such times as the Arian will ever come again. As to the present, certainly, if there ever was an age which might dispense with the testimony of the faithful, and leave the maintenance of the truth to the pastors of the Church, it is the age in which we live. Never was the Episcopate of Christendom so devoted to the Holy See, so religious, so earnest in the discharge of its special duties, so little disposed to innovate, so superior to the temptation of theological sophistry. And perhaps this is the reason why the "*consensus fidelium*" has, in the minds of many, fallen into the background. Yet each constituent portion of the Church has its proper functions, and no portion can safely be neglected. Though the laity be but the reflection or echo of the clergy in matters of faith, yet there is something in the "*pastorum et fidelium conspiratio*," which is not

in the pastors alone. The history of the definition of the Immaculate Conception shows us this; and it will be one among the blessings which the Holy Mother, who is the subject of it, will gain for us, in repayment of the definition, that by that very definition we are all reminded of the part which the laity have had in the preliminaries of its promulgation. Pope Pius has given us a pattern, in his manner of defining, of the duty of considering the sentiments of the laity upon a point of tradition, in spite of whatever fullness of evidence the Bishops have already thrown upon it.

In most cases when a definition is contemplated, the laity will have a testimony to give; but if ever there be an instance when they ought to be consulted, it is in the case of doctrines which bear directly upon devotional sentiments. Such is the Immaculate Conception, of which the *Rambler* was speaking in the sentence which has occasioned these remarks. The faithful people have ever a special function in regard to those doctrinal truths which relate to the Objects of worship. Hence it is, that, while the Councils of the fourth century were traitors to our Lord's divinity, the laity vehemently protested against its impugnors. Hence it is, that, in a later age, when the learned Benedictines of Germany and France were perplexed in their enunciation of the doctrine of the Real Presence, Paschasius was supported by the faithful in his maintenance of it. The saints, again, are the object of a religious *cultus*; and therefore it was the faithful, again, who urged on the Holy See, in the time of John XXII., to declare their beatitude in heaven, though so many Fathers spoke variously. And the blessed Virgin is preëminently an object of devotion; and therefore it is, I repeat, that though Bishops had already spoken in favour of her absolute sinlessness, the Pope was not content without knowing the feelings of the faithful.

Father Dalgairns gives us another case in point; and with his words I conclude: "While devotion in the shape of a dogma issues from the high places of the Church, in the shape of devotion . . . it starts from below. . . . Place yourselves, in imagination, in a vast city of the East in the fifth century. Ephesus, the capital of Asia Minor, is all in commotion; for a council is to be held there, and Bishops are flocking in from all parts of the world. There is anxiety painted on every face; so that you may easily see that the question is one of general interest. . . . Ask the very children in the streets what is the matter; they will tell you that wicked men are coming to make out that their own mother is not the Mother of God. And so, during a livelong day of June, they crowd around the gates of the old cathedral-church of St. Mary, and watch with anxious faces each Bishop as he goes in. Well might they be anxious; for it is well known that Nestorius has won the court over to his side. It was only the other day that he entered the town, with banners displayed and trumpets sounding, surrounded by the glittering files of the emperor's body-guard, with Count Candidianus, their general and his own partisan, at their head. Besides which, it is known for certain, that at least eighty-four Bishops are ready to vote with him; and who knows how many more? He is himself the patriarch of Constantinople, the rival of Rome, the imperial city of the East; and then John of Antioch is hourly expected with his quota of votes; and he, the patriarch of the see next in influence to that of Nestorius, is, if not a heretic, at least of that wretched party

which, in ecclesiastical disputes, ever hovers between the two camps of the devil and of God. The day wears on, and still nothing issues from the church; it proves, at least, that there is a difference of opinion; and as the shades of evening close around them, the weary watchers grow more anxious still. At length the great gates of the Basilica are thrown open; and oh, what a cry of joy bursts from the assembled crowd, as it is announced to them that Mary has been proclaimed to be, what every one with a Catholic heart knew that she was before, the Mother of God! . . . Men, women, and children, the noble and the low-born, the stately matron and the modest maiden, all crowd round the Bishops with acclamations. They will not leave them; they accompany them to their homes with a long procession of lighted torches, to do them honour. There was but little sleep in Ephesus that night; for very joy they remained awake: the whole town was one blaze of light, for each window was illuminated."*

MY OWN drift is somewhat different from that which has dictated this glowing description; but the substance of the argument of each of us is one and the same. I think certainly that the *Ecclesia docens* is more happy when she has such enthusiastic partisans about her as are here represented, than when she cuts off the faithful from the study of her divine doctrines and the sympathy of her divine contemplations, and requires from them a *fides implicita* in her word, which in the educated classes will terminate in indifference, and in the poorer in superstition.

* Sacred Heart.

NOTES on other Publications

THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

1.

World politics. Raymond Aron, highly-respected political writer for *LE FIGARO*, contributed an article entitled, "Can we negotiate a settlement now?" to the *JUNE COMMENTARY*. In it he criticizes *ESPRIT*'s attempt to formulate a policy of coexistence between Russia and the U.S., feeling it is based on the following untenable assumptions: "that both the great powers are equally responsible for the present world situation; that both are equally undesirous of a war, but that each, if left to its own designs, natural impulses, or fears, is equally likely to end up by unleashing one; and that the countries in the middle should therefore do the two brainless giants the favor of keeping them apart." Aron emphasizes that Russia fears America alone, not France and Great Britain; a demonstration of western Europe's omnipotence would only increase their vulnerability, and even a future possibility of European *armed* neutrality would necessitate submission to German hegemony. Aron underlines the dubious prospects of successful negotiations except in very limited areas, but he is unable to offer any more positive counsels than the readiness for continuance of the "cold" war in a manly spirit of stoicism.

2.

The publication of Aneurin Bevan's *In Place of Fear* (Simon & Schuster) has provoked a lively and hostile reaction from most British Catholic publications. After noting that the Catholic press in England is generally considerably more inclined towards conservatism than the rank-and-file Catholic voter, *LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE* (June) presents a documentation on this subject, citing declarations by Bishop Heenan, Douglas Hyde, Christopher Hollis, and Michael de la Bedoyere, attacking Bevan's "neo-Marxism" and sympathies for Tito. Such critics appear to ignore distinctions between Marxism and Stalinism; they seemed to regret the weakening of the Methodist current in British Socialism, but did not raise the question of whether it met the demands of either the British public or the realities of present-day political and economic problems. On the other hand, those Catholic representatives of the Labor party in Parliament who wrote in protest against these criticisms, stating their confidence in Bevan's "idealism," did not answer the difficulties involved in a situation in which the capital and wealth of a country would be totally in the hands of a group of politicians free to use it as they thought best, and who might be able to grasp totalitarian powers despite the trappings of constitutional government. The admiration of the *BRITISH CATHOLIC WORKER* for Bevan's moral courage in opposing a policy of large-scale rearmament as a matter of conscience, rather than cede to the pressures making for "party unity," indicates that at least emotional sympathy for Bevan's position is wide-spread.

3.

The editor of *LE MONDE*, Hubert Beuve-Méry, perhaps the most respected and experienced political commentator who has been associated with the vague stereotype of opinions which have been given the label "neutralism," has published his *Réflexions politiques, 1932-1952* (Editions "Le Monde"). F. Perroux praises the book warmly, but without great clarity of presentation in *LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE* (July). He rightly emphasizes that the present political orientation of Beuve-Méry cannot be dissociated from the evolution of political events in Europe since the end of World War I, and especially outside the context of a France without a truly national purpose since the days of Munich. Perroux feels that the stigma of neutralism (if it is to be used as a term of opprobrium) ought to fall on that sector of opinion which allows France to be pushed into one decision after another under the pressure of events, without the nation ever having taken a genuine option in any specific political direction.

4.

Also noted. Douglas Parmée's article in the March *CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL* is a good introduction to the work of Georg Sorel. The June number contains a critical appraisal of the late John Dewey's views on education (by G. H. Bantock), and an account of the situation of Catholic education in France (by P. Mansell-Jones); Robert Montagne's "The modern state in Africa and Asia" is in the July issue. "Christian Ethics and the Welfare State" is a balanced statement on this subject by Canon V. A. Demant (*THE FRONTIER*, July).

5.

Church and State. Douglas Woodruff has edited Lord Acton's *Essays on Church and State*; the introduction by the editor (which was published separately in the *DUBLIN REVIEW*, 1952, no. 1) is a worth-while essay on the relations of the laity and hierarchy within a specific historical context. Woodruff gives the background of Newman's brief editorship of *THE RAMBLER* (and of the article reprinted in this issue of *CROSS CURRENTS*)—the situation might be summed up by saying that Newman was brought to give up his position as editor because he wished to defend the rights of the laity—and Acton's later difficulties in the same post. . . . The Spring *THOUGHT* contains an anthology of the writings of Father John Courtney Murray on the subject of Church and State. . . . In order to recognize that Spanish opinion is divided in its approach to the subject of religious liberty, the debate may be followed in *RAZON Y FE* (June), where an attack is made by Guerrero not only against Maritain, but also his compatriot J. B. Manyà, and in *DOCUMENTOS* (no. 10), containing the reply of Manyà.

6.

Literature. In "Appunti per una storia di Max Jacob" (*HUMANITAS*, January) Elvira Cassa Salvi traces the artistic development of this bizarre poet and mystic, from an early bohemian life in Paris to death in a concentration camp. Jacob refused to submit his creative insight to conventional patterns of imagery

and versification, and strove to express his artistic and religious experience in a strange dialectic, marked by the free interplay of sharply opposing perspectives. In the March issue Salvi comments on Gide's last writings, *Ainsi soit-il* and *Nunc manet in te*, stressing the contradictory character of his dialectic, precariously suspended on the negative and forever uncommitted. She points to its self-destruction, not by virtue of an appeal to moral principles which Gide himself would reject, but "by virtue of the intrinsic human insufficiency of his thought, his incapacity to overcome an abstractly critical position, and the eternal circle of his own rhetoric of freedom and sincerity." Yet we must not deny, Salvi continues, "the critical value of Gide's message, his power of forcing the individual back to his roots, to the fundamental and inexhaustible dilemma of human morality, nor his power as a stimulant to a continuous revision of one's own values. . . ." Wallace Fowlie studies "Gide's earliest quest: *Les nouvelles Terrestres*" in *ESSAYS IN CRITICISM* (July).

7.

THOUGHT continues its series of useful bibliographical articles on modern writers with surveys of criticism to date of Graham Greene (by William Birmingham, Spring issue) and François Mauriac (by F. Vial, Summer issue). The Spring issue also contains an article on comedy by W. H. Auden, and on a section of the *Divine Comedy*, by Francis Fergusson; the Summer issue presents a study of Claudel by Henri Peyre. The July *ESSAYS IN CRITICISM* includes "A new interpretation of *The Waste Land*" by John Peter, and Alfred Adler's "In what sense can poetic meaning be verified?". The July *CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL* includes an enthusiastic appraisal of the novels of C. S. Lewis by Wayland Hilton-Young.

8.

Among the recent novels the most interesting seem to be *The Invisible Man*, by Ralph Ellison (Random House); *Look Down in Mercy*, by Walter Baxter (Putnam); *Heaven and Earth* by Carlo Coccioli (Prentice-Hall); and *Epitaph of a Small Winner* by Machado de Assis (Noonday Press). Ellison's hero is a Negro who emerges from successive disillusionments with hypocritical paternalism and fanatical Communism to discover his own identity, and vindicate the discovery of this unique existence against a world which has yet seen only his exterior, forcing him to be "the invisible man." Although uneven, it is powerfully written, and has received an enthusiastic reception, even being called an American Negro transcription of Dostoyevsky's *Notes from the Underground*. . . . Baxter is extremely successful in creating the terror and hardship of the British infantry retreat through Burma during the last war. With this accompanying action, he is able, without sensationalism, to strip his chief character of his illusions about himself to the point of discovering that he is shot through with cowardice and susceptible to homosexuality. Despite its pathos, the book is less moving than might be expected; perhaps because the whole burden of the case rests predominantly on the ordeal—there is insufficient illumination of the patient, the unique person who suffers. . . . Coccioli's priest-hero will undoubtedly summon up comparisons with Bernanos' charac-

ters. Many of the same preoccupations recur: a strong sense of the presence of Satan in the world, the mystery of poverty, a keen awareness of the failure of Christendom to believe what it professes. Although the book has been well received and widely discussed in both Protestant and Catholic groups in Europe, the comparison with Bernanos is not to Coccioli's advantage: he does not appear to have the French novelist's sureness and delicacy in indicating the reality of the supernatural, nor his rich symbolism flowing, as if inevitably, from the narrator's interior voice. . . . *Epitaph of a Small Winner* is the first work to appear in English of a writer considered to be the greatest Brazil has produced. The narrator is a highly ironic and sometimes profound ghost, who relates his memoirs with the detachment of the grave, and is able to distil a universal pessimism from his leisurely account of minor intrigues in love and politics. His concluding line: "upon arrival on this other side of the mystery, I found that I had a small surplus. . . . I had no progeny, I transmitted to no one the legacy of our misery." . . . Mary McCarthy's *The Groves of Academe* (Harcourt Brace) is an amusingly acid satire on the difficulties of a professionally "liberal" academic institution at the mercy of a self-created martyr to anti-Communism. . . . New Directions has brought out a translation of Stendhal's *Lamiel* . . . Bernanos' dialogue for the movie version (*Dialogue des Carmelites*) of Gertrude von Le Fort's *Song at the Scaffold* has been published in England by The Bodley Head as *The Fearless Heart*.

9.

Donat O'Donnell has published *Maria Cross* (Oxford), a study of "imaginative patterns in a group of modern Catholic Writers"—C Claudel, Mauriac, Bloy, Péguy, Waugh, Greene, Bernanos, and O'Faoláin. He finds "the most striking common feature of all the patterns is a sense of exile," (although Claudel at least "is an exile who is not unmanned by the homesickness he feels") from both the "modern" and the "rational" in the world, as well as from childhood. Although O'Donnell's book is helpful in furnishing ammunition against those who would interpret Maritain's counsel "to purify the source" in an overly-simplified manner, and underlines the inevitable ambiguity of the term "Catholic imagination" in the relation of erotic passion and the cross in the work of Mauriac and Claudel, there are often examples of strain, pressing his valid insights past their applicability in an effort to discover further "levels" before the literal meaning has been assimilated.

10.

The Yale University Press has begun the publication of a series of "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought" which deserves a wide welcome. Thus far four volumes have appeared: *Baudelaire*, by P. Mansell Jones; *Paul Valéry*, by Elizabeth Sewell; *Rainer Maria Rilke*, by Hans Egon Holthusen; and *Benedetto Croce*, by Cecil Sprigge. They are brief studies, unencumbered by detail, and manage to present a single total impression of their subjects. The editor, Erich Heller, must be congratulated for his part in achieving an over-all tone of well-informed urbanity and sensitivity; previous critical writing on the subjects of these essays seems to have been digested with an

awareness of an intellectual tradition, and translated into readable prose. Mansell Jones does a fine job of documenting his view that Baudelaire and his poetry were, at bottom, Christian; Elizabeth Sewell constructs an ingenious parallel between Paul Valéry and Lewis Carroll as poets who loved to play with mathematics and mirrors. Arguing from a Christian viewpoint, Hans Holthusen finds Rilke's poetry deficient in the drama of human personality, history and death, but later he recognizes that in his own way Rilke has given as much to the religious sensibility as any poet of our time. Cecil Sprigge examines the doctrines of liberal humanism preached by Croce, reminding us of the work of a contemporary without whom Modern Italian thought cannot be understood, who is superficially considered "passé" in America where he has never been widely or deeply read.

11.

Science. D. Dubarle's article on the progress of science in the December *ESPRIT* is extremely suggestive. There is a difficulty due to the fact that the author sometimes mixes the levels of discourse in his attempt to discuss the religious-theological overtones of the positive sciences (for the purposes of which no adequate vocabulary has been yet established) . . . François Russo furnishes a valuable commentary on the doctrinaire Marxist response to the recent papal discourse to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. (*ETUDES*, June).

12.

Sociology. The acute dialectic tension of our time, torn between history and the metahistorical, sociology and religion, is the central theme of a suggestive essay by the sociologist Marchello, "Ideologica e valore nello storicismo" (*HUMANITAS*, April). A critical analysis of Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge serves as a framework for a discussion of the theoretical presuppositions of a sociology open to the possibility of the transcendental and of a spiritualistic philosophy disposed to engage itself in history: the influence of Sturzo's "historical sociology" is evident.



PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

1.

N. O. Lossky's *History of Russian Philosophy* is the work of a philosopher, and not a professor of philosophy; we should therefore be grateful for the meditation and speculative genius that has produced this fine work on a neglected and sadly under-estimated field of thought. Some critics have found fault with Lossky's methodology and have accused him of magnifying the importance of religious experience in Russian culture, neglecting her positivistic-naturalistic tradition. This judgment seems one-sided and inaccurate, since the profound in-

sight of Russian philosophy lies in its attempt at a total, all-embracing expression of the manifold levels of experience. While no single phase of being is valid so long as it is disconnected from all the others, no level of meaning, howsoever partial, is ever omitted from the final and total synthesis. Lossky's own words are explicit: "The whole truth is only revealed to the whole man," said Kireyevsky and Khomiakov. It is only through combining all his spiritual powers—sense experience, rational thought, aesthetic perception, moral experience, and religious contemplation—that man begins to apprehend the world's true being and grasp the supra-rational truths about God. It is precisely such integral experience that underlies the creative work of many Russian thinkers."

2.

Phenomenology. Perhaps Father Oesterreicher's chapter on Husserl in his *Walls are Crumbling* will encourage American thinkers to make some comparative studies between Husserl's thought and other philosophies. A splendid example in this direction is provided by Max Müller, one of the leading German Catholic students of phenomenology and existentialism. In the Dutch review *TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PHILOSOFIE* (March) he contributes an article on "Phenomenology, Ontology, and Scholasticism." Müller singles out three aspects of Husserl's thought that can fruitfully be compared with the realistic metaphysics of the Scholastics: the feeling that philosophy ought to break clean with the modern epistemologies and start off afresh; the stress upon the internationality of thought, in which our mind is directed essentially to objects other than itself; the process of transcendence of thought in the direction of being. Müller criticizes Husserl mainly for not making it clear that the being which is known intentionally is not a mere form of thought. Realists will still have to work with the data provided by Husserl and go beyond his own conclusions.

Francis Jeanson, already known as the author of a good study of Sartre as moralist, has written a rapid, clear and reliable account of phenomenology (*La Phenomenologie*, Tequi, Paris) as the method behind the speculations of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (there are only a few notes on Husserl). This French development of phenomenology stresses the social aspects of the method, its application to the attitudes of the different social classes. Because every individual member of a social class must exert a definite act, in adopting the standpoint of the class, determinism is an incomplete philosophy of history.

2.

Freedom. Yves Simon, although Chicago University Press published his *Philosophy of Democratic Government* last year, continues to write lucid books in French, such as *Traité du libre arbitre* (Liège, 1951). This treatise on free choice is a rational analysis of one of the basic tenets upon which democratic government rests. Simon refutes three common misconceptions concerning free choice: that the free act is an uncaused act; that freedom is essentially irrational and opposed to reason; that the free act is in no way connected with naturally necessary tendencies. Modern approaches to freedom, from Descartes to Bergson, are examined for their worth.

3.

"*Situation-Ethics*." Josef Fuchs presents (in the German Jesuit review, *SCHOLASTIK*, v. 27, 19) a sympathetic account of the theological problems involved in this conception of the requirements of God's will, distinguishing between the philosophical and theological issues at stake. Philosophically, the problem concerns the relation between the universal moral law and the particular act of the individual. The existentialists have brought out some of the agonizing difficulties of fitting individual conduct to universal moral precepts. Theologically, the issue revolves around the way in which we can know God's sovereign will, precisely as a direction for concrete action in the here-and-now. Fuchs takes most of his references from Emil Brunner's *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* and tries to give a Catholic estimate of the problems raised in that book.

4.

Hegel. B. Welte gives a detailed exposition of Hegel's concept of religion (*SCHOLASTIK*, v. 27, 1952) and asks whether Hegel has eliminated the ambiguity concerning the relation between the concrete, individual man and the Absolute. Moreover, a distinction is possible between the reality of the Absolute and the idea of God. Is this idea one with the necessary and absolute being, or is it merely a projection of human consciousness? On this issue, Hegel and Feuerbach stand divided. Perhaps the alternative is not an exhaustive one. A theist would admit that the idea we have is a perfection of the human mind (although the reality to which it refers is no mere projection of our mind) and that there is no identity between the human and divine minds.

J. Moller's *Der Geist und das Absolute* (Paderborn, Schöningh, 1951) bears as its sub-title: "Toward the Foundation of a Philosophy of Religion, in Reference to Hegel's Thought." Moller follows the pioneer views of Marechal and Rahner, in attempting to take as full account of Hegel's philosophy of religion as is possible, without becoming involved in a dialectical absolutism. To many French and German theists, Hegel's defense of spiritual values and the religious outlook is a valuable effort, which ought to be appropriated today. One must be cautious about appraising this rapprochement, not only because of the problems it raises concerning the meaning of Hegel's system, but also because of the criticisms of Hegel made by Feuerbach and Marx.

5.

Existentialism. Two noteworthy studies on this subject may be added: Luigi Stefanini's *Esistenzialismo ateo esistenzialismo teistico* (Padua, Cedam, 1952) and Jean Wahl's *La Pensée de l'existence* (Paris, Flammarion, 1951). Wahl's book, which confines itself to a re-appraisal of Kierkegaard and Jaspers, will be especially welcome to all those who have hoped that Wahl would put into manageable form the vast erudition displayed in his important *Etudes Kierkegaardiennes* (written just before World War II). Perhaps even more important will be the publication of his series of Sorbonne lectures on Heidegger's newest trends of thought, as aids in understanding the latter's attitude toward metaphysics and truth.

6.

Mounier. Mounier's name was invoked in a context of topical interest in an acute commentary on Whittaker Chambers' *Witness* (Random House) by Philip Rahv (PARTISAN REVIEW, July-August). Dissatisfied with the way that Chambers had allowed his search for an absolute to bring him to link up his religious position with a reactionary political order, Rahv gives Mounier as an example of a religious thinker who managed to preserve an independence of judgment in the political sphere. Rahv is attracted by Mounier's Christianity, but is forced to admit that he has seen no other example of Christians able to make these genuine distinctions in practice, and refrain from employing *a priori* decisions established in terms of their absolute values. (The book of Mounier he is discussing is *Personalism*, a translation of *Le Personalisme*, originally published in the *Que sais-je* series by Presses Universitaires, and now issued in English by the Grove Press. The other Mounier title available in English, *Be not Afraid*, is a translation of *La petite peur du XXe siècle* and *Liberté sous conditions*, and was brought out by an English publisher, Rock-cliff.)

7.

Social Ethics (Herder). This large volume by J. Messner is perhaps the most comprehensive work on social philosophy available in English. He first deals, in *The Foundation* of Book I, with the nature of man, the nature of society, the order of society, and the social question. Considering man to be the ultimate constituent of all social existence, he approaches the task of answering the question, What is man?, by outlining the various psychological replies and several schools of naturalist thought; it soon becomes clear that his definition will resemble that offered by metaphysical and Christian psychology. After exploring the impulses of human nature he is led to an analysis of the concept of moral law, and defines morality as "the correspondence of human conduct with the end designed in the impulses which characterize human nature" (p. 20).

His discussion of society as a person, in which he speaks of the collective responsibility of the members of the society, and a section on the common good, are especially interesting. In general Messner shows a fine grasp of contemporary social problems in his attempt to construct what might be termed a modern Scholastic approach to a theory of social reform. However, he is not always able to free his thinking from attitudes characteristic of certain classes in European society at the beginning of this century. This is particularly noticeable in his section on colonies, mandates and trusteeships (Book II, part 4, section 112, p. 454), and in the alarming ease with which he discusses the "only measures defensible before the forum of justice for limiting a virtually privileged position of the Jews in economic and cultural life" (Book II, part 3, section 92, p. 382).

8.

The Parish and the World. Several recent publications have appeared which consider the general problems of the apostolate from the perspective of the parish. Abbe G. Michonneau's *The Missionary Spirit in Parish Life* (Newman)

is in many ways a continuation and clarification of his earlier (but still invaluable) *Revolution in a City Parish*. The book is primarily addressed to priests, and while guarding against the terrors of extremists and novelty-hunters, constantly endeavors to prepare the kind of priestly spirituality needed in a modern parish which would be inspired by this missionary spirit. Bishop John Heenan's *The People's Priest* (Sheed and Ward) contains many wise counsels to prepare the experienced priest who may have become overwhelmed by his routine for a serious examination of conscience. One is struck, however, by the absence of a sense of confidence in the layman, or helpful counsel to aid priests to give the laity a greater sense of their vocation in the Church. The most crucial difference between this book and that of Father Michonneau is precisely the absence of the missionary spirit. The latter's insistence that the Church is in a state of mission everywhere, not excepting the "practicing" parishes, has not yet been understood. In this connection the review article by C. B. Daly in *THE FURROW* (May) on Father Michonneau's first book is extremely revealing. Daly makes many sensible distinctions and points up obvious differences between the situation in France and the one in Ireland, but he does not feel the importance of the criticisms made in the chapter, "The Clink of Money Round the Altar," and his over-all attitude might easily be interpreted as a benevolent clericalism.

Newman has also brought out *THE AMERICAN APOSTOLATE*, edited by Father Leo C. Ward, C.S.C., stressing the positive accomplishments of American Catholics in the 20th century. There is a wealth of background information here on the growth of the liturgical movement, various forms of specialized Catholic Action, attempts to instill a social sense in an increasingly-middle-class Church, the Catholic Worker, Friendship House, the C.Y.O., the situation of the press and the schools, etc. Since the different chapters are written by those engaged in the particular work, there is perhaps insufficient self-criticism, but the feeling that tremendous work remains to be done is everywhere evident.

9.

Also noted. The *REVUE D'HISTOIRE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE* (no. 2, 1952) contains J. D. Benoit's "Le protestantisme de Pascal," and "La methode theologique de Grotius" by R. Voeltzel. . . . Regis Jolivet has published an original and personal meditation on the delicate problem of sincerity, *Essai sur le problème et les conditions de la sincérité* (E. Vitte, Paris). Sincerity is experience as "a mode of existing," as the very act by which the whole person commits himself and espouses values. It is neither an introspective nor reflective datum: it is an act of lived, not analyzed, experience, and is achieved in silence, through recollection and communion with the Absolute. . . . Students of Blondel's philosophy will be glad to know of the bibliographical study of R. Crippa in the November-December 1951 issue of *GIORNALE DI METAFISICA*. . . . The *SUPPLEMENT DE LA VIE SPIRITUELLE* (no. 20, February) devotes a special issue to lay spirituality, including articles by Yves Congar, Jean Guitton, and Dr. Jouvonnoux; this represents a further stage in the discussion begun in that journal's November 1950 issue. . . . The May issue of the *SUPPLEMENT* contains A. Leonard's "Simone Weil et l'appartenance invisible à l'Eglise."

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